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Two modified Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) 
Block IV interceptors are launched from 
the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie 
(CG 70) during a Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) test to intercept a short-range 
ballistic-missile target, conducted on the 
Pacific Missile Range Facility, west of 
Hawaii, in 2008. The SM-2 forms part of 
the Aegis ballistic-missile defense (BMD) 
program. In “A Double-Edged Sword: 
Ballistic-Missile Defense and U.S. Alli-
ances,” Robert C. Watts IV explores the 
impact of BMD on America’s relationship 
with NATO, Japan, and South Korea, 
finding that the forward-deployed BMD 
capability that the Navy’s Aegis destroyers 
provide has served as an important 
cement to these beneficial alliance 
relationships.
Source: U.S. Navy photo, by the MDA
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FROM THE EDITORS
The tendency of professional military discourse in the United States to embrace 
buzzwords and jargon is remarked often; less so is the negative impact this phe-
nomenon can have on the way American civilian and military elites actually 
wage war� Occasionally a senior officer sufficiently loses patience with the use 
of a certain term or concept to denounce it publicly, but in general the problem 
seems to be shrugged off� But in “Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid 
War—Two Failures of American Strategic Thinking,” Donald Stoker and Craig 
Whiteside make a vigorous case for expunging the pervasive terms gray zone and 
hybrid war from the vocabulary of contemporary military analysis� They argue, 
first, that the supposedly novel phenomena in question are not new at all; and 
second, that the failure to distinguish in the traditional way between war and 
peace creates unnecessary confusion and could have very undesirable conse-
quences in practice� Donald Stoker was formerly, and Craig Whiteside is cur-
rently, a professor at the Naval War College’s program at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California�
It is not widely appreciated that ballistic-missile defense (BMD) has been for 
some years a key mission of the U�S� Navy� Since the 1960s, BMD also has been an 
unusual focus of political controversy, both domestically and in terms of the con-
cerns of some allied governments that it would undermine the deterrent effect 
of offensive nuclear forces� In “A Double-Edged Sword: Ballistic-Missile Defense 
and U�S� Alliances,” Robert C� Watts IV explores the impact of BMD on America’s 
relationship with NATO, Japan, and South Korea in the light of the evolving 
character of BMD as a collaborative alliance project, as opposed to an essentially 
unilateral American enterprise� He finds that in recent years, in spite of some 
complications in both Europe and Northeast Asia, the forward-deployed BMD 
capability that the Navy’s Aegis destroyers provide has served as an important 
cement to these important alliance relationships� Commander Watts is a surface 
warfare officer in the U�S� Navy�
Alliance-management issues are also at the center of Jihoon Yu and Erik 
French’s article, “Should the United States Support a Republic of Korea Nuclear 
Submarine Program?” While the authors admit that there are serious cons 
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associated with this idea—particularly the extraordinary expense of construct-
ing nuclear attack submarines, as well as technology-transfer and proliferation 
issues—they make a strong case for U�S� support for such a program, particularly 
in terms of strengthening American ties with the Republic of Korea (ROK) at a 
time when ROK-Japan tensions have had a destabilizing impact on America’s 
alliance relationships in the region� Lieutenant Commander Yu is a submarine 
officer in the ROK Navy; Erik French is a professor at the College at Brockport, 
State University of New York�
Finally, it is well to be reminded that there is more to the history of the U�S� 
Navy than big battles and war-fighting admirals� In “Neptune’s Oracle: Admiral 
Harry E� Yarnell’s Wartime Planning, 1918–20 and 1943–44,” Frank A� Blazich 
Jr� traces the long and eventful career of an exemplary American admiral whose 
name is hardly known beyond the confines of the Naval War College, which he 
attended in its early years and where he absorbed a methodology of naval plan-
ning that would serve him well in the future� His involvement in postwar plan-
ning during World War II reveals an acute grasp of emerging strategic realities, 
although he surprisingly failed to anticipate a possible revolution in China and 
the threat of global Communism� Frank Blazich is a military historian at the 
Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History�
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters 
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W309, 330, 333, 
334, 335)� For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236)�
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
BY ANY MEASURE, the U�S� Naval War College (NWC) is an ab-
solutely remarkable place� It is remarkable because of the high-
ly talented and dedicated professionals who form the NWC family: our faculty, 
staff, student body, and their families� Our extended family includes our friends 
and supporters from the NWC Foundation; the patriotic citizens of Rhode Is-
land, who are so welcoming and encouraging of everything we do; and our sister 
services’ professional military education colleges and organizations, which share 
our commitment and passion for preparing the nation’s leaders to serve with 
integrity, creativity, and a sharply focused sense of purpose� In the months since 
my husband, David, and I joined this multifaceted (and multinational) family, 
we have been incredibly impressed by the contagious spirit of excellence we have 
seen at every turn�
My first several months as the fifty-seventh President of the Naval War College 
have been incredibly busy� Both our external engagements and our on-campus 
visitor roster have revealed the degree to which our great College is held in high 
esteem and increasingly is seen as a place for innovative research and scholarship�
Among my first duties as President was to officiate at the Academic Convoca-
tion, which took place on August 5, 2019� This time-honored ceremonial event 
served to open the 2019–20 academic year for the 530 resident students from all 
the military services, a host of government agencies, and seventy-five partner na-
tions� Studies also commenced for over 1,900 students in our worldwide College 
of Distance Education programs�
In late August 2019, our International Programs and Alumni Programs offices 
combined forces to organize the College’s Eighteenth Regional Alumni Sympo-
sium in Buenos Aires, Argentina� This highly anticipated event, cohosted by 
A Few Months in the Life of the Naval War College
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the Argentine Navy, enabled participants to discuss a wide range of topics� The 
symposium had three primary objectives:
1� To listen to one another with respect and open minds
2� To learn from each other, since learning is not just a discrete, one-time 
event but instead is a continuous practice
3� To renew and refresh friendships with other alumni and to commit to 
maintaining these relationships into the future
During the three-day event, more than a hundred international officers, 
including the heads of eight navies from the region, participated in briefings 
and engaged with panelists on a number of important regional issues� Some of 
the topics discussed were maritime control, maritime surveillance, information 
sharing and interoperability, and the use of the sea’s resources to achieve sustain-
able development� Rear Admiral Donald D� Gabrielson, USN, Commander, U�S� 
Fourth Fleet / U�S� Naval Forces Southern Command, provided keynote remarks�
Then–Secretary of the Navy the Honorable Richard V� Spencer served as a 
special guest speaker� He emphasized the importance of teamwork, noting that 
“[e]very day, our allies and joint partners join us in defending freedom, deterring 
war, and maintaining the rules which underwrite a free and open international 
order� We are each other’s force multiplier, and serving together, studying togeth-
er, and completing exercises together increases our joint operational readiness 
and helps secure a safer world�”
Our host, Admiral José Luis Villán, Chief of the General Staff of the Argen-
tine Navy, added, “This academic conference gives us an excellent opportunity 
to strengthen the relationship amongst our navies, and we learn from each� The 
symposium’s main purpose is to exchange ideas on how regional nations can 
overcome problems together�”
At the same time that our team was working to promote global maritime- 
security cooperation in South America, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Dr� Mark 
T� Esper journeyed to Newport to speak to our students and faculty, his first ad-
dress at a military academic institution since taking office� He asserted that, after 
eighteen years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense 
must be focused on our near-peer competitors, China and Russia� He noted, 
“Many of you spent most of your career fighting irregular warfare, but times 
have changed� We are now in an era of great-power competition� Our strategic 
competitors are Russia and China�” The question for the Department of Defense, 
Esper said, is how to address that competition� “I see the greatest challenge 
that I have, that the department faces, is how do we balance the present versus 
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the future?” Esper asked, “How do we offset near-term readiness versus future 
modernization?” He told the Naval War College audience that, as senior military 
leaders of the future, they must keep this context in mind� “It will affect nearly all 
aspects of the U�S� armed forces, including training, equipment, and placement 
of troops around the world�” SECDEF noted that the world is only getting more 
complex, and the challenge before the U�S� armed forces is to be ready�
During his visit, SECDEF also had the opportunity to observe the GLOBAL-11 
Joint Operations war game� McCarty Little Hall was operating at full capac-
ity hosting over six hundred participants, including more than eighty flag and 
general officers and members of the Senior Executive Service� GLOBAL-11 was 
designed to assess the Navy’s roles and responsibilities in leading a joint task force 
(JTF) and employing joint war-fighting capabilities� Admiral John C� Aquilino, 
USN, Commander, U�S� Pacific Fleet, was the game’s sponsor� Fundamental to his 
ability to exercise his role as lead was the presence and participation of high-level 
representatives of all JTF components: General Charles Brown, USAF, Com-
mander, Pacific Air Forces; Major General John Johnson, USA, representing U�S� 
Army Pacific; and Lieutenant General Lewis Craparotta, USMC, Commanding 
General, U�S� Marine Forces, Pacific� The war game sought to identify challenges 
associated with integrating new technologies and joint war-fighting concepts 
across the entire spectrum of warfare� In a shift from previous war games, Deputy 
Chiefs of Naval Operations attended, many for the entire week� Among the senior 
leaders participating in the distinguished visitors’ plenary session were then– 
Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer; Chief of Naval Operations Admiral 
Michael M� Gilday, USN; Commandant of the Marine Corps General David 
H� Berger, USMC; and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force General Stephen W� 
Wilson, USAF�
Rounding out a busy fall, we also celebrated the College’s 135th anniversary 
with a packed ceremony in Spruance Lobby� It was an honor to share the event 
with four previous NWC Presidents who were on campus participating in the 
Past Presidents’ Colloquium and Strategy Review� Returning “home” for the an-
niversary were Vice Admiral P� Gardner Howe III, USN, our fifty-fifth President, 
who served from July 2014 to July 2016; Vice Admiral John N� Christenson, USN 
(Ret�), our fifty-third President, who served from March 2011 to July 2013; Vice 
Admiral Rodney P� Rempt, USN (Ret�), our forty-ninth President, who served 
from August 2001 to July 2003; and Rear Admiral James R� Stark, USN (Ret�), 
our forty-seventh President, who served from June 1995 to July 1998� The col-
loquium provided the unparalleled opportunity to receive input and suggestions 
about the College’s future from a group uniquely qualified to render such advice�
As our College embarks on its 136th year of service to our Navy and the na-
tion, I continue to be impressed by the entire U�S� Naval War College family’s 
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contributions to our students, to our academic excellence, and to our Navy and 
joint force war-fighting readiness in support of our National Defense Strategy� 
And welcome home to Admiral Howe and his wife, Erin, as they join another part 
of our NWC extended family: our retired military community here in Newport� 
Our sincerest congratulations on a remarkable career!
SHOSHANA S� CHATFIELD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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BLURRED LINES
Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of American 
Strategic Thinking
Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside
 Among today’s great ironies is that, despite the fact that the United States has been at war for the better part of two decades, rare is the American policy 
maker who speaks adeptly about our use of military power in a coherent manner� 
On the one hand, political leaders attempt to avoid categorizing our air strikes 
and raids targeting al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in countries around the world 
as war, while on the other hand they conflate hostile Russian acts with some form 
of hyphenated war� This article argues that the adoption of two prominent and 
fashionable theoretical terms and their various iterations—the gray zone or gray-
zone conflict (usually described as the space between peace and war) and hybrid 
war (often described as Russia’s new form of mixed-methods warfare birthed 
by General Valery Gerasimov)—is an example of an American failure to think 
clearly about political, military, and strategic issues and their vitally important 
connections�
These terms, as well as the concepts arising from them, should be eliminated 
from the strategic lexicon� They cause more harm than good and contribute to an 
increasingly dangerous distortion of the concepts of war, peace, and geopolitical 
competition, with a resultant negative impact on the crafting of security strategy 
for the United States and its allies and partners around the world�
If an effort to eliminate two such commonly accepted terms and the theoreti-
cal approaches arising from them seems a fruitless effort to corral the contents of 
Pandora’s box, then examine the most recent U�S� National Security Strategy and 
National Defense Strategy�1 You will not find either term in these documents even 
though, as we will see, both have appeared regularly in U�S� political and strategy 
documents for years� This demonstrates that it is possible to discuss security 
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challenges without reliance on problematic terms that confuse strategic issues 
rather than clarify them� This is what we hope to achieve in this article�
There are four key problems with gray-zone conflict and hybrid war and the 
related variations of each� 
1� They are examples of poorly constructed new theories that more often 
than not cloud rather than clarify�
2� They distort or ignore history, sometimes by claiming to be new when we 
have seen similar confusion in the past�
3� They feed a dangerous tendency to confuse war and peace�
4� They undermine U�S� strategic thinking via the construction of critical 
political and strategic documents on the basis of flawed ideas, even 
sometimes resulting in strategic guidance derived from a focus on tactical 
matters� 
After almost two decades of war, we should heed the lessons that writers such 
as Emile Simpson learned firsthand in Afghanistan: “What liberal powers do by 
blurring the conceptual boundaries between war and peace is often to militarise 
in a polarised manner pre-established patterns of political activity, which might 
otherwise not be part of the wider conflict�”2 As we will see, part of the cure for a 
poor understanding of some of our geopolitical problems is not to confuse geo-
politics, competition among adversaries, or ham-handed influence efforts with 
war� The United States (and its allies) survived the Cold War (what some have 
termed more accurately the Cold Peace) without confusing whether it was at war 
or at peace with the Soviet Union—when such confusion could have produced 
nuclear Armageddon� We need to relearn how to make this distinction�
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
To support these claims, we must do something of fundamental importance: 
establish the basis for our discussion� This will give us a firm foundation for 
analysis, because without a secure base one cannot evaluate terms and concepts 
consistently and rationally� This is important because what some advocates of hy-
brid and gray-zone ideas are doing is elevating the importance of these concepts 
to being a new theory of war. Proposing supposedly new tools or methods for 
analysis is to present new theory� How do we judge whether this theory is valid, 
rigorous, and testable?
Carl von Clausewitz gave us the first steps� “The primary purpose of any 
theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and 
entangled�”3 Theory, as Sir Julian Corbett tells us, “can assist a capable man to 
acquire a broad outlook�” Theory should teach us to think critically, to analyze, 
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to bring a questioning but informed eye to the problem at hand, and to consider 
both its depth and breadth� It provides conceptual tools and grounds us by defin-
ing our terms and providing us a firm foundation for analysis, while teaching us 
to distinguish between what is important and what is not�4
The results of theory, Clausewitz insists, “must have been derived from mili-
tary history, or at least checked against it,” thus ensuring “that theory will have 
to remain realistic� It cannot allow itself to get lost in futile speculation, hair- 
splitting, and flights of fancy�” Most importantly, particularly in any theory ad-
dressing warfare, it “is meant to educate the mind of the future commander�”5 
Historian Peter Paret has made similar points� “A theory that is logically and 
historically defensible, and that reflects present reality, has the pedagogic func-
tion of helping the student organize and develop his ideas on war, which he draws 
from experience, study, and from history—the exploration of the past extends the 
reality that any one individual can experience�”6 
A way to conceptualize the relationship between the political objective and 
how a state uses its power to obtain that objective is to view these elements as 
distinct but interrelated realms� The graphic below is presented as an analytical 
tool� We start with the political objective, or the political aim� As Clausewitz, Cor-
bett, and other theorists make clear, nations and peoples go to war for political 
FIGURE 1
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE AND THE USE OF POWER
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reasons; there is something they want to achieve, or they want to protect what 
they have�7 Some (e�g�, the Islamic State) might mask these objectives in religious 
terms or various euphemisms, but in the end when states go to war they are us-
ing violence to get something they want—violence that is inherently political in 
nature� To ignore this is to ignore the very essence of every war, and to forget 
that bloodshed is involved is to refuse to accept war’s nature� It certainly is true 
that states also pursue political objectives without resorting to war; one wishes 
this were the preferred method, but the sweep of history demonstrates a human 
predilection for war� Elaboration of the political objective also should include a 
vision of what victory looks 
like and what it means; this vi-
sion almost always is lacking�
When nations pursue their 
political objectives—whether 
defensive or offensive, and 
whether at peace or at war—
they use various elements of national power to try to achieve them� This is 
the realm of grand strategy�8 Here we find the tools of the state beyond merely 
military power� Sometimes this is represented by the acronym DIME (diplo-
matic, informational, military, economic)� This is not a bad way to think about 
grand strategy, but one should not forget internal political influence on national 
decision-making as well� This method grants analytical breadth and firmness and 
applies to the pursuit of political objectives in both peace and war�9
The term strategy too often is used without bothering to define it� Military 
strategy generally is discussed in the context of warfare, but strategy certainly 
applies to peacetime as well� For our purposes, strategy is defined as the larger 
use of military power in the pursuit of a political objective� It is how a nation 
uses military power to get what it wants—whether at peace or at war—and is 
the military element of grand strategy� Some examples of a state’s use of military 
power include deterrence, reassurance, and coercive acts of force using strategies 
of annihilation, attrition, exhaustion, or protraction�
When military power is used in war, operations are the campaigns one con-
ducts to implement a strategy� Operational art is the way one conducts these 
campaigns and is defined by the U�S� Army as “the pursuit of strategic objectives, 
in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, 
and purpose�”10 Operations should support the implementation of strategy� They 
also should affect the enemy’s will or material ability to wage war� It is better if 
they do both� If your operations are doing neither of these, then you must ques-
tion their efficacy and whether you understand the use of force, and realize that 
you are wasting time, resources, and, more importantly, lives�
[W]hen new terms appear . . . they must be 
tested immediately against history and exist-
ing theory. Most new so-called classifications 
of war would be instantly killed if properly 
examined through these lenses.
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Tactics, or the tactical realm, deal with how military forces directly fight the ene-
my� Weapons technologies and methods for using them drive tactics more than any 
other factor, and the constant roiling of technology means tactics never stand still�
Also relevant to this discussion is the so-called spectrum of conflict� This is 
a commonly used term that seeks to classify the interaction among nations (at 
war or not), often (but not always) by the scale and type of means being used�11 
Soldier-scholar Harry Summers pointed out that this notion entered the U�S� 
military lexicon as the “spectrum of war” via the U�S� Army’s 1962 Field Service 
Regulations� Then the spectrum stretched from cold war to limited war� Summers 
correctly identified a “serious flaw”: the spectrum fails to delineate between war 
and peace�12
This type of defective thinking continues to feed current American miscon-
ceptions as we continue to confuse war and peace, something manifest in the 
discussions of hybrid war, gray-zone war, and so-called cyber war� In a 2016 
article, Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA (Ret�), made an argument similar 
to that of Summers, observing that U�S� leaders are fuzzy about just what war is, a 
problem fed by the 1994 adoption (really, readoption) of a spectrum-of-conflict 
approach to strategic analysis�13
Objecting to using this inaccurate analytical tool does not, as some argue, 
merely “perpetuate the binary peace/war distinction�”14 It is in reality an insis-
tence on clear analysis and an embrace of the notion that peace and war are not 
the same� Their relationship is not binary; it is dialectical� War and peace are best 
defined in opposition to one another, as one is the antithesis of the other� If a state 
is engaged in armed conflict, it is at war� The armed conflict can be with another 
state or not� Clausewitz famously defines war as “an act of force,” one intended 
to achieve a political object� Lukas Milevski cogently observes that Clausewitz’s 
definition “elegantly encapsulates the three most important elements of war: vio-
lence, instrumentality,” and its adversarial nature� If the state is not in an armed 
conflict, it is at peace� Thomas Hobbes tells us that peace is the absence of war�15 
War should not be confused with warfare, which usually is defined as the under-
taking of the military actions themselves�
Understanding this is critical because we begin our analysis with the question 
whether the nation is at war� One must remember, though, that nations can be 
in competition with one another and not be at war and involved in killing the 
soldiers (and usually civilians) of the other state� Competition among all states, 
friendly or not, is a norm—and to be preferred� But allowing our analysis of wars 
or competition among states to rest on intellectual constructs that fail to honor 
the critical distinction between war and peace means we have lost the logical 
foundation for critical analysis�
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Having established a solid analytical foundation, why do we say what we do 
about gray-zone conflict and hybrid war? Our analysis will start with a decon-
struction of the more expansive term: gray-zone conflict�
GRAY-ZONE CONFLICT—CONFUSION IN BLACK AND WHITE
Commentators frequently use the gray zone phrase to describe the war Vladimir 
Putin launched against Ukraine in 2014, implying that the actions were opaque 
enough to cloud perceptions about whether war had erupted in the Donbas� 
Commentators also use gray zone and its variations to describe China’s moves 
to cement its extralegal territorial claims in the South China Sea against weaker 
opponents, as well as Iranian moves in Syria and the Persian Gulf�
The popularization of the term gray zone appears to have been inspired by 
its incorporation into military documents and speeches� The 2010 Quadrennial 
Defense Review references challenges that occur in an “ambiguous gray area 
that is neither fully war nor fully peace�”16 But it took the remarks delivered five 
years later by General Joseph L� Votel, USA, the then head of Special Operations 
Command, to bring the term into the public eye� He incorporated the concept 
into his briefing to Congress on the unique challenges posed by Russia and the 
Islamic State, noting that “our success in this environment will be determined 
by our ability to adequately navigate conflicts that fall outside of the traditional 
peace-or-war construct�”17
An article discussing “a ‘gray zone’ between traditional notions of war and 
peace” appeared soon after�18 More publications quickly followed; they seem to 
be an elaboration of General Votel’s remarks and to discuss conflicts “that fall 
between the traditional war and peace duality�”19 Collectively, this work gave us 
a generally accepted definition of the term� Other publications arrived before 
the end of 2015�20 After these instances, use of the term exploded�21 One article 
arguing for a place between peace and war did appear in August 2014, but it 
does not mention a gray zone specifically�22 The earliest example of this delinea-
tion (which does not appear to underpin the key relevant literature) appeared 
in a 1995 international law article that mentions “the gray zone between war 
and peace�”23 Japan’s 2010 and 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines took a 
slightly different tack, pointing out that “there are a growing number of so-called 
‘gray-zone’ disputes—confrontations over territory, sovereignty, and economic 
interests that do not escalate into wars�”24 There is also a related October 2014 
Stars and Stripes article�25
The key academic text seems to be Michael J� Mazarr’s Mastering the Gray 
Zone, which does not provide a sufficiently clear definition of the gray zone� The 
best that can be derived from it is that a “new standard form of conflict” is emerg-
ing from “revisionist states” that are “competing below the threshold of major 
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war�”26 Moreover, gray-zone war is defined in relation to an undefinable term: 
major war.27 A commonly accepted definition of this in certain academic circles 
is as follows: “Major war means an operation where the United States deployed 
over fifty thousand troops and there were at least one thousand battle deaths�”28 
This definition is arbitrary and means based, and thus unusable�
Mazarr derived the term—at least in part—from the work of the special op-
erations community�29 But our inquiries have failed to determine any inspiration 
for other recent American users of the term� It could derive from a 2005 book 
by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, American and Italian Marxist scholars, 
respectively (Negri is a devotee and former student of Michel Foucault)� Hardt 
and Negri related the gray-zone concept to the post-Saddam Iraqi insurgency 
and wrote that “most of the current military engagements of the United States 
are unconventional conflicts or low-intensity conflicts that fall in the gray zone 
between peace and war�”30 Ironically, here gray zone is used by critics of America 
to describe what is seen as deliberate efforts to blur recognition of what is clearly 
a military action: the occupation of a sovereign nation� Even more ironically, 
Russian officials frequently depict hybrid war as something “the Americans do” 
with “their advocacy of color revolutions”—which demonstrates the crossover 
contagion effects of the use of both terms�31
GRAY-ZONE CONFLICT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THEORY
There are several fundamental problems with use of the term gray zone�32 The 
first has to do with theoretical considerations� Again, the advocates of the 
concept—whether or not they realize it, and whether or not they insist they are 
doing so—are creating new theory about what is and is not war�33 The advocates 
of the gray-zone conflict terminology fail this test because, as we will see, they are 
not clarifying concepts but instead creating confusion�
As with some discussions of hybrid war, gray-zone publications haphazardly 
swirl and mingle the levels of war� Mazarr mixes strategy and tactics when he calls 
Chinese actions in the South China Sea the “use of gradual, multi-instrument 
strategies,” then in the next sentence states that Russia’s moves against Ukraine 
“also constitute a variety of the tactic,” and in the next sentence avers that Iran’s 
search for regional power and nuclear weapons is “a variety of gray zone strategy�” 
He also writes that “gray zone conflict involves the holistic application of a mosaic 
of civilization and military tools, short of combat operations, to achieve gradual 
progress toward political objectives�” Here, as in other places, the author is partly 
writing about grand strategy, because he is examining the various tools of power 
a nation can employ in pursuit of its political objective�34
All this produces a critical problem in logic� If you do not define your terms 
and stick to a valid use of them, you have not presented a basis for rational 
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discussion� Failing to differentiate among grand strategy, strategy, operations, 
and tactics compounds this problem� A challenge on the tactical level must be 
addressed in ways starkly different from those applicable to a strategic threat�
Mazarr also argues that revisionist powers “are creating a new approach to the 
pursuit of aggressive aims, a new standard form of conflict” by undermining foes 
gradually on their periphery�35 The reality is that there is nothing new here� The 
Nazis used subversion to undermine Austria and Czechoslovakia before World 
War II� This was a standard Soviet practice against NATO countries� Mazarr 
himself writes that the ancient Greeks behaved in the manner now associated 
with gray-zone conflict� Revisionist or aggressive powers certainly are a problem 
today, but they always have been a problem and always will be�
None of this, of course, counters the fact that Mazarr and others indeed are 
correct about the danger from revisionist states� But we must parse the problem 
in a clearer manner to develop proper responses� If one identifies the problem 
incorrectly, one very likely will deliver the wrong answer� The most important 
and useful part of Mazarr’s text provides superb analysis of the threat to the 
international order from several aggressive, revisionist powers� The challenges 
from China and Russia today resemble those of the 1950s� Both the Soviet empire 
and China had, on their respective borders, weak states that were not tied to any 
alliance system� Both also had revolutionary, and thus revisionist, regimes, as 
does Iran� Today, Russia, China, and Iran all have weak, often unaffiliated states 
on their borders, or ungoverned or disputed areas, such as parts of the South 
China Sea� The methods one uses to go about obtaining control of these areas 
fall under the realms of grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics� It is also 
here where the ideas of the original gray-zone writers, as we will see shortly, are 
very applicable�
The gray zone, as Adam Elkus observes, is “just another example of the strate-
gic studies community needlessly confusing itself by generating new terminology 
to replace what is not broken�”36
THE GRAY ZONE’S FORGOTTEN HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
What will come as a surprise to most is that the term gray areas in relation to con-
flict, particularly when dealing with Russia, has been around since at least 1954, 
though in a different form from that generally used today� Thomas K� Finletter, a 
World War I veteran, career U�S� government official, and the second Secretary of 
the Air Force (1950–53), first discussed competition in the gray areas in his 1954 
book Power and Policy in a section titled “The Struggle against Communism in 
the Gray Areas�” Finletter defined the gray areas in a geographical sense, identify-
ing “the countries outside of NATO which are in contact or nearly so with Russia 
and China, the long frontier between Freedom and Communism starting from 
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Turkey on the west, and leading eastward through Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
India, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, Formosa, Korea, and Japan to the 
western limit of NATO in the Aleutian chain�”37 Today, Finletter’s description of 
the strategic situation across this belt of the world is far more right than wrong� 
Obviously, the periphery has changed a bit with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
so one should add the new states that have emerged in Central Asia and Eastern 
Europe, but the situation still 
is easily recognizable�
Finletter goes on to note 
the vulnerability of the gray 
areas and their importance, 
but also insists that the United 
States cannot build a defense 
system here along the lines of 
NATO, because the arena is so 
different� This makes it harder to develop ways of blocking “Communist [Rus-
sian] Imperialism in the Gray Areas�”38 Finletter’s remarks immediately bring to 
mind the current situations in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, particularly in 
Georgia but in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus as well� The vulnerable gray areas 
lack the political and cultural similarities and economic ties linking post–Second 
World War Western Europe, but just as in the 1940s and 1950s they face threats 
from a revisionist Russia and growing China�
In his discussion Finletter asks a question particularly applicable to today� 
“What are the guiding principles of the United States foreign policy for the Gray 
Areas?” He poses a number of rhetorical questions to try to answer the concern 
he raises, but then properly says that the political leadership must decide what 
policy will be before one can determine military strategy for the gray areas�39 In 
other words, how the United States seeks to handle these areas must be subsumed 
under the nation’s larger political aims� The country’s grand strategy then should 
be aligned with this�
There are certainly reasons to treat many of Finletter’s comments with a skep-
tical eye� He often gives too much credit to Soviet influence in China and to the 
general reach of the Soviets and Chinese into what in the mid-1950s was called 
the emerging Third World, but it is interesting that his fears are not unlike those 
of current policy makers� For example, he frets about Iran’s tilt toward Russia, 
something that is part of current policy discussion� He also notes that “the Rus-
sians have therefore moved their military pressures—actual and threatened—to 
the Gray Areas�” The Russians are providing the equipment and training while 
the Chinese, “acting as junior partners and the middlemen,” are (in regions such 
as Southeast Asia) “threatening to move the barrier forward by force at many 
Calling something new and revolutionary 
just because part of it takes place in the cyber 
domain (which merely constitutes the next 
evolution in signals-based elements of war 
fighting that began with the telegraph) does 
not make it a new form of war[;] . . . it is at 
best merely a form of tactical innovation.
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points�”40 Again, the picture he paints is in many ways familiar: Russia is pushing 
using proxies, but China also is on the move�
Other authors quickly followed Finletter into the gray areas� Henry Kissinger, 
in his 1955 Foreign Affairs article “Military Policy and Defense of the ‘Grey Areas,’” 
credits Finletter’s work� Kissinger takes on the problems of Russian and Chinese 
aggression in the same areas, particularly regarding the problems of deterrence 
and the threat that military action here could lead to war between a Communist 
aggressor and the United States� He urges that the “immediate task” of the United 
States in this area “must be to shore up the indigenous will to resist” via political 
and economic aid� He also argues for the creation of military forces in the most 
vulnerable states that do not possess significant defensive power, and the neces-
sity of the United States and others having the capability to come to their aid�41
For today’s audience a perhaps more useful take on the gray-areas issue is 
found in political scientist Robert E� Osgood’s well-known 1957 book Limited 
War: The Challenge to American Strategy� Osgood credits Finletter with develop-
ing the concept and includes in his work a section titled (not too surprisingly) 
“Limited War in the Gray Areas”; he also tackles the subject on other pages�42 
Osgood defines the gray areas as being “all around the Eurasian rimlands [sic] 
from Iran to Korea,” calling it “a vast region contiguous to the Communist sphere 
of power that was ripe for Communist expansion�” He fears “Communist pres-
sure” against the “gray areas,” but is more concerned that events there would work 
to separate the United States from its allies, as well as to siphon U�S� strength away 
from more-important regions� He also worries that these areas lack the strength 
to defend themselves against “determined Communist attack�”43 The substitution 
of “Russian and Chinese” for “Communist” would align his statements with the 
concerns of many in today’s U�S� strategic community�
Osgood built on Finletter’s concept and linked the threat to the gray areas to 
the challenges of the containment strategy during the Cold War� He wrote that 
containment in the gray areas would rest on the areas’ inhabitants and their re-
spective abilities to defend their own states against the very threats that Ukraine 
faces today: foreign subversion, infiltration, insurrection, and conventional 
military attacks� Osgood also wisely observed that many of the states of the gray 
areas lacked the internal structures and solidity to build the power to resist, even 
with American military and economic help� To address this challenge, Osgood 
offered “three general requirements” for containing Russia and China in the gray 
areas� First, the “indigenous regimes” had to possess the “minimum internal co-
hesion and stability,” as well as “a minimum ability to satisfy social and economic 
demands to prevent Communist ideological and political penetration�” Second, 
these local states needed to have military forces that could deal with insurrec-
tions and guerrillas� Third, these same local military forces, when supported by 
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U�S� military and economic aid as well as military units, provided the “nuclei” for 
defeating “larger military incursions on a local basis�”44 In other words, the states 
should demonstrate the desire and ability to govern and defend themselves, but 
the United States should help those manifesting a core seriousness of purpose�
What is particularly interesting about Osgood’s statements is that over sixty 
years later not only are the concerns the same but so are the actions the United 
States is taking to address them� Moreover, this is exactly what the United States 
has been doing for the past sixty-plus years, in some form or other—sometimes 
with success, sometimes not�
There undoubtedly are many additional older sources discussing the gray ar-
eas that remain forgotten�45 For inspiration on how to deal with Vladimir Putin’s 
Russia, as well as China and Iran, Cold War literature is something that current 
security studies authors would be wise to examine�
There are other, later works depicting the gray zone in a geographical manner, 
not unlike Finletter’s approach, that predate our core examples of Votel’s testi-
mony and Mastering the Gray Zone� These include works from 1986, 1987, 1995, 
and 1998, as well as a 1999 book chapter on NATO expansion that mentions a 
“‘gray zone’ of insecurity�”46 A 2007 work uses the term in relation to electoral 
reform�47 One 2004 source defines the gray zone as a type of threat�48 Others are 
addressed below�
But what is most important to draw from this is that Finletter and his intellec-
tual successors are describing a geographical and geopolitical challenge similar to 
that which the United States faces today—without making the error of confusing 
peace with war� They understood the difference—and they understood that the 
costs of such a misunderstanding could be fatal�
THE GRAY ZONE INJURES OUR ABILITY TO DISTINGUISH  
BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR
All this brings us back to a key argument made by gray-zone enthusiasts� “A fun-
damental implication of gray zone campaigns is to blur the dividing line between 
peace and war, and between civilian and military endeavors� They are, in a sense, 
the use of civilian instruments to achieve objectives sometimes reserved for mili-
tary capabilities�”49 We will ignore the obvious confusing of a campaign and a war 
to address the larger issue raised�
The problem is not that there is a blurring of the line between peace and war 
in the behavior of aggressive actors� The problem is in the failure of analysts 
and policy makers to understand the differences between war and peace and 
the frequent conflation of acts of subversion, harassment, and espionage among 
countries nominally and legally at peace with war� As discussed previously, 
war is a distinct state in which violence is used to achieve political ends� 
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While new domains or new fronts of competition frequently open in an age of 
rapid technological proliferation, the division between war and peace remains 
fixed despite the efforts of some to elide the difference� Thomas Rid brilliantly 
addresses this issue in relation to so-called cyber war in an article appropriately 
titled “Cyber War Will Not Take Place�” He argues, convincingly, that cyber at-
tacks are acts of sabotage, espionage, or subversion lacking the violence necessary 
to make them acts of war�50
Recalling the relationship between the pursuit of the political objective and the 
elements of grand strategy presented earlier—grand strategy, again, meaning how 
we use all the elements of national power in pursuit of a political aim—clarifies 
this issue� For example, what Russia has done in Ukraine since 2014 is to conduct 
successfully a war for limited political aims, using both active violent and subver-
sive means� The failure of many political leaders to brand this war a war does not 
alter the facts on the ground or prevent honest analysis�
But one must remember that the above-mentioned analytical tools apply to 
both peace and war� Just because a state is not at war with a rival state, it does not 
mean that the first state is not attempting to subvert the second� The Cold War 
epitomized this� Currently, neither Russia nor China is at war with the United 
States, despite many insistences to the contrary, but both constantly practice 
forms of subversion against the United States, such as meddling in political 
campaigns and all forms of hacking�51 All nations compete with one another, and 
with regard to Russia and China one could brand them unfriendly U�S� competi-
tors, or perhaps more accurately adversaries� But states compete with other states 
even if they are not at war with them (i�e�, actually involved in fighting them)� 
In the end, the problem is that analysts writing about the so-called gray zone are 
confusing war with subversion (in the case of the U�S� relationship with Russia) 
while forgetting (in the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine) that subversion 
and its tools are used both in peace and in war� Russian expert Michael Kofman 
noted in a Texas National Security Review roundtable on the U�S� National De-
fense Strategy that Russia’s “annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the almost entirely 
conventional fighting continuing in Ukraine are hardly the product of emerging 
technologies to subvert democratic processes, unless this is new jargon for tanks 
and artillery�”52
If the most important role of political leaders is to get the political aims right 
so that all else follows logically, an important consideration is the need for po-
litical and military leaders to communicate them clearly to friend and foe alike� 
Identifying key national interests and drawing sharp redlines around them while 
providing for their credible enforcement is key to avoiding situations that evoke 
the label “gray-zone confrontation�”53 But this requires political leaders to under-
stand what they want and to be clear and specific in their pronouncements�
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In March 2017, General Votel, then head of U�S� Central Command, briefed 
the Senate Armed Services Committee� His command posture statement used 
both “hybrid war” and “gray zone” in the official text� In addressing the danger 
from the Islamic State, Votel described it as an “‘evolving’ hybrid threat (con-
ventional and irregular warfare)�” Switching gears, Votel detailed Iran’s bevy of 
conventional and irregular threats and described Iran’s implementation of its 
strategy for gaining regional hegemony as being “primarily within the ‘gray zone,’ 
the space short of conventional conflict where miscalculation can easily occur�”54
The continued use of these terms insists on the existence of a nonexistent 
space between war and peace and risks the dangerous possibility that these acts 
that take place beyond established redlines for action will generate a cause or 
push for war� More likely, the angst over shadowy activities short of war by ma-
levolent actors could push policy makers to counter minor threats to U�S� inter-
ests rashly, in ways that backfire or perhaps erode U�S� legitimacy as a global or 
regional influencer of stability and prosperity� Not understanding the difference 
between peace and war can cause miscalculations that land us in the latter�
THE SO-CALLED GRAY ZONE UNDERMINES  
U.S. STRATEGIC THINKING
The flawed gray-zone concept undermines U�S� strategic thinking in two man-
ners� First, U�S� government political and strategic planners and analysts are 
assessing adversaries and writing official U�S� government policy and strategy 
documents—as well as influential reports and policy papers—on the basis of a 
dangerously flawed idea� Second, gray-zone thinking provides America’s adver-
saries with a means of undermining the liberal international order�
The penetration of gray-zone thinking into the policy and strategy debates of 
the United States has been immense� It is nearly impossible to attend a defense-
related presentation in Washington, DC, without hearing “gray zone” refer- 
ences�55 More dangerous is the gray zone’s infiltration into official U�S� political 
and defense documents� We noted above its first official appearance in the 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review�56 This was only the start, as the concept began find-
ing its way into all manner of official U�S� civilian and military publications� It 
reached the Army’s Unified Land Operations manual in 2011 and the Army Train-
ing and Doctrine Command’s Operational Environments to 2028 in 2012�57 The 
key source is General Votel’s aforementioned 2015 congressional testimony�58 
A 2017 National Intelligence Council report discusses the gray zone�59 The of-
ficial, unclassified 2018 National Defense Strategy summary does not contain 
the term, but the congressionally mandated analysis of the document includes 
voluminous references to hybrid war and the gray zone; indeed, one could argue 
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that the gray zone is key to its intellectual foundation�60 Moreover, an extensive 
(152-page) assessment project released in May 2019 is underpinned completely 
by the gray-zone concept, as well as hybrid war� The report has twenty-four dif-
ferent contributors from numerous U�S� military commands and influential think 
tanks, and includes prefaces by the head of the U�S� Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, a Navy rear admiral on the Joint Staff, and a European Command 
civilian expert on Russia�61
The term gray zone also commonly appears in defense-related congressional 
briefings, often in conjunction with hybrid war� In March 2017, a RAND em-
ployee testified before Congress in what was generally a discussion of Russian 
actions against other states� His remarks clearly illustrate the problem� 
[E]xperts use the term “hybrid warfare” in different ways, including several related 
terms such as “gray zone strategies,” “competition short of conflict,” “active measures,” 
and “new generation warfare�” Despite subtle differences, all these terms point to the 
same thing: Russia is using multiple instruments of power and influence, sometimes 
with an emphasis on nonmilitary tools, to pursue its national interests outside its 
borders—often at the expense of US interests and those of US allies�62
He went on to add—correctly—that these actions are not new; the Soviet 
Union acted similarly during the Cold War�63
If there is nothing new here, then why needlessly complicate matters with 
a new concept or a new theory? Simply call things as they are� The same wit-
ness then brands what the Russians are doing “tactics” and suggests “strategies” 
for dealing with them, then refers to “hybrid war tactics” and “hybrid warfare 
strategies�”64 Is it hybrid or gray? And should we not develop tactics to counter 
tactics and strategies to counter strategies?
Why does this matter? Because U�S� leaders are analyzing potential threats to 
the United States and constructing elements of American strategy on the basis 
of an intellectual construct that has no analytical utility and confuses war with 
peace� With this, we have resurrected part of our previous point� Moreover, the 
danger in doing this is that one will construct and then try to implement strate-
gies that are inappropriate for the situation at hand� The United States might 
commit an act of war—attacking a special operations unit or blockading a newly 
constructed island—under the assumption that one is “fighting in the gray zone,” 
when in reality the nations actually are at peace� The United States might think 
of itself as being in the gray zone—the area between peace and war—but to the 
other nation the situation could be crystal clear: it is now at war with the United 
States� Shoddy thinking could produce horrific consequences�
Additionally, America’s adversaries find the gray zone useful for their pur-
poses� The propagators of the gray zone seem unaware that some Russian writers 
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find our addiction to a variation of this concept particularly useful� How much is 
not clear, but the problem must be considered� Russian political scientist Dmitry 
Baluev argues that the acceptance of political gray zones allows the Russians to 
introduce national security concepts “that differ from the traditional interna-
tional system and depart from western dominated international relations theory�” 
This “will be most useful for analysis of political and economic developments in 
south-east Asia” because these societies are different and face different threats� 
He also argues that the West needs to accept the diversity of the different govern-
ing principles of this region�65
Baluev’s reasoning is in many respects very broken, and it is difficult to see 
how one translates his ideas into action� What is particularly interesting is that 
Baluev (with a coauthor) has been writing about this since at least 2010—five 
years before Votel and Mazarr—and says that his gray-zone ideas are derived 
from those advanced by Americans�66 But the more dangerous and important 
issue is this: one Russian thinker sees in confused Western analysis a means of 
delegitimizing democracy and undermining the international order� While this is 
not indicative of all Russian thought, by any means, it is an approach dangerous 
to the United States and its interests�
Having discussed thoroughly our issues with the concept of the gray zone, we 
move on to the other half of our discussion: hybrid war�
HYBRID WAR—A NEW TERM FOR NEW WARS?
We can distinguish hybrid war from the gray zone by the fact that instead of 
describing a shadowy space where an alleged pseudowar is taking place, hybrid 
war pretends to describe the character of activities during what is clearly war 
among two or more entities� These activities take place at the tactical level of 
war, and analysts detail them so they can categorize the tools as a mix of conven-
tional and irregular in the same space� The continual expansion of diverse tools 
and examples is considered evidence of the existence of hybrid war, a term now 
used to describe nearly every form of interstate competition and conflict from 
the tactical to the political� The result has been to confuse rather than clarify our 
understanding of war�
The urtext of hybrid war is Frank G� Hoffman’s 2007 Conflict in the 21st 
Century, although he first broached the issue in an article coauthored in 2005 
with now-former Secretary of Defense James Mattis�67 Moreover, it would be 
patently unfair to blame Hoffman for the proliferation of this term, as more 
than a decade’s worth of writers have exploited the existence of hybrid war 
and its variants in a dizzying number of articles and policy papers�68 Professor 
Robert Johnson, the director of the University of Oxford’s Changing Character 
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of War Centre, noted at a 2017 conference that he had surveyed more than one 
hundred articles on the topic�69 Some of the authors seem to have carried things 
much further than originally intended� Surprisingly, given what is noted above, 
the term does not make it into Mattis’s own summary of the National Defense 
Strategy in 2018�70
Some authors credit the first use of the term to a master’s thesis written in 
1998 by Lieutenant Robert G� Walker, USN�71 Walker defined hybrid warfare 
(not hybrid war) as that “which lies in the interstices between special and con-
ventional warfare� This type of warfare possesses characteristics of both the spe-
cial and conventional realms 
and requires  an extreme 
amount of flexibility in or-
der to transition operation-
ally and tactically between 
the special and conventional 
arenas�” Walker’s text makes clear he is using hybrid as an adjective and not seek-
ing to establish an entirely new form or type of war� To quote from his thesis: 
“[T]hroughout its history, the United States Marine Corps has demonstrated 
itself to be a hybrid force, capable of conducting operations within both the con-
ventional and unconventional realms of warfare�”72
The term reappeared in another Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis four 
years later� In this text, hybrid war is defined as guerrilla warfare circa 2002, and 
the Chechen wars are held up as the historical examples� Here the term was in-
spired by works on so-called fourth-generation warfare and the “New Wars” the-
sis of Mary Kaldor� These consider hybrid war to be made up of conventional and 
unconventional means, crime, terrorism, subversion, and technological innova-
tion� But this means-based foundation is too subjective and inexact to provide 
a basis for analysis�73 The claim is also ahistorical, in the sense that the authors 
purport to identify something new�74 The 2002 NPS work does not cite Walker’s 
1998 thesis, carrying the first known appearance of the term, and Conflict in the 
21st Century does not reference it�
Further uses of the term, as well as many variations, soon followed� It ap-
peared in a pair of articles in 2006, again used as an adjective to describe tactical 
matters�75 Hoffman penned a quartet of hybrid-related texts in 2006 and 2007 
that largely set the foundations for increased use of the concept�76 A 2007 work 
used the term to describe threats to the United States and to critique the 2005 
National Defense Strategy�77 John Arquilla, the director of the Walker thesis men-
tioned above and who also chaired the department under whose umbrella the 
two NPS theses mentioned above were written, used the term as an adjective to 
describe warfare in 2007�78 The same year also saw the term’s first appearance in 
[B]y confusing competition among adversaries 
with things called hybrid or gray-zone war,  
we risk conflating everything with war—a 
dangerous proposition.
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an official U�S� government publication, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower, which probably was influenced by the 2005 Mattis and Hoffman text 
and Hoffman’s work at the Marine Corps’s Center for Emerging Threats and Op-
portunities� Here, hybrid is an adjective describing tactical matters�79 Hybrid war 
also appeared in British doctrine and an Australian writing the same year, as an 
adjective related to irregular warfare�80
After the publication of the 2007 Hoffman text, use of the term hybrid war 
rapidly accelerated�81 For example, in a 2008 article, Army Chief of Staff General 
George C� Casey wrote about hybrid threats, which betrayed “diverse, dynamic 
combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities�” 
This, he said, would “make pursuit of singular approaches difficult, necessitat-
ing innovative, hybrid solutions involving new combinations of all elements of 
national power�”82 Yet the idea of using and combining all the aspects of national 
power to achieve political objectives is an ancient one, and the failure of the for-
mer service chief ’s declaration to acknowledge that is surprising�
Others have noted this 2009 remark by Secretary of Defense Robert M� Gates: 
“One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction—from the sophis-
ticated to the simple—being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more com-
plex forms of warfare�” Here, Secretary Gates used “hybrid” as a simple adjectival 
descriptor for tactical issues�83 This, though, changed by the time of Gates’s 2010 
Quadrennial Defense Review�84 Here, hybrid first appears in a section titled “The 
Shifting Operational Landscape�” But it appears as hybrid threats, which are de-
fined as “diverse, dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and 
criminal capabilities�”85
But what does hybrid war mean? In 2007, Hoffman provided the following 
definition—the foundation for the hybrid war texts that followed it: “Hybrid 
Wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional 
capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate 
violence and coercion, and criminal disorder� These multi-modal activities can be 
conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally opera-
tionally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to 
achieve synergistic effects” (italics in the original)�86
At first glance, this definition seems entirely workable, and an accurate de-
scription of a growing number of battlefields and hot spots around the world� 
But it is hard to think of a single characteristic of war, particularly at the tactical 
level, that does not fit within it� If this is true, hybrid war becomes a redundant 
term; it simply constitutes war as we always have known it� Moreover, as we will 
see, the term introduces nothing different from what the United States and other 
Western countries have encountered from adversaries historically, or even what 
they have done to others in the conduct of war�
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HYBRID WAR AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MILITARY THEORY
Theory clarifies concepts while serving as a basis for analysis� When one first 
encounters a newly constructed military term, it should be tested immediately 
against the foundational concepts of political-military analysis and checked 
against history� This will establish its validity� Using this methodology, what is 
hybrid war? And how useful is it as theory?
Hybrid war is at best simply a neologism for tactical innovation� Moreover, 
the theoretical problem is compounded when one digs deeper into the key texts� 
It is unclear whether hybrid war is supposed to refer to war, warfare, or a threat� 
For example, hybrid threats may be “competitors who will employ all forms of 
war and tactics, perhaps simultaneously,” as well as “criminal activity�”87 This ex-
planation is followed by the following: “[H]ybrid threats incorporate a full range 
of different modes of warfare�” The same paragraph adds that “Hybrid Wars can 
be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors�”88 In a 2009 article 
we find the following: “It appears that CW [compound war] is the more frequent 
type, and that hybrid threats are simply a subcomponent of CW in which the 
degree of coordination or fusion occurs at lower levels�”89 This describes hybrid 
war as a subtype of compound war, which is simply an expression of the reality 
that nations use a variety of military means to fight wars�
One can boil down the core discussion of hybrid war to the usage of tactical 
means, something revealed in the fact that sometimes the works focus on infan-
try weapons� When one is discussing the use of antitank weaponry, you are in the 
tactical realm�90 This is fine in and of itself, but it hardly reveals a new form of 
war, or even a new threat� This also can be seen in an elaboration on the original 
hybrid war entry: “I define a hybrid threat as: Any adversary that simultaneously 
and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, 
terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political 
objectives�”91 This is simply a depiction of tactical means and methods that cre-
ates an arbitrary distinction with little explanatory value beyond what is useful 
for tactical-level commanders fighting in multiple directions�92
Additionally, some hybrid war works insist on having identified a new type of 
war�93 This is simply not the case, as even most hybrid enthusiasts would agree� 
As we have seen, all wars—as both Clausewitz and Corbett tell us—are fought for 
regime change (an unlimited political objective), or something less than this (a 
limited political objective)� All wars can be lumped under this rubric� Hybridists 
work from a means- or methods-based foundation, one that is too subjective to 
provide a definable, firm, universally applicable basis for analysis—thus failing a 
key test for building theory�
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Finally, hybridists are partly imitating an earlier intellectual infatuation� Con-
ceptually, U�S� defense officials advanced something similar to hybrid war before, 
although under a different name, when faced with new and heated geopolitical 
competition after 1945� In 1951, U�S� Navy captain Harvey B� Seim wrote about 
what he called fringe war. This, he noted in the context of the Cold War, “is local-
ized, yet global; it consists primarily of a series of minor engagements for limited 
objectives; it is carried out by relatively small forces; it utilizes puppet or satellite 
groups as a smokescreen to mask the single coordinated communist effort; it is 
waged in many different manners, both military and non-military�”94 This reads 
like a description of many modern conflicts from some hybrid and gray-zone 
enthusiasts, who often conflate the distinct definitions of the two concepts and 
focus on the small forces, deception, and military and nonmilitary “modes,” with-
out any focus on the political nature of the dispute or conflict�
So, where does this leave us? Discussions of hybrid war invariably mix the 
realms and tools of conflict, with a focus on the tactical level of war� Calling 
something new and revolutionary just because part of it takes place in the cyber 
domain (which merely constitutes the next evolution in signals-based elements 
of war fighting that began with the telegraph) does not make it a new form of 
war� As stated above, it is at best merely a form of tactical innovation� Theory is 
supposed to clarify issues and improve our analysis, but the hybridists have only 
sown confusion by trying to create a new type of war to describe the constantly 
shifting character of war�
HYBRID WAR: DISTORTED HISTORY
Arguments for the uniqueness of hybrid war as a concept and for an increase in 
its occurrence in practice often are supported by a selective reading of history� 
In Hoffman’s original work that helped define the term hybrid war, the Vietnam, 
Napoleonic, and American Revolutionary Wars are given as examples of conflicts 
that cannot be classified as hybrid wars, because the different “modes” of warfare 
do not merge at the tactical level�95 This assertion is disputable, particularly when 
we rely on his popular definition of hybrid war�
The very nature of North Vietnam’s effort to unify the country forcibly under 
Communist rule constituted the blending and use, simultaneously, of every type 
of military and nonmilitary element that one possibly could imagine� Indeed, the 
essence of North Vietnamese grand strategy was the integration of all elements of 
national power working toward the political objective at every level of war� The 
entire state—military and civilian—was mobilized to achieve the political aim� 
“Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Warfare” combined armed dau tranh 
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(struggle) with political dau tranh� All effort was to act upon the enemy�96 Figure 
2 illustrates this� 
It is important to distinguish the term grand strategy—meaning the use of 
all elements of national power to achieve political objectives—from the use of 
a variety of means at the tactical level� Terrorism and criminality in the forms 
of kidnapping and assassination were tactics integral to the Communist effort 
to topple South Vietnam’s government and drive out its foreign sponsor�97 The 
Communist North also practiced constant subversion against South Vietnam� 
The memoir of a North Vietnamese Communist agent working in South Vietnam 
provides only one example of this�98
FIGURE 2
SCHEMATIC OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE 
GRAND STRATEGY
Note: dau tranh means “struggle.”
Source: Pike, Viet Cong, p. 212.
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Vietcong (VC) units habitually fought alongside North Vietnamese regular 
units in South Vietnam� Moreover, the VC itself was hardly monolithic, possess-
ing Main Force formations made up of light infantry units fighting beside full-
time and part-time VC guerrillas� North Vietnamese army forces also regularly 
fought as guerrillas in South Vietnam�99 After the near evisceration of the VC 
during the 1968 Tet Offensive and its subsidiary offensive operations in 1969, 
inclusion of North Vietnamese army forces was common in decimated VC units 
fighting the guerrilla war in South Vietnam�100
The blending of the regular and irregular during the Napoleonic Wars was also 
habitual� After Napoléon’s 1812 invasion of Russia, Russian militia continuously 
fought alongside Russian regular army forces�101 After Prussia broke with Na-
poléon in early 1813, Prussian militia (Landwehr) commonly filled out Prussian 
units until Napoléon’s second abdication, in 1815� Carl von Clausewitz helped 
raise these units in 1813� Indeed, the plans for doing so were ones he originally 
authored�102
The blending of modes of warfare was prevalent during the American Revolu-
tionary War� After the debacle of his defeat in New York in 1776, George Wash-
ington habitually used regular and irregular forces simultaneously� This is made 
very clear in numerous books, as well as in Washington’s correspondence�103 In 
June 1777, he wrote from his camp in New Jersey as follows: “My design is to col-
lect all the force that can possibly be drawn from other quarters to this post, so 
as to reduce the security of this army to the greatest certainty possible, and to be 
in a condition of embracing any fair opportunity, that may offer, to make an at-
tack on advantageous terms� In the mean time I intend by light Bodies of militia, 
seconded and encouraged by a few Continental Troops, to harass and diminish 
their number by continual Skirmishes�”104
American general Nathanael Greene wrote something similar in 1781 when he 
commanded the American forces opposing the British invasion of the southern 
states�
The Salvation of this country don’t [sic] depend upon little strokes, nor should the 
great business of establishing a permanent army be neglected to pursue them� Par-
tizan strokes in war are like the garnish of a table� � � � They are most necessary and 
should not be neglected, and yet, they should not be pursued to the prejudice of more 
important concerns� You may strike a hundred strokes and reap little benefit from 
them, unless you have a good Army to take advantage of your success� � � � It is not a 
war of posts but a contest for states�105 
The Americans used regular and irregular methods and forces throughout 
the struggle, often in the same battle, famously deploying Daniel Morgan’s rifle-
men as a dispersed sharpshooting unit in the otherwise conventional Battle of 
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Saratoga�106 Moreover, if one was feeling particularly ungenerous to our founding 
father, one could define Washington’s requisitions of supplies after 1780 as crime 
because the Americans were so broke that Washington took what he needed 
without making payment�107
The hybrid conversation perhaps has been linked most heavily to the war 
Russia launched against Ukraine in 2014, but the infection quickly spread to discus-
sions of the Islamic State’s war� In the case of the Islamic State, just as in every other 
example held up as hybrid, there is nothing new here� Just like its insurrectionist 
predecessors, the Islamist group took pages from the “Revolutionary Warfare” 
and protracted war playbooks of the Vietnamese Communists and China’s Mao 
Zedong�108 The Islamic State moved through Mao’s three phases, from weak in-
surgency to conventional war, using all military and political means—from ter-
rorism and drones to recruiting former Baathists, in the manner of the Bolsheviks 
building the Red Army—and then wrapping it all in an effective information-
operations campaign, using social media instead of just a printing press�109 While 
many current insurgency scholars argue for a divorce from the Maoist concepts, 
as supposedly being outdated in our globalized age, they fail to credit the Islamic 
State’s ability to garner large amounts of local and global popular support in its 
campaign to create a political entity called a caliphate�110 The reality is that the 
group uses small, conventional units in conjunction with irregular forces to apply 
coercion and violence to achieve political aims using a variety of tactics� Again, 
there is nothing new here� Despite this, in article after article commentators de-
bate the means and methods of the Islamic State way of war as if it heralded the 
first case of a nonstate actor adopting so-called hybrid formations and tactics�111
The strongest argument that hybridists could make is that all wars are hy-
brid, but to varying degrees� Retired U�S� Army officer and historian Antulio 
Echevarria writes, “It is worth asking whether history can provide examples of 
wars that were not hybrid in some way�”112 All wars are—in the sense that they 
mix conventional and unconventional fighting modes and methods and include 
criminality and subversion—hybrid (as an adjective), but this does not create a 
new creature� But if all wars are hybrid wars, the term is redundant, similar to 
saying violent wars.
HYBRID WAR DANGEROUSLY CONFUSES PEACE AND WAR
Despite its creator’s intention to use the term hybrid war to describe acts that 
are clearly warfare, it instead has become popular to use it in the opposite sense, 
as a way to describe a supposed new way of war that deliberately blurs the lines 
between peace and war� A factor in the accelerated use of the term hybrid war 
was the publication of a 2013 article by the chief of the Russian General Staff, 
General Valery Gerasimov� Mark Galeotti drew attention to this article in his 
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initial writings on what he called the Gerasimov Doctrine—something he walked 
back later in a subsequent article titled “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov 
Doctrine�’”113 In many Western eyes, the general authored a blueprint for a unique 
campaign style that accurately describes Russian aggression against Ukraine� Yet 
there is no such thing as a Gerasimov Doctrine� Among other things, Gerasimov 
was simply giving his view of the operational environment and what a future war 
might look like; he was not attempting to construct anything else�114
What makes this particularly interesting is that Gerasimov’s work is itself a 
misreading of events� He deems the Arab Spring a military event, which it was 
not� He insists that “the very ‘rules of war’ have changed�” They have not (one 
could make an excellent argument that there are no rules)� He also says that 
nonmilitary means “in many 
cases � � � have exceeded the 
power of force and weapons 
in their effectiveness,” but 
gives no example of this�115 
Gerasimov then says that “the 
focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad 
use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary 
measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population�” 
He then adds, “All of this is supplemented by military means of a concealed char-
acter, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions 
of special-operations forces� The open use of forces—often under the guise of 
peacekeeping and crisis regulation—is resorted to only at a certain state, primar-
ily for the achievement of final success in the conflict�”116 (As an aside, Gerasimov 
apparently delivered a speech in Moscow in early November 2017 in which he 
insisted that the United States and other Western forces were using hybrid war 
against Russia�)117 At its core, all this is a rendition of grand strategy, meaning the 
use of various elements of national power in the pursuit of political objectives� 
The concealment of the military means is covered by Sun Tzu’s approximately 
2,500-year-old insistence that “[a]ll warfare is based upon deception�”118 We also 
could classify this under Clausewitz’s examination of cunning, which, it is impor-
tant to point out, he says is a tool of the weak�119
The confusion of peace and war on our part arises from our manner of in-
terpreting Gerasimov’s highlighting of the tactical use of subversion against 
other states, something stressed in some hybridist works� American analysts 
are forgetting that subversion is a tool both of peacetime state interaction and 
of war� Believing that subversion is restricted to wartime activities, and classify-
ing it as an act of war, clouds our thinking� Historically, subversion has always 
been a part of both Russian foreign policy and military action�120 Moreover, the 
[P]art of the cure for a poor understanding 
of some of our geopolitical problems is not to 
confuse geopolitics, competition among adver-
saries, or . . . influence efforts with war.
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above-mentioned use of disguised military forces prior to open hostilities is an 
act of war regardless of whether the power using them admits it or other nations 
fail to properly brand it such� Putin’s Russia fought—and is still fighting, as of 
2019—a war against Ukraine�
THE HYBRID WAR CONCEPT UNDERMINES  
U.S. STRATEGIC THINKING
The unfortunate result of this intellectual confusion is the construction of ele-
ments of U�S� strategy on myth and misunderstanding and the militarization of 
grand strategy, producing what the late strategic analyst Michael Handel referred 
to as the tacticization of strategy�121 U�S� leaders have taken a badly formed tactical 
concept and used it as one of the pillars for the creation of strategy� Tactics and 
strategy are in the same arena, but they are different animals�
We see this in the fact that the notion of hybrid war made its way into the 
2015 U�S� National Military Strategy, where it sat on an unusable “Continuum 
of Conflict” consisting of “State Conflict,” “Hybrid Conflict,” and “Non-state 
Conflict�”122 This document insists that hybrid conflict “blends conventional and 
irregular forces to create ambiguity, seize the initiative, and paralyze the adver-
sary� May include use of both traditional military and asymmetric systems�”123
The first problem with this definition—and this criticism fits the document’s 
descriptions for state and nonstate conflict—is that this is an expression of the 
means and methods used to wage war—two very subjective creations—and 
therefore presents no foundation for constructive analysis� This critical weakness 
is compounded by the fact that the definition given for hybrid war—which one 
could construe as the official U�S� military and government line, because of its 
source—is tactical in nature� All warfare blends conventional and irregular forces 
and traditional and “asymmetric systems�” War’s very nature creates ambiguity, 
and seizing the initiative is part of the job when waging a war, as is paralyzing 
the enemy� There is nothing here that has not been practiced since ancient times� 
Thucydides would have defined this as simply war�
The 2017 U�S� European Command posture statement contains no mention of 
either term, but this did not prevent the chair of the U�S� House Armed Services 
Committee from starting the question-and-answer period of the command’s 
annual briefing to Congress with his concerns about the “hybrid warfare” occur-
ring in Europe, from “little green men in Ukraine to political assassinations � � � 
to buying influence and political parties, snap exercises to intimidate neighbors, 
and of course cyber-attacks of various kinds�”124 Linking together a wide range 
of acts in multiple domains, in and out of conflict zones, serves to confuse more 
than clarify—which is certainly the result here�
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Unfortunately, terms such as hybrid war have gained enough currency not 
only to pollute U�S� policy and strategy documents but also to corrupt the non-
U�S� military lexicon� A German writer appropriated the idea to examine Iranian 
actions, institutions such as the Austrian National Defence Academy have hosted 
conferences partly dedicated to examining it, and a Dutch library published a bib-
liography on the topic�125 One also easily can find Spanish articles on the topic�126 
Fortunately, not everyone is buying what is being sold� A French author branded 
hybrid war nothing more than a revival of the indirect approach discussed by B� H� 
Liddell Hart and French theorist André Beaufre�127 The statement is incorrect, 
because Liddell Hart was discussing strategy, not tactics, but this demonstrates 
the chain of intellectual devastation that has been wrought�
Historian Hew Strachan provides a particularly cogent skewering of “the 
current jargon,” noting that “asymmetry and hybridisation have become catch-
alls applied to any war in which the two sides have not been made up of armies 
organised and equipped on similar lines�”128 Theorist Colin Gray writes that “the 
trouble with the hybrid war concept is that it encourages the innovative theo-
rist to venture without limit into the swamp of inclusivity, indeed of a form of 
encyclopedism�”129 Hybrid war becomes everything; thus it is nothing�
Discussions of hybrid war are simply discussions of the means and methods of 
waging war� This is nothing new, it is nothing exotic, it is nothing original� Study-
ing the means and methods of warfare is critically important, but trying to make 
it something other than what it is by creating an illogical, imaginary category 
of war is an example of cloudy and potentially dangerous reasoning� If we focus 
laser-like on the means and methods, we forget what the war is about� Hybrid war 
as a term injures rather than aids our ability to do practical strategic analysis and 
leads to the construction of strategy on the basis of tactics� It also encourages the 
militarization of other elements of grand strategy while driving us to view every 
geopolitical act through a warlike lens� This should encourage us further to move 
away from use of this term� Thus far, if Russian maskirovka (deception) has suc-
ceeded, it is only because we have fooled ourselves�
BUT WHY DO WE THINK THIS WAY?
American leaders since the end of the Second World War too often have chased 
buzzwords and their related intellectual debris� They also have minimized the 
immense problems related to waging war by using euphemisms for it; “signaling” 
and “modernization” in relation to the Vietnam War come instantly to mind� 
Such terms almost invariably manifest as an expression of means� The result of 
this is analysis of wars bereft of any political context (something Clausewitz railed 
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against as early as 1815), and sometimes the launching of wars without calling 
them wars or having any idea of what victory means�130 Moreover, by confusing 
competition among adversaries with things called hybrid or gray-zone war, we 
risk conflating everything with war—a dangerous proposition� If we are at war 
with another country, our citizens rightly can ask what exactly we are doing about 
it� If it is merely heated competition and international politics, meaning who 
gets what, when, and where, then elements of national power other than force or 
threats to use force will have to be relied on to a larger degree—and this seems 
to be the root of American leaders’ problem� For too long unchallenged by states 
with near-peer levels of economic or military might, the United States needs to 
relearn how to compete with other states in the international arena� Even better, 
it should relish the competition in the hopes of inspiring innovation and internal 
improvements—something quite natural to the American character when the 
polity is vigorous and healthy� Since no one is anywhere close to describing the 
United States as such at present, the confusion over what is competition and what 
is war is likely a symptom of an ailing U�S� political elite�
Another reason for the proliferation of new jargon on war is an ever-decreasing 
level of knowledge of military history, a point addressed in an article by Lukas 
Milevski�131 It is easy to insist that one has created something new or even devel-
oped a new concept or theory in the military realm if one’s knowledge of military 
history and history in general is insufficient� A second and related problem is a 
poor knowledge of military theory, particularly of the standard works such as 
Clausewitz’s On War and Sun Tzu’s Art of War, as well as past doctrinal practices� 
The related misuse of these works is perhaps a greater factor than an ignorance 
of them, particularly of Clausewitz’s On War� A third issue is the not-always- 
beneficial drive to develop something new in academic circles� This is particularly 
true in the international affairs and political science realms, where too often there 
is professional pressure to develop another microtheory to explain an element of 
political or military behavior or practice, and then to fit history into it rather than 
to analyze the past to see what patterns develop and what we can learn�
Worse is that war, for many in the West, has become an exercise in risk man-
agement, which means that leaders are no longer concerned with the war’s politi-
cal aims�132 If we are not worried about the aims, or perhaps do not even know 
what they are because we have lost our ability to think clearly about war, we forget 
how important it is to win wars, and thus to end them with agreement on or the 
imposition of a better peace�
In his critique of the concept of “fourth-generation warfare,” soldier-scholar An-
tulio Echevarria gives some advice applicable to discussion of so-called hybrid 
and gray-zone wars as well as other flawed notions� Pushing these ideas is “an 
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activity that only saps intellectual energy badly needed elsewhere,” and their pro-
ponents should stop spending their time “advancing or reinventing a bankrupt 
theory�”133 And the U�S� government and think tanks should stop funding re-
search projects supporting work that is injurious to American strategic thinking 
(although our adversaries will be very happy to see this wastage continue)� The 
problem is that too many of the people writing about these subjects, as well as 
those publishing them, either lack the tools to evaluate systematically what they 
are publishing or simply do not care�
The solution to this problem is simple: a return to the core principles of stra-
tegic analysis recounted above� No matter the conflict or adversary, the analysis 
must begin with an honest identification of the political objectives of all the 
actors involved� We must differentiate between war and peace, and properly 
identify the arenas of power within which we are operating� Moreover, when new 
terms appear—and they will—they must be tested immediately against history 
and existing theory� Most new so-called classifications of war would be instantly 
killed if properly examined through these lenses�
We need to relearn how to think about war and peace and remember the obvi-
ous fact that competition occurs in both arenas� The end of the Cold War brought 
new actors willing to challenge American hegemony and the resultant interna-
tional order� As historian and strategic analyst Brad Lee put it, “We are now in an 
era when the United States can no longer expect to overcome its problems with 
sheer material superiority or overwhelming military force�”134 While America’s 
strategic reality has changed, the worldview of U�S� policy makers seemingly 
has not� Inheriting an international order that is based on “cooperative security 
among states that shared [America’s] domestic political principles,” these politi-
cians and their advisers are surprised continually by actors who buck the prin-
ciples of cooperation and instead demonstrate hostile intent toward significant 
U�S� interests�135 The pushback from nonrogue states creates an uncomfortable 
disconnect between political aims and reality, driving the reflexive use of vague 
terms such as hybrid warfare and the gray zone among frustrated (and often un-
aware) practitioners and policy makers�
The U�S� pattern of misjudging its adversaries has grown since 1990; from 
surprise at the rise of nonstate actors declaring war on the United States to 
multiple failed resets with a former superpower determined to right perceived 
past wrongs, multiple American administrations have continued to look past 
or attempt to wish away determined opponents�136 More recently, U�S� leaders 
misjudged, if not resisted acknowledging, the Islamic State’s rise and its ability to 
achieve its political goal of establishing a caliphate in the aftermath of a trillion-
dollar nation-building project, while simultaneously assuming that a rising re-
gional power in the Pacific would be a responsible stakeholder and partner in the 
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international order� China’s recent land-reclamation projects in the South China 
Sea—blatantly situated in the exclusive economic zones of its neighbors and con-
trary to international law—expose the flawed and hopeful assessments that have 
fueled American foreign policy and grand strategy� What we need are concepts 
that clarify and inform our thinking, not muddy our intellectual waters and make 
it more difficult to pursue our political aims peacefully as well as to wage our 
wars� The 2017 U�S� National Security Strategy seems to be a belated recognition 
by some policy elites that the United States has been caught in an extended period 
of wishful thinking, of hoping that its competitors would see the advantage of an 
American-led world order and refrain from challenging it when and where they 
could� The new strategy clearly labels countries that are challenging U�S� power 
and interests and ones that are destabilizing their respective regions�137
At a late-2017 conference at the Austrian National Defence Academy, in Vi-
enna, which focused heavily on hybrid war and included dozens of speakers from 
the United States and Europe, the Austrian general who delivered the closing 
remarks said that Austria should not pay too much attention to things coming 
out of American think tanks� Americans should consider taking his advice, espe-
cially if the documents are larded with terms that unhelpfully confuse and distort 
already-complex human endeavors�138 Before the attacks on September 11, 2001, 
the buzzwords were transformation, net-centric warfare, and the revolution in 
military affairs. Hybrid war and the gray zone soon will follow them into oblivion, 
perhaps helped by the new grand strategy documents that identify malignant ac-
tors and actions threatening to U�S� national interests�
To summarize, policy makers and their advisers, when analyzing threats 
to U�S� national interests, apply variations of the unclear and poorly defined 
terms hybrid war and gray zone to describe the intents as well as the actions of 
global, regional, and nonstate actors, whether we are at war with them or not, 
and regardless of whether the discussion focuses on political or criminal acts, 
and regardless of whether military action is occurring in the tactical, operational, 
strategic, or grand strategic realms� This is not merely unhelpful, it is dangerous; 
worse, it communicates that American strategic analysis is like castles made of 
sand, soon to disappear, then only to be remade frantically again and again�
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 Alliances and ballistic-missile defense (BMD) are both significant elements of U�S� security policy, but the emphasis on each may be changing� Since the 
end of World War II, the global network of allies of the United States has been 
a strategic cornerstone�1 The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy 
reaffirms the vital role of alliances in U�S� security, but President Trump’s interac-
tions with traditional U�S� partners suggest a new degree of fluidity in these long-
standing relationships�2 BMD’s importance surged in the first half of the Trump 
administration, particularly after North Korea tested ballistic missiles that could 
threaten the U�S� homeland� In response, the U�S� Congress increased the Missile 
Defense Agency’s funding by over one-third, from $8�2 billion in 2017 to $11�5 
billion in 2018�3 How might an increased emphasis on BMD affect U�S� alliance 
relationships?
U�S� defense policy contends that BMD 
strengthens alliances� The historical record, how-
ever, is mixed� While BMD has bolstered alliances 
at times, at other times it has exacerbated allies’ 
doubts about U�S� commitment� Why have allies 
responded so differently to BMD and what are 
the implications for contemporary U�S� policy? 
Variations in threat perceptions, relative depen-
dence and vulnerability, and expectations of U�S� 
commitment could cause an ally to perceive that 
U�S� BMD increases the risk of abandonment or 
entrapment—meaning that the United States 
might either shirk an alliance obligation or drag an 
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ally into a war, respectively�4 When determining BMD policy and investments, 
U�S� leaders should consider not only expected defensive benefits but also how 
their decisions might affect allies’ perceptions of alliance cohesion and credibility�
After providing theoretical background on alliances and the concepts of 
abandonment and entrapment, this article will review how U�S� policy expects 
BMD to benefit alliances� It then tests this policy framework against two sets of 
case studies� The first set examines the earliest U�S� BMD system—Sentinel—in 
the late 1960s and its impact on alliance relationships with Japan and European 
NATO allies� The second set considers BMD since the end of the Cold War and 
again evaluates its effect on the Japanese and NATO alliances, and adds South 
Korea� The article lastly recommends how these lessons from the past and the 
present can better inform contemporary U�S� BMD policy�
ALLIANCE THEORY: ABANDONMENT AND ENTRAPMENT
States form alliances to increase their security efficiently� In an anarchic world, 
states must provide for their own security but often try to minimize costly de-
fense spending�5 A country typically seeks security by self-strengthening (i�e�, 
building up its own military) and by allying with other nations� Alliances have 
several potential benefits, such as distributing risk among multiple partners and 
improving security more quickly and cheaply than self-strengthening�6 That 
being said, allies may share the fiscal burden unevenly and alliances often in-
volve other, less tangible costs�7 For example, a state may sacrifice some political 
autonomy to gain security in an alliance�8 A cohesive alliance—one in which its 
members share common interests and agree on how to achieve them—is more 
likely to be effective and valuable to its members than one that is not�9
The credibility of one ally’s commitment to fight for the other or to restrain 
itself from undesirable adventurism is an essential element of alliance cohesion 
and effectiveness� An ally that doubts its partner’s credibility could fear either 
abandonment or entrapment�10 One ally could abandon another by ending the 
alliance, defecting to a different alliance, or abrogating an alliance commitment� 
Entrapment, on the other hand, means that one country could drag an ally into 
a war even if the conflict were contrary to the ally’s interests� Some analysts con-
tend that states rarely are entrapped, but more often are subject to entanglement, 
meaning that a state supports its ally in an undesirable undertaking to uphold 
alliance cohesion�11 Whether entrapment or entanglement, these related concepts 
involve one country’s fear that sacrificing autonomy to an alliance will expose it 
to more risk�
If an ally fears that it could be abandoned or entrapped, it might try to miti-
gate this risk, which then could undermine alliance cohesion, effectiveness, and 
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efficiency� To counter the risk of abandonment, an ally could discount the al-
liance’s value and offset that loss by self-strengthening or finding new allies� 
Alternatively, it could increase its own level of commitment to the alliance—or 
threaten to abandon the alliance—to spur the wavering ally to reaffirm its al-
legiance� Lastly, it could reduce the need for an alliance by reconciling with its 
opponent� Similarly, an ally fearing entrapment could preemptively quit the alli-
ance, appease the potential adversary to reduce the risk of an entrapping conflict, 
or take other steps—such as reducing its own commitment to the alliance—to 
restrain the ally before it starts an alliance-triggering conflict�12 If an ally per-
ceives that its partner might abandon or entrap it, alliance cohesion likely would 
weaken and the pact would become less valuable and credible in the eyes of both 
members and adversaries�
The late Glenn Snyder, a political scientist at the University of North Carolina, 
proposed the theory of the “alliance security dilemma” to explain why an alli-
ance member might fear abandonment or entrapment�13 The security dilemma, 
on which his theory is based, suggests that actions taken by a state to increase its 
power and improve its security in turn will make other countries feel less secure, 
causing them to strengthen their power as well� After this action and reaction, the 
original state again feels insecure and further increases its power, and so on in a 
vicious cycle�14 Snyder proposed that a similar dilemma exists within an alliance� 
An alliance member likely assesses the cost and risk of being abandoned or en-
trapped by an ally� Actions to reduce the risk of one outcome are apt to make the 
other more likely� Doubling down on an alliance commitment may mitigate the 
risk of abandonment but increase the risk of entrapment� Conversely, loosening 
alliance ties may avoid entrapment but raise the specter of abandonment�15 The al-
liance security dilemma makes it difficult for an alliance to achieve and maintain 
cohesion, which lies between the two extremes of abandonment and entrapment�
Snyder offered several variables that can determine whether a hypothetical al-
liance will be cohesive or a member will fear abandonment or entrapment� These 
factors include the extent of shared interests, one ally’s dependence on the other, 
and the explicitness and credibility of the alliance commitment� First, Snyder 
defined interests as whether allies share common objectives and a common op-
ponent� Overlapping interests minimize the risk of abandonment or entrapment� 
Second, relative dependence measures how much one ally needs the other’s 
support—and how each partner perceives this dependency� A country is more 
likely to fear abandonment if it perceives itself as being highly dependent on its 
ally, while that ally is less dependent on it� Third, commitment combines both 
the degree of promised support stipulated in an alliance agreement and also the 
credibility of that on the basis of the ally’s past behavior and reputation, as well as 
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one country’s judgment about its ally’s expected future behavior�16 Snyder’s model 
of interests, dependency, and commitment may help assess how allies perceive 
U�S� BMD capabilities�
Arguably, missile defense affects how allies view the credibility of U�S� alliance 
commitments�17 To gauge how and why U�S� BMD capabilities might influence al-
lied fears of abandonment or entrapment, this article adapts Snyder’s variables to 
the BMD context� First, discussions of allies’ shared interests should incorporate 
their threat perceptions� For instance, if allies do not agree on the importance 
or imminence of a missile threat, this divergent perception likely would reduce 
perceived mutual dependence and commitment, spurring fears of abandonment� 
Second, calculations of relative dependence should consider whether BMD tech-
nology and its ostensible benefits are restricted from, available to, or even net-
worked with an ally� An ally’s access to BMD’s defensive benefits not only affects 
its dependence on the United States but may change the relative vulnerability 
between the United States and its ally� Just as Snyder predicts that a high varia-
tion in dependence contributes to fears of abandonment, these differences in how 
BMD technology is employed and shared could affect an ally’s assessment of its 
dependence and relative vulnerability, thereby bolstering or weakening percep-
tions of the likelihood of abandonment� Modern BMD systems, some of which 
depend on cross-border sensor networks and forward-deployed weapons, could 
reduce perceived differences in dependence and vulnerability, thereby lessening 
abandonment fears but possibly raising entrapment risks� Lastly, U�S� allies could 
regard U�S� BMD policy and deployment decisions as indicators of U�S� alliance 
commitment� For example, basing U�S� BMD systems in an allied country might 
send a signal of strong U�S� commitment, while enlarging BMD systems in the 
continental United States and also reducing overseas troop deployments might 
send the opposite signal�
After reviewing the theoretical foundation of alliances, this article next exam-
ines the expected benefits of BMD to U�S� alliance relationships�
POLICY PERSPECTIVE:  
BMD IMPROVES ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS
Contemporary U�S� policy identifies three reasons why U�S� BMD capabilities 
should improve alliance relationships� First, BMD protects U�S� military capabili-
ties at home and abroad, which should reassure allies that the United States will 
be able to fulfill its commitments� Second, BMD directly benefits allies by defend-
ing their forces, people, and territories� Third, BMD opens up new avenues for 
military integration and industrial cooperation with allies� Official policy docu-
ments across recent presidential administrations highlight these three benefits� 
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Similarly, the academic and policy analysis communities also widely, but not 
universally, describe a constructive relationship between BMD and U�S� alliances�
The 2002 National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense, issued by the George 
W� Bush administration, argued that BMD capabilities would reassure allies, 
defend them, and encourage international defense cooperation� First, fielding 
BMD capabilities would “devalue missiles as tools of extortion and aggression,” 
preventing a ballistic-missile-armed state from using those weapons to forestall 
U�S� intervention on behalf of an ally, thus enhancing the credibility of U�S� de-
terrence and alliance commitments� Second, BMD would protect “not only the 
United States and deployed forces, but also friends and allies” against the widely 
proliferated missile threat� Finally, the United States should encourage allies to 
help develop BMD technologies�18 This three-pronged perspective on how BMD 
should benefit alliances continued into the Obama and Trump administrations�
The Obama administration’s 2009–10 Ballistic Missile Defense Review again 
emphasized that BMD could improve U�S� alliance relationships�19 It asserted that 
BMD is “integral” to pursuing “collaborative approaches with allies and partners” 
and again highlighted three benefits of BMD to U�S� alliances� First, BMD would 
reassure allies that the United States will uphold its alliance commitments despite 
the increased ballistic-missile threat� Second, BMD would protect allied popula-
tion centers and essential military capabilities� Finally, the United States would 
both share and codevelop BMD technology with U�S� allies�20 The Bush and 
Obama BMD policies demonstrate a consensus about BMD’s potential to benefit 
alliance relationships that has extended across U�S� presidential administrations 
and political parties and has continued into the Trump administration�
Trump administration policy has affirmed the importance of BMD to national 
security and shared the view that missile defense benefits U�S� alliances� The 2017 
National Security Strategy describes the threat that advanced missiles pose to 
the United States and its allies and advocates improving U�S� and allied missile- 
defense capabilities�21 The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) notes that “missile 
defense plays an increasingly important role in � � � reinforcing the indivisibility 
of U�S� and allied security” by protecting allies, assuring them of U�S� commit-
ment, deterring attacks, and creating opportunities for cooperation and burden 
sharing�22 Consistent with these policy documents, the Trump administration has 
continued to cooperate closely with allies on missile defense� Examples include 
deploying Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defense bat-
teries to South Korea, successfully testing the SM-3 Block IIA missile codevel-
oped with Japan, and improving missile-defense capabilities in Europe�23
Some scholars and policy analysts agree with this political consensus but 
also suggest other ways BMD should strengthen U�S� alliances� Brad Roberts (of 
59
Naval War College: Winter 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 5 4  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and a former Obama administration 
official responsible for missile defense) argues that BMD benefits alliance ties by 
demonstrating U�S� resolve, reducing the political pressure to escalate a conflict 
prematurely, and constraining an opponent’s ability to use ballistic missiles as a 
coercive tool�24 Stephan Frühling of the Australian National University points 
out that because of BMD’s defensive nature, the United States can employ it to 
demonstrate alliance commitment in a “generally non-threatening manner�”25 
Roberts and Frühling also both assert that BMD bolsters the credibility of U�S� 
extended deterrence, referring to the commitment to use nuclear weapons in 
defense of certain allies�26 Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service adds 
that BMD capabilities can protect critical infrastructure abroad, can ensure that 
the United States can deploy forces in defense of an ally, and can help form or 
maintain coalitions� As an example, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, deployed 
Patriot batteries both defended key installations in Saudi Arabia and helped 
restrain Israeli retaliation against Iraqi missile attacks�27 However, Ted Postol, a 
physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a BMD skeptic, asserts 
that some of the political benefits of BMD to U�S� allies during the Gulf War were 
merely “serendipitous” rather than a repeatable outcome�28 Yet despite some such 
dissenting views, there appears to be broad agreement that BMD contributes to 
alliance cohesion�
U�S� BMD policy across recent administrations has argued consistently that 
BMD benefits U�S� alliances� Although U�S� strategists intend for BMD employ-
ment at home or abroad to benefit U�S� alliances, this article next will analyze 
allies’ perspectives on U�S� BMD to see whether their perceptions match with or 
differ from U�S� policy expectations�
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:  
ALLIES’ MIXED RESPONSES TO U.S. BMD
Case studies from two different eras of U�S� missile defense offer the opportunity 
to test the theory that BMD strengthens alliance relationships, and they reveal 
that BMD has not always improved these ties� The first period begins with delib-
erations about deploying the Sentinel antiballistic missile (ABM) system in 1965 
and ends with the 1972 ABM Treaty� Although BMD technology and the interna-
tional security environment of the 1960s do not compare cleanly with contempo-
rary circumstances, U�S� government documents from this period shed light on 
internal debates and decisions�29 The second period begins with U�S� withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty in 2001 and continues to the present, permitting analysis 
of modern missile defenses in a contemporary technological and strategic setting�
This article assesses the bilateral U�S�-Japan alliance and the multilateral 
NATO alliance in both time frames and adds the U�S�–South Korea alliance in 
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the second period� Cold War scholar Michael Mandelbaum has described the 
U�S�-Japan alliance and NATO as the world’s only “nuclear alliances”—alliances 
in which the United States has committed to employing nuclear arms in their 
defense�30 That these alliances depend on nuclear deterrence makes BMD par-
ticularly relevant to alliance cohesion, either by providing some protection from 
a nuclear attack or by defending U�S� nuclear retaliatory capabilities� The second 
period adds South Korea because U�S� nuclear deterrence also pertains to this al-
liance and the 2017 deployment of THAAD to South Korea provides insight into 
modern entrapment risks�31
Pre–ABM Treaty (1965–72)
On 18 September 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert S� McNamara announced 
President Lyndon B� Johnson’s decision to field Sentinel, an ABM system in-
tended to defend U�S� territory against the anticipated threat of a small number of 
Chinese nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)�32 The John-
son administration described Sentinel as a “thin” defense, meaning it would pro-
tect large areas of the United States against a small number of missiles�33 Sentinel 
would have employed nuclear-armed interceptors� Existing guidance technology 
was not accurate enough to use either a conventional high-explosive or kinetic 
(“hit-to-kill”) warhead like the one that modern BMD interceptors use�34
While the debate within the Johnson administration about Sentinel largely 
weighed its limited military use against domestic political considerations, U�S� 
policy makers also evaluated its likely impact on alliance relationships�35 U�S� 
government documents exhibit how U�S� officials expected allies to respond to 
ABM deployment� The limited scope of the ballistic-missile threat, Sentinel’s 
U�S�-exclusive nature, and how this decision interacted with other signals of al-
liance cohesion complicated U�S� efforts to assure allies that this new capability 
did not signal a change in Washington’s security commitments� Sentinel generally 
benefited relations with Japan but sparked fears of abandonment among many 
NATO allies�
In the 1960s, nuclear arms and ICBMs were new technologies that had not 
proliferated widely yet; only one major nuclear power, the Soviet Union (USSR), 
and one emerging nuclear state, the People’s Republic of China, concerned the 
United States� By 1965, U�S� observers believed that the USSR had over two 
hundred ICBMs, so the Soviet arsenal already was too big to defend against 
cost-effectively�36 McNamara noted that “any ABM system can rather obviously 
be defeated by an enemy simply sending more offensive warheads or dummy 
warheads than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them�” He 
projected that developing a Soviet-oriented ABM system would lead to each side 
spending more on defenses, only “to be relatively at the same point of balance on 
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the security scale that we are now�”37 According to his analysis, the limited secu-
rity gained by a “heavy,” or high-capacity, anti-Soviet ABM system would not be 
worth the expense�
Mindful of the limitations of ABM capabilities, U�S� policy makers instead 
designed Sentinel as a “thin,” or relatively low-capacity, defense against the an-
ticipated Chinese threat� U�S� government analysts believed that China was not 
yet developing ICBMs but was likely to have a small number of them by 1975�38 
Because of America’s overwhelming nuclear superiority, McNamara asserted 
that it would be “insane and suicidal” for China to attack the United States, but 
by deploying a “Chinese-oriented ABM � � � we wish to reduce such possibilities 
to a minimum�” He further argued that Sentinel would “indicate to Asians that 
we intend to deter China from nuclear blackmail,” hinting at potential benefits 
to U�S� credibility�39
Sentinel was exclusive to the United States� Allies gained neither protection 
from ballistic missiles nor opportunities for industrial cooperation�40 Washing-
ton considered Sentinel to be too costly and complex for allies and infeasible to 
deploy overseas� Allies were geographically too close to the threats, meaning that 
a forward-deployed ABM system would not have enough reaction time to work 
effectively�41 Furthermore, the interceptors’ nuclear warheads raised significant 
command-and-control challenges and introduced risk that an ally could modify 
ABM interceptors into nuclear-armed ballistic missiles� Mindful of how allies 
might recoil against ABM restrictions, a State Department official said in a 1967 
meeting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that U�S� policy was “to 
discourage decisions by friendly countries in favor of an ABM defense—but to do 
so in a manner that would avoid damage to our relations with those countries�”42 
This approach essentially sought to limit the political impact of restricting mis-
sile defense from allies by dodging the topic rather than meaningfully consulting 
with valued partners�43
In this period, U�S� policy makers could not determine whether ABM defense 
improved or undermined allies’ perceptions of U�S� commitment� A 1965 State 
Department study on the “possible political and psychological effects” of such a 
system suggested that NATO allies could view it either as “underwriting U�S� will-
ingness to fulfill its commitments” or as “lending credence to the Gaullist view 
that the U�S� is not really fully committed to Europe�” This analysis was also of 
two minds about Asian responses� Creation of defenses against a Chinese nuclear 
attack, in the form of an ABM system, might cause Asian countries to “conclude 
that the U�S� would stand by its commitments�”44 Conversely, “it might appear 
that the U�S� did not place a sufficiently high value on its commitments to war-
rant risking even a limited nuclear attack,” and ABM deployment might inflate 
perceptions of China’s threat in Asia unnecessarily�45
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The Department of Defense also studied likely allied responses to Sentinel� 
In May 1967 the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed that allies would view the ABM 
decision in the context of U�S� efforts to increase allied defense participation and 
reduce “US involvement abroad (particularly in Asia)�” If allies perceived that 
the United States was “beginning to look more inward than outward,” they might 
view ballistic-missile defenses negatively� “To European and Japanese thinking 
only in terms of their own protection, a project to ‘defend the United States’ may 
have little realistic appeal, unless they can be convinced that a system which 
protects the strategic war making capability of the United States also helps deter 
a strike against their own countries�” The report concluded that Japan, whose 
“strategic views � � � are less fixed than those of the Europeans,” would be inter-
ested in ABM technology and would appreciate that “such a system might make 
the United States less susceptible to Soviet or Communist Chinese nuclear black-
mail�” In Europe, however, a decision to deploy an ABM system “would unnerve 
NATO,” and “further undermine European confidence in US intentions to fulfill 
its nuclear commitments to the Alliance�”46 The upcoming sections demonstrate 
that this analysis proved prescient: Japanese leaders felt that ABM deployment 
would benefit alliance cohesion, while ABM heightened abandonment fears 
among many European NATO allies�
Japan: BMD and U.S. Credibility. Japanese policy makers believed the U�S� ABM 
program would strengthen alliance cohesion and responded favorably to Ameri-
can plans� Their reaction stemmed from shared threat perceptions, the limited 
effect of any ABM deployment on the already-high mutual dependence between 
the two countries, and other signs of Washington’s commitment that Tokyo val-
ued more highly�
Bilateral ABM discussions and Japan’s reactions to China’s nascent nuclear 
capability indicate that in the mid-1960s Japan and the United States assessed the 
Chinese threat similarly� Starting as early as November 1965, U�S� and Japanese 
diplomats and military officers routinely discussed the future Chinese nuclear 
threat, ABM defense, and its implications for the alliance�47 Reflecting their con-
cern about the Chinese threat, senior Japanese defense officials asked whether 
ABMs could be used against shorter-range Chinese missiles that could strike 
Japan, and asked for “data for use in planning anti-missile defenses,” even though 
“they would require deployment of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil�”48 Because 
of the warheads involved, U�S� participants discouraged such planning� In 1966, 
the U�S� Central Intelligence Agency reported that China’s successful nuclear 
weapons tests had made the “Chinese Communist threat to Japan credible,” and 
Japan’s “leading papers � � � for the first time unanimously [warned] of the pos-
sible Chinese menace to Japan’s security�”49 Furthermore, in an internal Japanese 
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government report (referred to as the 1968/70 Report) leading nuclear experts 
warned that future Chinese nuclear capabilities could both threaten Japan and 
weaken the credibility of U�S� extended deterrence�50 These analyses suggest that 
both Japan’s political leaders and the public likely viewed China’s nuclear capabil-
ity as threatening, which aligned with the U�S� perspective�
Japan highly depended on U�S� security guarantees, and plans to field Sentinel 
did not change this circumstance dramatically, especially at a time when many 
other issues played a more important role in the relationship� The 1960 mutual 
defense treaty between the two countries included extended deterrence under 
the so-called U�S� nuclear umbrella� Even if Japanese leaders doubted U�S� cred-
ibility, the authors of the 1968/70 Report concluded, they had no better alternative 
than to rely on U�S� extended deterrence�51 Furthermore, Japan’s rehabilitating 
economy and peace-oriented constitution limited its options for military mod-
ernization and prohibited it from pursuing nuclear weapons�52 Several other sig-
nificant events in the late 1960s encouraged close communication and coopera-
tion between Tokyo and Washington rather than one-sided dependence� These 
catalyzing events included Japan’s efforts to recover Okinawa, the increasing in-
volvement of the United States in the Vietnam War, the renegotiation of the 1960 
treaty, and the U�S� desire for Japan to assume a larger role in East Asian security�53
From an alliance-management perspective, the ABM question created op-
portunities to consult with Japan and treat it as a valued security partner, not 
just a client� Although the United States would not share ABM technology with 
Japan, the United States provided detailed information about ABM capabilities 
and U�S� intentions� In May 1967, the U�S� ambassador to Japan met with the vice- 
ministers of Japan’s foreign ministry and its defense agency to discuss technical 
details concerning ABMs and to explain the rationale for U�S� deployment deci-
sions� One U�S� military participant was surprised by the frank conversations 
and the technological details that U�S� participants provided� “I was impressed 
(amazed) at the amount of substantive material and discussion given by our side 
at this meeting�”54 Open communication with an ally, particularly on sensitive 
subjects, can buttress alliance cohesion, and may have had that effect on the 
Japanese in this case�55
In these meetings, Japanese policy makers explicitly stated their belief that 
ABM deployment would strengthen the credibility of U�S� commitments, but 
also noted that it was not a very important factor� In May 1967, Vice-Minister 
Nobuhiko Ushiba of the foreign ministry said that Japan “believed that a U�S� 
ABM deployment would enhance the credibility of the U�S� deterrent�”56 In Au-
gust 1967, only weeks before McNamara’s Sentinel announcement, Vice-Minister 
Yoshio Miwa of the Japan Defense Agency reaffirmed to U�S� ambassador U� 
Alexis Johnson that Sentinel “would increase U�S� credibility,” but reminded 
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him that Japan still considered the “deterrent power of the U�S�” to be the “most 
effective method to protect Asian countries�” Johnson then asked Miwa and his 
foreign ministry counterpart, Vice-Minister Ushiba, what the United States could 
do “to maintain its deterrent capability�” Ushiba replied that “repeated assurances 
on suitable occasions” were more important than an ABM system itself, and 
emphasized the point by saying, “We believe your words�”57 Public pronounce-
ments that the United States would defend Japan bolstered its confidence in U�S� 
defense commitments�58 Japan had full faith in U�S� alliance commitments� An 
ABM system might have strengthened Japan’s perception of U�S� credibility, but 
it was not the most important factor�
Shared threat perceptions, high-but-constant mutual dependence, and faith in 
U�S� security commitments all contributed to Japan’s acceptance of U�S� Sentinel 
ABM plans and to some degree bolstered Japan’s assessment of the U�S� commit-
ment� This outcome roughly matches what modern U�S� BMD policy expects� 
NATO allies, on the other hand, reacted negatively to Sentinel�
NATO: Fear of “Fortress America.” Western European NATO allies, particularly 
the nuclear-armed United Kingdom, believed that U�S� ABM plans increased the 
risk of U�S� abandonment in the face of a Soviet attack� Allied concerns stemmed 
from differing threat perceptions, expected changes in mutual vulnerability, and 
broader concerns about the credibility of U�S� commitments�
Many Western European NATO members—including both of the nuclear-
armed allies (the United Kingdom and France) and West Germany—were con-
cerned that the United States might prefer to defend itself from a Soviet strategic 
strike rather than deter an attack on European allies with a credible guarantee 
of U�S� nuclear retaliation�59 U�S� BMD by itself may have increased allied per-
ceptions of U�S� credibility, but NATO allies expected that U�S� deployment of 
an ABM system coincident with countervailing Soviet defenses would have the 
opposite effect�
Western European governments and policy analysts were leery of Sentinel’s 
expected deployment� As early as July 1965, the U�K� Foreign Office assessed that 
ABM deployment would not upend the “balance of deterrence” between NATO 
and the Soviet Union but might “tilt it and thus increase tension and instability�” 
It warned that the “disparity between Europe and the two super-powers would 
be increased to the disadvantage of Europe” and that U�S� ABM deployment 
would “strengthen the hand of Gaullists and would be unhealthy for the Atlan-
tic Alliance�”60 A month after this analysis, Britain’s ambassador to the United 
States warned Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the ABM decision was “likely 
to have important consequences” for “the position of Europe within the Western 
Alliance�”61 Summarizing European worries, Johan Holst, a Norwegian defense 
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analyst who was later Norway’s minister of defense and minister of foreign af-
fairs, wrote that ABM deployment “might look like an expression of American 
neo-isolationism, a return to Fortress America based on self-defense without 
entanglements�” Holst acknowledged that if the United States alone had BMD 
that might “strengthen the alliance by adding potency to the U�S� guarantee,” but 
the dual fielding of U�S� and Soviet BMD systems, he argued, “might on balance 
also be perceived as reducing the validity of the [U�S�] guarantee�”62 These con-
cerns about U�S� ABM plans likely were rooted in divergent perceptions of the 
ballistic-missile threat�
NATO allies disagreed with the U�S� assessment of the Chinese strategic 
nuclear threat� Britain’s Foreign Office concluded that a nuclear war with China 
was “not at present on the cards [sic]�”63 Some European analysts, such as Britain’s 
Laurence W� Martin, then believed that American fears of “China’s embryonic 
nuclear force” were “hysterical and dangerous” and “exaggerated�”64 Others sus-
pected that the U�S� focus on the Chinese threat was a pretext to field an ABM 
system that would grow from a thin system into a larger, heavy one that could 
defend the United States against the Soviet ICBM threat�65 Even if the Chinese 
threat was not a duplicitous justification, some European observers thought that, 
as ABM technology improved, U�S� political leaders would not be able to resist fu-
ture U�S� domestic pressures to build a heavy system that would affect European 
security more negatively�66 Additionally, because the United States withheld ABM 
technologies from NATO allies, the system offered them no security from Soviet 
nuclear and conventional forces arrayed against Western Europe�
Although the Soviet Union posed different threats to the United States and Eu-
rope, without missile defenses the United States and Europe faced similar levels 
of risk� Sentinel changed this perception of shared vulnerability� A 1967 report on 
European views of Sentinel by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research (INR) noted that “many in Europe believe � � � that the advent of this new 
military technology � � � will result in greater difference in the degree of security 
enjoyed by countries on the two sides of the Atlantic, to the disadvantage of West-
ern Europe�” Parallel ABM deployments in the Soviet Union could exacerbate this 
change in relative vulnerability� Helmut Schmidt, then a parliamentary leader of 
West Germany’s Social Democratic Party and later West Germany’s chancellor, 
opposed any ABM deployment for this reason� According to the 1967 INR report, 
he thought that such a course “would lead to a rapid erosion of both the NATO 
and Warsaw Pacts” because the superpower in each alliance might become more 
comfortable with the idea of defending itself rather than keeping its deterrence 
commitments� He also thought that this gap between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, as ABM-capable states, and the other countries in Europe “would 
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cause a crisis of confidence on the part of the [Western European countries] 
about the [U�S�] nuclear guarantee�”67
This concern that BMD might change the relative vulnerability between the 
United States and its European allies was not limited to European political lead-
ers but likely was shared by some members of the public� European newspapers 
exhibited similar anxiety about the advent of U�S� and Soviet BMD� An editorial 
in Hamburg’s Die Welt opined that “[a] Europe sandwiched between the two 
ABM-equipped world powers is confronted with the alternatives of continued 
nuclear protection by the respective superpowers—a protection that implies 
increased dependence—or of withdrawing this protection�” A writer in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine claimed that the expected deployment of ABM systems 
would “accentuate the differences between the haves and have-nots and increase 
fears among the latter�”68 An article in France’s Le Monde identified the challenge 
the ABM concept posed to France’s and Britain’s small nuclear deterrents: “The 
advent of the ABMs has every chance of limiting the strategic [nuclear] game to 
the very big powers�”69 According to these perspectives, the advent of an ABM 
system would improve U�S� defenses while simultaneously undercutting Western 
Europe’s, thus significantly changing Western European perceptions of the rela-
tive vulnerability between the United States and Europe�
Broader fears of a “decoupling” between European and American inter-
ests, combined with sparse consultation with NATO allies about ABM policy, 
worsened Western European worries of U�S� abandonment� In the early years 
of the Cold War, the U�S� promise of extended deterrence was credible partly 
because the United States based nuclear weapons in Europe, from which they 
could better reach Soviet targets�70 The development of U�S� strategic weapons, 
such as the Minuteman ICBM and the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic 
missile—which could be launched from U�S� territory or the open ocean, 
respectively—meant that the United States could remove some of its weapons 
from Europe� The United States still pledged to use nuclear weapons in response 
to a Soviet attack on Europe, but the shrinking U�S� nuclear presence in Europe 
heightened allied doubts�71 The decision to deploy an ABM system exacerbated 
the sense that the United States was weakening its nuclear commitment to Eu-
rope’s defense�72 Additionally, despite some ABM discussions with the United 
Kingdom in 1966, the United States consulted with other NATO allies only 
days before McNamara announced Sentinel�73 This approach effectively forced 
a controversial issue on the alliance as a fait accompli and—in contrast to the 
approach taken with Japan—appeared to European observers to be a deliber-
ate snub of alliance consultative processes, which European allies valued as a 
symbol of transatlantic solidarity�74
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Divergent threat assessments, changing perceptions of relative vulnerability, 
and wariness about U�S� security commitments all contributed to European allies’ 
fears that the United States might abandon its nuclear commitments� This out-
come does not align with what modern U�S� BMD policy expects, and contempo-
rary analysts should appreciate that allies could again perceive U�S� BMD invest-
ments as increasing the risk of abandonment, particularly if threat assessments 
differ, relative vulnerability changes inequitably, or other factors compound allied 
doubts about U�S� commitment� Noting but skipping over the era of the ABM 
Treaty (1972–2001), this article next will examine several modern case studies�
Modern BMD (2001–Present)
Sentinel and follow-on U�S� ABM systems affected U�S� alliances less than first 
expected because the 1972 ABM Treaty between the United States and the So-
viet Union curtailed ABM efforts� The treaty limited the size and scope of ABM 
systems and imposed constraints on future research and development� It also 
distinguished between strategic and theater ballistic-missile defenses, restricting 
the former more tightly�75 By defending the United States against a long-range 
ICBM threat, Sentinel would have been considered a strategic system, while a 
shorter-range system such as the modern Patriot missile would have been clas-
sified as a theater defense� By limiting the United States and the Soviet Union to 
no more than one hundred strategic ABM weapons, the treaty emphasized the 
importance of nuclear deterrence rather than missile defense�76 Within a few 
years, the United States abandoned its ABM program and did not field strategic 
BMD systems again until after President George W� Bush withdrew from the 
ABM Treaty in December 2001�77
The Bush administration withdrew from the treaty partly because of the 
changing ballistic-missile threat�78 Unlike in the 1960s, contemporary ballistic- 
missile threats were diversifying and proliferating� Modern convention-
ally armed ballistic missiles were increasingly attractive alternatives to manned 
strike aircraft because they were cheaper to produce or purchase, required less 
expertise to employ, and were difficult to defend against�79 No longer simply a 
weapon in the nuclear superpower standoff, in the post–Cold War environment 
ballistic missiles posed a worldwide challenge to the United States and its allies�80 
Today, over thirty countries have ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 
kilometers�81
Over recent decades, BMD has broadened to include not only defending the 
continental United States from ICBMs (homeland defense) but also protecting 
deployed U�S� forces and allies from ballistic missiles with shorter ranges (re-
gional defense)� U�S� homeland defense—like strategic defense before it—focuses 
on defending against countries such as North Korea and Iran that have, or might 
in the future have, small numbers of ICBMs, rather than against countries with 
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larger nuclear arsenals, such as China or Russia�82 A network of land-, sea-, and 
space-based sensors support this mission�83 The ground-based interceptor (GBI) 
would be used to defend against ICBMs, but only forty-four are fielded, and they 
have had mixed success in live-fire tests�84 To borrow terms from the Johnson 
administration, one could best describe U�S� homeland defense as a thin rather 
than a heavy system�
Regional defense employs a range of sensors and weapons to defend deployed 
forces and allies against shorter-range threats in the midcourse and terminal 
phases of flight� Midcourse defense involves intercepting missiles while they are 
outside the atmosphere� Terminal defense means intercepting a ballistic missile 
as it descends toward its target�85 Some USN ships with the Aegis combat system 
and AN/SPY-1 radar are BMD capable and can employ SM-3 and SM-6 intercep-
tors against targets in the midcourse and terminal phases, respectively� The U�S� 
Army has BMD sensors such as the AN/TPY-2 radar and weapons such as the 
THAAD and Patriot missile systems for terminal defense� These Navy and Army 
weapons use either conventional explosive or kinetic—so-called hit-to-kill— 
warheads�86 Notably, some of the regional BMD sensors, such as the shipborne 
AN/SPY-1 or the land-based AN/TPY-2, also can provide U�S� homeland de-
fenses with earlier detection and tracking of an incoming missile�87
BMD no longer is an exclusive U�S� capability� It is now accessible to and even 
networked with U�S� allies, many of whom face ballistic-missile threats and have 
acquired or developed missile defenses� The United States encourages allies to 
participate in BMD efforts and advocates interoperability across national sys-
tems�88 Nineteen individual nations and the NATO alliance cooperate with the 
United States on BMD� This cooperation has included pooling research-and-
development efforts, acquiring interoperable BMD systems, hosting U�S� BMD 
systems, and coordinating operational employment�89 The 2019 MDR empha-
sizes the importance of “interoperability among various [U�S� and allied] missile 
defense capabilities, to include command and control networks, sensors, and 
[integrated air and missile defense] systems�”90 A ballistic missile’s speed, altitude, 
and range limit the time available for detection, tracking, and interception�91 The 
United States tackles this challenge by sharing information among different sen-
sors and interceptors to improve engagement opportunities and by conducting 
deliberate planning and decentralizing decision-making to shorten engagement 
timelines�92 Cooperation with interoperable allies could improve both U�S� and 
allied defenses further by broadening sensor coverage, increasing the number 
of available interceptors, and planning and executing combined defenses better�
Similarly to the pre–ABM Treaty period, modern BMD’s effect on U�S� alli-
ance relationships appears closely related to shared threat perceptions, relative 
dependence and vulnerability, and other signs of U�S� commitment� In Japan, 
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these factors arguably have enabled BMD to overcome Tokyo’s fear of entrap-
ment and strengthen the U�S�-Japan alliance� In South Korea, cross-border BMD 
integration has raised fears of entrapment� In Europe, as the United States began 
fielding modern BMD systems there, some NATO allies initially were wary of 
abandonment, but as the threat evolved and U�S� deployment plans changed these 
fears subsided�
Japan: Overcoming Entrapment Fears and Embracing BMD Cooperation. U�S� 
policy suggests that BMD demonstrates America’s commitment to work with and 
defend allies around the world� Recent experience with Japan supports this argu-
ment� Japan and the United States similarly perceive the ballistic-missile threat, 
BMD increases the overall dependence between the two countries while also 
evenly reducing vulnerability, and forward-deployed BMD forces tangibly dem-
onstrate U�S� commitment to Japan’s defense� As a result, U�S� BMD capabilities 
appear to have improved the U�S�-Japan alliance�
Japan has worked closely with the United States on BMD since the late 1990s, 
but its policy makers initially worried about entrapment risks� China’s 1996 mis-
sile exercises near Taiwan and North Korea’s missile testing in 1998 demonstrated 
Japan’s vulnerability to ballistic missiles�93 By 2001, Japan’s Defense Agency iden-
tified BMD as “an important issue for Japan’s defense policy” but underscored 
the importance of “[tackling] the issue independently�”94 Because modern BMD 
systems typically are networked, Japan feared that closer BMD cooperation 
with the United States might cause Japan to become embroiled in other regional 
conflicts—such as in South Korea or Taiwan—even if it was not attacked direct-
ly�95 Defending another country also would have been inconsistent with Japan’s 
constitutional prohibitions against collective self-defense�96 The government of 
Japan announced its intentions to introduce BMD systems in December 2003, 
but the announcement reflected its concern that BMD might lead to entrap-
ment, or at least the appearance of participating in collective self-defense� Japan 
underscored that the BMD system would defend only Japan (not so-called third 
countries) and would “be operated on Japan’s independent judgement, � � � based 
on the information � � � acquired by Japan’s own sensors�”97 This emphasis on BMD 
independence waned, however, as the ballistic-missile threat to Japan increased�
More recently, shared threat perceptions drove Japan to cooperate closely 
with the United States on missile defense� Regional ballistic-missile capabilities, 
primarily in North Korea and China, have improved steadily, and the United 
States and Japan both consider these weapons to be threats�98 As a result, Japan 
no longer hesitates to integrate with U�S� systems� According to Japan’s 2016 de-
fense white paper, “Further cooperation with the U�S� government including the 
U�S� Forces in Japan is necessary for efficient and effective operation of the BMD 
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system,” to include “real-time sharing of BMD operational � � � information�”99 A 
strong, shared threat perception likely stimulated the alliance relationship�
The United States and Japan have robust joint BMD capabilities, which im-
prove the security of both countries to a similar degree and increase their depen-
dence on each other�100 BMD-capable USN ships are based in Yokosuka, Japan, 
and regularly exercise with Japan’s own BMD-capable destroyers�101 The United 
States and Japan collaboratively developed the SM-3 Block IIA, an advanced, 
midcourse, regional defense interceptor that both navies use�102 The United 
States has placed two AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan that provide information to 
U�S� regional and homeland-defense systems and also share data with Japanese 
defenses�103 Japan also employs U�S�-designed Patriot PAC-3 missiles and plans 
to purchase two Aegis Ashore systems, a land-based adaptation of a naval BMD 
capability�104 Furthermore, Japan has taken steps to coordinate BMD operations 
better with the United States, such as establishing a Japan-U�S� Bilateral Joint 
Operation Coordination Center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base, near Tokyo�105 
Within the limits of Japan’s defense budget and political will, this close technical 
and operational BMD cooperation enables it to benefit from BMD to a similar 
extent to the United States�
Forward-deploying U�S� BMD forces to Japan also strongly signals U�S� com-
mitment� According to the late political scientist Thomas Schelling, stationing 
U�S� forces abroad communicates U�S� commitment beyond even their military 
utility� Forward-deployed forces, particularly in a geographically constrained 
and isolated area such as Japan, may act as a “trip wire�” If another country at-
tacked Japan, these U�S� forces would come under attack as well, which would 
make it politically difficult for the United States to fail to intervene� Furthermore, 
defensive forces such as missile defenses place the onus on an opponent to take 
the initiative and go on the offensive—likely ceding the moral high ground to 
the United States and its allies�106 The presence of U�S� forces that include BMD 
capabilities should deter an opponent from attacking and reassure Japan that the 
United States is likely to follow through on its alliance commitments�
South Korea: Mitigating Entrapment Risks. As in Japan in the early years of last 
decade, U�S� BMD capabilities have elicited fears of entrapment in South Ko-
rea� South Korea and the United States long have viewed North Korea’s ballistic 
missiles as a threat, but North Korea’s numerous successful missile tests in 2017 
increased South Korea’s concern to such an extent that it permitted the United 
States to complete its politically controversial THAAD deployment�107 Despite 
this shared threat perception, concern about dependence on the United States, 
the risk of unintended cooperation with Japan, and expectations of U�S� behavior 
all likely added to South Korea’s worry that U�S� BMD could result in entrapment�
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Entrapment and entanglement concerns have shaped South Korean leaders’ 
perceptions of BMD since at least 1999, when Seoul declined to participate in 
nascent U�S� BMD efforts, partly because the effort might have damaged rela-
tions with Beijing�108 The recent U�S� deployment of the THAAD system to South 
Korea revived this concern�109 China argues that THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar is 
part of America’s homeland-defense sensor network and thus threatens China’s 
limited nuclear deterrent, thereby leaving China vulnerable to U�S� nuclear coer-
cion�110 Beijing retaliated against Seoul for agreeing to host THAAD by imposing 
unofficial economic sanctions, including boycotts of popular Korean bands and 
reduced Chinese tourism�111
The structure of U�S� alliances in East Asia also likely affects Seoul’s fear of 
BMD-enabled entrapment� BMD integration could expose South Korea to en-
tanglement with Japan, the other major ally of the United States in Northeast 
Asia� Victor Cha, a Korea expert at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, describes South Korea and Japan as quasi allies because they share the 
United States as a common ally but are not allied themselves�112 Although the 
United States encourages closer defense cooperation between the two coun-
tries, animosity rooted in Japan’s decades-long occupation of Korea in the early 
twentieth century inhibits closer alignment�113 Because U�S� and Japanese BMD 
systems are integrated with each other already, adding South Korean BMD sen-
sors and weapons into this network could support the defense of Japan directly, 
or alternatively could cause South Korea to depend on Japanese systems to defend 
itself� Either outcome likely would be unwelcome in South Korea, which is loath 
to cooperate with Japan�114
To mitigate these risks of entrapment or entanglement, in 2006 Seoul began 
developing the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) as an alternative to 
U�S� BMD systems�115 Referring to KAMD, South Korea’s defense minister said 
in 2013 that “we will not join the U�S� missile defense system, but take our own 
path�” KAMD includes a mix of domestic and international components, such as 
an Israeli-made early warning radar, the U�S� Aegis BMD-capable naval weapon 
system, and South Korean and U�S� interceptors�116 Economic motivations also 
shaped KAMD� South Korea purchased some secondhand weapons to reduce 
costs and bought some domestic equipment to spur its defense industry�117 De-
spite these efforts at independent BMD, some South Korean analysts remain 
skeptical about the distinction between KAMD and U�S� BMD systems, positing 
that “it is only a matter of time” before KAMD is “integrated into the U�S�-led ef-
forts to create ballistic missile defense in the Asian-Pacific region�”118
Despite these concerns, South Korea recognizes the importance to its defense 
of interoperability with U�S� systems� Despite Seoul’s efforts to minimize the 
risks of entrapment or entanglement, South Korea continues to cooperate with 
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the United States on other BMD efforts, such as participating in multinational 
(United States, Japan, and South Korea) naval BMD exercises and building three 
BMD-capable warships incorporating the U�S� Aegis combat system�119 In the 
future Seoul could determine that the security benefits of closer BMD integration 
with the United States may outweigh the entrapment risks� Furthermore, KAMD 
maintains optional interoperability with the United States� According to South 
Korea’s 2016 defense white paper, Seoul desires to strengthen “both ROK-U�S� 
combined capabilities and independent capabilities � � � to effectively deter and 
respond to mounting nuclear and missile threats from North Korea�”120 South 
Korea’s actions and words suggest that, despite a desire for BMD independence, 
it does not reject cooperation with the United States completely�
South Korea’s perceptions of U�S� commitment and expected behavior also 
likely color Seoul’s perceived risk of entrapment or abandonment� Some scholars 
have observed that during the Cold War South Korea primarily feared abandon-
ment, but since the end of the Cold War it more often has feared entrapment, 
partly because of the sometimes aggressive U�S� military stance toward North 
Korea�121 President Trump’s bellicose rhetoric toward North Korea and reports in 
2017 of planning for a limited strike on North Korea might have raised further 
South Korea’s fear of entrapment�122 On the other hand, Trump’s call for renego-
tiating the U�S�-ROK Free Trade Agreement or suspending combined military 
exercises after the 2018 Singapore summit with Pyongyang’s Kim Jong-un could 
send confusing messages about Washington’s commitment to Seoul�123 Whether 
U�S� BMD causes an ally to fear abandonment or entrapment does not occur in a 
political vacuum, and an ally such as South Korea instead probably assesses BMD 
as one piece of evidence about the overall commitment of the United States to 
their mutual alliance�
NATO: From Fear of Abandonment to Alliance BMD. NATO’s initial encounter 
with modern U�S� BMD, which focused on homeland defense during the George 
W� Bush administration, fanned familiar fears of abandonment, but this anxiety 
waned as U�S� missile-defense policy in Europe evolved to favor regional defense� 
In the years around Washington’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the Euro-
pean NATO allies did not consider ballistic missiles a threat, they expected BMD 
to change mutual dependence and vulnerability, and they had broader doubts 
about U�S� commitment� Not surprisingly, these factors stoked European fears of 
abandonment� The shift to regional defense during the Obama administration 
helped assuage these earlier fears and contributed to the alliance benefits that U�S� 
policy predicts�
Even before the Bush administration withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001, 
the United States and its NATO allies disagreed on the relevance of BMD in the 
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post–Cold War environment� The United States advocated national missile de-
fense (NMD) to counter the threat that “rogue states” such as North Korea might 
pose in the future�124 Europeans, however, did not think these missile threats were 
imminent or compelling, particularly when compared with more-immediate 
and proximate challenges such as terrorism or conflict in the Balkans�125 French 
policy makers not only believed that the existing missile threat did not justify 
BMD but worried further about how a missile-defense revival might threaten its 
independent nuclear deterrent�126 For Europeans who already were concerned 
about diminished U�S� interest in European security, NMD and the likely U�S� 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty—which some Europeans viewed as the foun-
dation of nuclear stability—provided further evidence to complement anxieties 
about U�S� reliability in the seemingly unipolar post–Cold War environment�127
Against this backdrop, the Bush administration’s 2006 proposal to put ten 
GBI missiles in Poland and a supporting radar in the Czech Republic to defend 
the United States and some of Western Europe against future Iranian ICBMs 
resurrected European abandonment worries� The United States referred to the 
proposal as the “third site,” because it would have been the third GBI base after 
Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California� Both host 
countries supported this initiative, which would have been a visible sign of U�S� 
commitment to them and, like the presence of any other forward-deployed U�S� 
forces, would have provided trip-wire benefits�128 However, the benefits were not 
as evident to the rest of NATO, which still disagreed with the United States about 
the relevance and likelihood of an ICBM threat from Iran�129 Furthermore, the 
third site would have contributed only to the defense of some NATO members, 
as well as the United States� Forward-deployed GBIs could not protect those 
NATO members closest to Iran, in southeastern Europe�130 The decision also 
negatively signaled U�S� commitment to multilateral alliance processes because 
the United States negotiated the basing arrangements directly with the host 
countries, bypassing NATO channels (which might have been slower and more 
contentious)�131 As with Sentinel, the United States seemed to have dodged the 
difficult work of meaningfully consulting with most NATO allies about its BMD 
plans�
Upon taking office in 2009, the Obama administration reassessed the missile 
threat from Iran and U�S� BMD capabilities� American policy makers determined 
that Iran was more likely to threaten Europe with shorter-range missiles than to 
hold the United States at risk with ICBMs�132 Additionally, U�S� regional-defense 
systems, particularly the Navy’s SM-3 interceptor, had proved themselves better 
in testing than GBIs�133 So the Obama administration scrapped the not-yet-
fielded homeland defense–oriented third site and replaced it with the Euro-
pean Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), a regional-defense plan that included 
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deploying BMD-capable USN ships to Europe and building Aegis Ashore sites in 
Romania and Poland�134
Russian opposition to missile defense also influenced European attitudes and 
Obama administration decisions� Russia suspected that the third site and EPAA 
were in opposition to Russian strategic nuclear capabilities and opposed both 
initiatives� Russia argued that the third site’s GBIs and the SM-3 Block IIB inter-
ceptor proposed for EPAA (but later canceled) would have had some capability 
of defending the United States against Russian ICBMs and that Aegis Ashore’s 
missile launchers could launch Tomahawk cruise missiles in violation of the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty�135 The United States and NATO 
disagreed with Russia’s positions�136 Russia’s opposition to the third site and to 
the SM-3 Block IIB in EPAA likely influenced allied opinions about these weap-
ons and U�S� decisions to cancel each program, particularly at a time when both 
Western Europe and the United States sought to improve relations with Russia�137
Despite Russia’s unmistakable imprint on these BMD decisions, it remains 
valuable to assess them from the intra-alliance perspective� Unlike the third site, 
NATO allies favorably received EPAA in part because U�S� and NATO threat 
perceptions more closely aligned, EPAA provided tangible defensive benefits to 
European allies, and EPAA’s deployment has indicated U�S� commitment to Eu-
rope across administrations� Whereas European allies did not believe an Iranian 
ICBM threat was imminent, they felt Tehran more plausibly could develop and 
field missiles capable of reaching parts of Europe� Reflecting this common threat 
assessment and new alliance-wide support for BMD, leaders of NATO countries 
declared in 2010 that they should develop a “NATO missile defense capability” 
that would include both EPAA and indigenous capabilities to defend all NATO’s 
population and territory from ballistic-missile attack�138 This change in European 
defense policy demonstrated that European NATO members recognized bal-
listic missiles as a threat and believed that U�S� BMD would benefit, rather than 
exclude, them�
Under EPAA, relative dependence and vulnerability between the United States 
and its allies did not change dramatically� Instead, the shift toward regional de-
fense enabled European allies to reduce their vulnerability by hosting and inte-
grating with U�S� BMD systems� EPAA serves as a component within a broader 
multilateral effort by NATO members toward an “alliance-commanded” BMD 
system, which will incorporate a variety of interoperable national systems�139 
While it may be difficult to integrate multinational capabilities seamlessly, NATO’s 
approach instead flexibly expands opportunities for participation and burden 
sharing among alliance members, particularly ones that may not be able to afford 
expensive U�S� equipment or may want to support domestic defense industries�
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U�S� BMD systems deployed to Europe as part of EPAA have provided tan-
gible evidence of U�S� commitment to European defense across administrations� 
Gustav Lindstrom, director of the European Union Institute for Security Stud-
ies, describes EPAA as “now a core project for Europe and NATO, effectively 
strengthening the relationship between NATO and the United States�” Therefore, 
he argues, it also has become a “weather vane for gauging the state and ‘tempera-
ture’ of transatlantic relations�”140 Similarly, Catherine McArdle Kelleher at the 
University of Maryland has described EPAA as a “barometer of U�S� support” for 
NATO�141 That being the case, NATO allies closely watch EPAA for evidence of 
continuity or change in the climate of U�S�-NATO relations� President Trump’s 
continued support of EPAA has reassured many NATO allies�142 As described 
earlier with regard to South Korea, while BMD cooperation constitutes just one 
portion of a complex alliance relationship, for allies it may be a particularly useful 
indicator of U�S� commitment because the amount of U�S� investment—in terms 
of money, military systems, and people—is readily apparent�
Many factors influence whether and how NATO attitudes toward EPAA will 
evolve in the future�143 Threat assessments may change or diverge� Some in Europe 
expected the Iranian ballistic-missile threat to diminish following the 2015 Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)� The Trump administration, however, 
has disagreed with that benign threat assessment� Burden-sharing expectations 
may shift� EPAA imposes few fiscal costs on the NATO alliance, but the Trump 
administration seeks more financial contributions by allies�144 As missile-defense 
capabilities improve, Russia likely will continue to pressure the NATO alliance to 
curtail or abandon missile-defense efforts� These factors could upend the existing 
alignment among NATO members about missile defense�
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
BMD has become a fundamental element of the modern security environment 
and it is appropriate for the United States to increase BMD investment, particu-
larly in light of North Korea’s improving strategic arsenal and other countries’ 
quickly maturing advanced conventional threats, such as antiship ballistic mis-
siles and hypersonic weapons� Missile defenses are, however, more than just 
weapon systems with defensive capabilities and fiscal costs; they also have politi-
cal benefits and drawbacks� Despite the policy consensus that BMD benefits U�S� 
alliances, the historical record shows that BMD has not had this positive effect 
consistently, and at times has caused allies to worry that the United States might 
abandon or entrap them� Increasing U�S� BMD capabilities could pose these risks 
again to U�S� alliances, even if U�S� policy makers do not intend that outcome� 
The United States can manage these risks by sharing information to align U�S� 
and allied perceptions of missile threats and BMD capabilities, promoting BMD 
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cooperation in a manner that reduces both U�S� and allied vulnerability, and le-
veraging BMD policy and capabilities to maximize its value as a symbol of U�S� 
alliance commitment�
Before an examination of the policy prescriptions, it is useful first to consider 
several ways in which modern BMD might sow doubt in our allies’ perceptions of 
alliance cohesion� First, increased U�S� spending on homeland-defense capabili-
ties, such as improved sensors or larger numbers of interceptors, could make it 
appear that the United States seeks to defend itself rather than allies and might 
spark allied fears of abandonment�145 At what point in building BMD capability 
and capacity might U�S� allies fear abandonment, and how can Washington limit 
this effect? Second, the United States likely will continue to advocate interopera-
bility across U�S� and allied BMD systems, which could cause some allies to worry 
about entrapment risks� How can the United States assuage these concerns while 
still benefiting from BMD interoperability? Lastly, President Trump’s combative 
rhetoric toward traditional allies could cause them to question U�S� commitment 
and view U�S� BMD investments through a clouded lens�
The factors that may influence an ally’s perception of U�S� BMD and the risks 
of abandonment and entrapment—shared threat perceptions, relative depen-
dence and vulnerability, and evidence of commitment—provide useful guide-
posts for understanding BMD’s effects on alliances and for designing policies that 
could reinforce rather than undermine alliance cohesion� U�S� missile-defense 
policy initiatives—such as increasing homeland-defense capability and capacity, 
fielding more space-based sensors, and encouraging more BMD burden sharing 
with allies—should be evaluated from an ally’s perspective, using this framework�
Divergent threat perceptions lie at the heart of each historical case in which an 
ally worried about BMD’s effect on alliance cohesion, such as European NATO 
members in the late 1960s, while closely aligned threat perceptions generally have 
caused allies to view U�S� BMD capabilities favorably, such as Japan in the 2010s� 
The United States should, or should continue to, share information about missile 
threats with its allies to the greatest extent possible through diplomatic, intelli-
gence, and even public affairs channels� This information will help allied leaders 
and their people understand U�S� intent for deploying new BMD capabilities, but 
also may help allies more fully appreciate the nature of the threat they face�
Just as BMD is more likely to improve alliance cohesion if both the United 
States and its allies share a common threat perception, they also should under-
stand the capabilities and limitations of U�S� BMD to counter these threats� For 
example, the MDR proposes placing more emphasis on homeland defense and 
advocates increasing the number of homeland-defense GBI missiles from forty-
four to at least sixty-four, improving the GBI’s warhead, and even employing 
the Navy’s SM-3 Block IIA interceptor as an “underlay” to supplement GBIs�146 
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An ally could perceive this new attention to homeland defense as a sign of U�S� 
retrenchment and perhaps increased risk of abandonment�
An ally might try to understand whether and how these changes will af-
fect U�S� capabilities� The 45 percent increase in GBIs likely would not re-
sult in a significant improvement in performance� With a shot doctrine— 
referring to the number of defensive missiles launched against every incoming 
ICBM—of two or four GBIs per target, the current U�S� homeland-defense system 
probably can engage only about ten to twenty threat missiles�147 An informed ob-
server could determine that adding twenty GBIs would enable the United States 
to defend against only five to ten more missiles, at best� Improvements to U�S� 
homeland defenses that are harder for an ally to quantify may be more likely to 
raise concerns of abandonment� Employing the SM-3 Block IIA as a homeland-
defense weapon, for example, would blur the previously clear lines between 
homeland defense and regional weapon systems, and it would be difficult for an 
observer to determine the quantity and types of weapons in the vertical launchers 
of a BMD-capable ship or an Aegis Ashore site�148
Despite these potential challenges, an open dialogue with allies should express 
that BMD alone is not likely to provide sufficient protection for the United States 
but will instead remain a thin defense against a relatively small-scale attack, and 
therefore only one part of U�S� security strategy� Put another way, capacity and 
capability constraints might reassure U�S� allies about the extent and intent of 
U�S� BMD systems, and thus limit concerns about alliance cohesion� Speaking 
about how an adversary could view U�S� BMD, Frank Rose, then Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, said in 2016 that 
he did not think BMD was destabilizing, because the United States has “limited 
numbers, limited capabilities, and we have been very, very transparent about our 
missile defenses�”149 Transparency with allies—particularly about missile-defense 
budgets, procurement, testing, and deployment plans—may similarly stabilize 
their perceptions of U�S� commitment� At least among democratic allies, trans-
parency also may help voters in allied countries make better-informed decisions 
about missile defense� Private and public transparency with U�S� allies about mis-
sile threats and defenses should continue�150
Not surprisingly, allies have responded favorably to BMD initiatives that do 
not negatively affect the balance of relative dependence or vulnerability in the 
alliance; they prefer BMD efforts that either directly improve their defenses or at 
least do not subtract from their own security� The Western European experience 
with Sentinel in the 1960s is a useful negative example; the United States would 
not share Sentinel with NATO allies, and the parallel growth of Soviet ABM 
capabilities could have reduced the value of some members’ nuclear deterrents� 
This dual shift in relative vulnerability—the United States seemingly reducing its 
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vulnerability while European NATO members’ vulnerability increased—likely 
contributed to their fear of abandonment�
The United States should recognize when U�S� BMD capability improvements 
might cause an ally to perceive a relative shift in their dependence or vulnerabil-
ity� One way to achieve this result while improving U�S� homeland and regional 
defenses would be to continue a U�S� policy of encouraging allies to acquire or 
develop BMD systems and advocating interoperability with U�S� and other allied 
BMD systems to the greatest extent possible� Not only will close cooperation 
avoid an imbalance in relative vulnerability but it also likely increases mutual 
dependence� BMD systems interoperability and information sharing could im-
prove allied perceptions of BMD’s effect on an alliance� Consider two possible 
outcomes if the United States expands its BMD sensor network in space, as the 
2019 MDR proposes�151 If the United States withholds these sensor data from 
allies, they could feel that U�S� battlespace awareness is improving while theirs 
falls behind, perhaps leading to questions about alliance cohesion� If, however, 
the United States shares data with allies using interoperable systems, they likely 
would recognize the mutual benefits of this technology and view it as bolstering 
their alliance�
U�S�-Japan BMD cooperation best exemplifies relative dependence and vul-
nerability moving in tandem� The close industrial and technological collabora-
tion on the SM-3 Block IIA likely sends a clear message to Tokyo that Washington 
could not field this advanced interceptor easily without its support� Similarly, 
the role that Japan-based sensors such as the AN/TPY-2 radar play in defending 
both Japanese and U�S� interests emphasizes the alliance’s mutually dependent 
and beneficial character� The interoperability of U�S� and Japanese BMD-capable 
destroyers also well demonstrates that U�S� and Japanese vulnerability against 
shared missile threats rises or falls together rather than separately� The United 
States should continue to grow and improve the BMD relationship with Japan 
and foster similar industrial and operational bonds with other allies�
South Korea’s concern about THAAD creating risks of entrapment, or at least 
entanglement, demonstrates a possible downside of efforts to share information 
and integrate capabilities across national borders� The 2019 MDR prioritizes 
cooperative BMD efforts that deepen integration across regions and between 
homeland- and regional-defense systems, which may increase allied concerns 
about entrapment further�152 Some analysts advocate separate information-
sharing architectures to segregate different allies from each other and reduce 
the apparent entanglement�153 This approach would impose additional costs on 
the United States to develop, test, and upgrade parallel systems� Instead, if an 
ally hesitates to join an integrated BMD network, the United States should still 
encourage it to deploy defenses that retain the option of later joining the U�S�-led 
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architecture� This encouragement could include urging an ally to buy already in-
teroperable U�S�-made systems or develop indigenous ones compatible with U�S� 
networks� If an ally perceives an increased missile threat, it could join an allied 
BMD architecture more quickly if it already has interoperable systems�
BMD’s relationship to allied perceptions of U�S� commitment is more complex� 
Unlike the case with perceptions of threats and vulnerability, the broader cross-
currents of an alliance relationship shape perceptions of commitment� Neverthe-
less, BMD policy still shapes these views and should be explicit and credible� The 
Trump administration’s policy values BMD as a positive factor in U�S� alliance 
relationships, but presidential rhetoric, which is often critical of U�S� allies, risks 
undermining the policy’s credibility� When President Trump unveiled the 2019 
MDR, he emphasized homeland defense and took a transactional approach to 
U�S� allies� He asserted that U�S� BMD “will prioritize the defense of the Ameri-
can people above all else,” which could revive an ally’s concerns of a “Fortress 
America” approach� As for allies, he said “we will insist on fair burden sharing 
with our allies� I’ve made it clear we are protecting many, many wealthy, wealthy, 
wealthy, wealthy countries� � � � We protect all of these wealthy countries, which 
I’m very honored to do, but many of them are so wealthy they can easily pay us 
the cost of this protection�”154 While burden sharing is a fundamental reason why 
states ally with each other, trying to account for the costs and benefits of missile 
defense misses the wider view of an alliance’s value to the United States and could 
foster an ally’s fears of abandonment�
To counter the mismatch between policy and presidential pronouncements, 
the United States should continue to leverage BMD investment and employment 
to signal credibly our support for our allies� Forward-deployed BMD systems, 
such as Aegis Ashore, and BMD-capable ships based abroad amplify this signal 
by embedding U�S� personnel in an ally’s territory and provide more-durable 
indications of U�S� commitment than mobile or rotationally deployed systems, 
which also signal U�S� commitment but could be removed more quickly�155 Re-
gardless of a forward-deployed or -deployable BMD system’s capability (how 
well or poorly it performs) or capacity (how many missiles it can engage), it still 
tangibly signals U�S� commitment� Increasing the number of forward-deployed 
BMD systems also might free up limited deployable U�S� and allied BMD-capable 
systems, such as ships or Patriot batteries, to be used more efficiently and flexi-
bly�156 The United States should continue fielding and operating Aegis Ashore in 
Europe, support Japan’s efforts to purchase its own Aegis Ashore systems, and 
identify other opportunities to deploy U�S� BMD capabilities forward�
{LINE SPACE}
Missile defense is a double-edged sword that can strengthen U�S� alliances, but 
also could weaken them by causing an ally to fear abandonment or entrapment� 
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Missile defense will remain an important component of U�S� security strategy, 
but missile-defense policy, rhetoric, and actions should reinforce, rather than 
undermine, U�S� alliances� To best leverage missile defense’s potential benefits to 
alliances, the United States should continue to inform allies about missile threats 
and U�S� defenses; share or integrate missile-defense capabilities with allies; and 
use BMD deployments, cooperation, and consultation to demonstrate U�S� alli-
ance commitment concretely� U�S� security strategy relies on both alliances and 
missile defense, but U�S� policy makers should not take allies for granted while 
pursuing technological solutions to geopolitical challenges�
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n response to the progress of North Korea toward a functional submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and the growing maritime assertiveness of 
China, South Korea has expressed a strong interest in acquiring a fleet of nuclear-
powered attack submarines (SSNs)�1 The United States now faces a difficult 
debate: it must choose whether it will oppose or support the Republic of Korea’s 
emerging SSN program� This article contributes to this debate, discussing how a 
Republic of Korea (ROK) SSN program could result in strategic risks or benefits, 
or both, for the United States� The risks of such a policy are readily apparent� 
First, the project might undermine already-fragile Sino-allied and ROK-Japan 
relations, damaging regional stability� Second, it might create nonproliferation 
concerns by expanding the ROK’s latent nuclear capabilities� Third, an ROK SSN 
program would involve major opportunity costs; the resources necessary to fund 
it inevitably would siphon ROK resources away from investments in other crucial 
capabilities�2
Despite these significant risks, however, this 
article argues that the United States should sup-
port and assist its ally if South Korea pursues ac-
quisition of SSNs� First, if the United States works 
with South Korea, it will have a greater ability to 
ameliorate the aforementioned risks that the pro-
gram poses� Second, U�S� assistance would bolster 
intra-alliance cohesion by reinforcing U�S� com-
mitment and allowing South Korea to bear more of 
I
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the burden for allied security� Third, support for ROK SSNs would improve the 
coercive diplomacy of the United States toward North Korea by enhancing allied 
capabilities and signaling allied resolve� Fourth, an SSN fleet would strengthen 
the ROK’s power-projection capabilities, improving the allies’ ability to cooperate 
on security contingencies beyond the peninsula�
ALLIED REGIONAL INTERESTS
Any discussion of the strategic implications of ROK SSNs for the United States 
must begin with an overview of the allies’ shared interests in the Indo-Pacific� 
First, the United States and South Korea have an interest in preserving their na-
tional security against military aggression� The allies seek to maintain a strong 
deterrent and defense against potential aggressors—most notably North Korea� 
They aim to dissuade challengers from direct attacks, as well as less-conventional 
aggression such as hybrid warfare and state-sponsored terrorism� They also en-
deavor to remain prepared to defeat aggression should deterrence fail�
Second, the allies are committed to preserving the economic growth and pros-
perity that has allowed their respective nations to flourish�3 Both recognize that 
this prosperity is dependent on the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, 
which in turn depends on the alliance’s ability to deter North Korea� The allies 
also appreciate that their continued economic vitality hinges on regional stability 
more broadly; instability in the Indo-Pacific undoubtedly would undercut the 
economic interests of both allies� In particular, the ROK economy depends on 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that run through the South and East China 
Seas� If these SLOCs were threatened or interdicted the prosperity of South 
Korea would suffer significantly� Regional security and stability are undergirded 
by the existing rules-based international order, which provides for freedom of the 
seas and the peaceful resolution of international disputes� This order, in turn, is 
underpinned by the U�S� hub-and-spoke alliances in the Indo-Pacific, including 
the vital U�S�-ROK alliance�
Third, the allies share common values�4 Both understand the importance of 
democratic governance and human rights� Similarly, the allies are committed 
to the rule of law, both domestically and internationally� This provides both 
allies with an additional incentive to resist the aggressive designs of the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the Korean Peninsula, defending 
the ROK’s successful democracy against the authoritarian regime in the north�
These allied interests face significant challenges in the Indo-Pacific� First, the 
DPRK’s accelerating nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic-missile (ICBM), 
and SLBM programs pose a major threat�5 These capabilities greatly increase the 
destructive potential of a peninsular war for both South Korea and the United 
States� If North Korea is able to use these capabilities to establish a secure nuclear 
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deterrent, it also might become emboldened, undercutting the allied ability to 
deter DPRK aggression short of war�6 These capabilities also make it far more 
difficult for the allies to defend against North Korea, should deterrence fail�
Although the allies have taken steps to offset the DPRK’s ICBM threat, such as 
strengthening the ROK’s Korea Air and Missile Defense systems and deploying 
terminal high-altitude area-defense (THAAD) batteries, the DPRK’s develop-
ment of diesel-electric ballistic-missile submarines (SSBs) and SLBMs threatens 
to circumvent these measures�7 North Korea already has tested a Pukkuksong-I 
SLBM fired from a Sinpo-B-class SSB successfully and is developing new, more-
capable versions of both the Pukkuksong and Sinpo� Estimates suggest that 
North Korea will be able to field the Pukkuksong by 2020�8 Once deployed, these 
systems will complicate significantly the allies’ ability to prosecute their “4D” 
operational concept: detecting, disrupting, destroying, and defending against the 
DPRK’s nuclear and missile capabilities�9
The growing maritime assertiveness of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
poses an additional, major obstacle to both allies’ security and economic in-
terests� China claims special privileges outside its territorial seas, both in its 
exclusive economic zone and within its nine-dash line in the South China Sea� 
These claims contradict the principle of freedom of the seas�10 China has become 
increasingly forceful and provocative in asserting these claims, harassing USS 
Decatur in the midst of its freedom-of-navigation exercise near the Spratly Is-
lands on 30 September 2018�11 Furthermore, China steadily has militarized the 
South China Sea, developing a host of new military facilities throughout this im-
portant waterway�12 Simultaneously, China has expanded its regional antiaccess/ 
area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, strengthening its ability to hold maritime traf-
fic at risk�13 These developments could threaten regional stability, the security of 
key SLOCs, and the rules-based international order�
Furthermore, the integrity of the U�S�-ROK alliance itself faces challenges 
rooted in uncertainty and ROK fears of abandonment� The rhetoric that can-
didate Donald J� Trump used on the campaign trail in 2016 subsequently cre-
ated significant concern in South Korea over whether President Trump and the 
United States would maintain a strong commitment to the alliance� Subsequent 
questions over host-nation support, the funding of THAAD, and U�S� trade pres-
sure only have compounded these concerns�14 Finally, the unilateral decision to 
cancel major U�S�-ROK military exercises as part of Washington’s efforts to ne-
gotiate denuclearization with Pyongyang has caused substantial alarm in Seoul�
SUBMARINE PROPULSION: AN OVERVIEW
Modern conventional attack submarines (SSKs) rely on diesel-electric propul-
sion systems rather than nuclear power� SSK propellers are driven via an electric 
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battery, which in turn is connected to and charged by a diesel engine� These 
propulsion systems depend on regular refueling for the diesel generator, which 
limits SSKs’ range� The system also prevents SSKs from remaining submerged 
for extended periods; SSKs must “snorkel” regularly at periscope depth to run 
their diesel engines to recharge their batteries� This feature limits their endur-
ance and renders them vulnerable and easy to detect�15 The recent introduction of 
air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems to augment the diesel-electric system 
has improved the undersea endurance of SSKs, but even the most advanced SSKs 
must snorkel to recharge at least once every few weeks�16
Nuclear submarines, in contrast, are propelled by onboard nuclear reactors� 
These reactors use enriched uranium to provide the power needed to drive the 
submarines’ propellers� This system gives SSNs and nuclear-powered ballistic- 
missile submarines (SSBNs) virtually unlimited range and endurance, allowing 
them to remain at sea or underwater almost indefinitely; neither diesel fuel 
nor air are required to propel these boats� The only limitation on the range and 
endurance of an SSN is food for the crew�17 Nuclear reactors also generate more 
power, supporting a faster and larger boat capable of carrying more extensive 
weaponry and sensors�18 This added endurance, range, speed, and equipment 
comes at a price, however� SSNs are noisier and less maneuverable than many 
modern SSKs� The reactors also require enriched uranium as fuel, creating prolif-
eration concerns� Indeed, many SSNs use highly enriched uranium (HEU), which 
is over 20 percent uranium-235 (U-235) and can be used to provide the fissile 
material for a nuclear weapon�
Development and subsequent operation of the SSN are technologically chal-
lenging and financially costly endeavors that only a few maritime powers have 
mastered� Presently, the United States, Russia, China, France, the United King-
dom, and India are the only states that operate SSNs� Brazil also is developing 
its own SSN, with assistance from France�19 The significant technological and 
financial hurdles to acquiring an SSN suggest that the club of states operating 
these boats will remain relatively small for the foreseeable future�
The United States fields a sizable fleet of SSNs; indeed, the U�S� submarine 
fleet is exclusively nuclear powered� The Submarine Force Pacific under U�S� 
Pacific Fleet operates thirty-one SSNs�20 As highlighted in table 1, these comprise 
twenty-four of the older but formidable Los Angeles–class SSNs and seven of the 
newer and more powerful Virginia- and Seawolf-class SSNs� They are based in 
Guam, in Hawaii, and along the West Coast�
North Korea possesses a range of diesel-powered submarines (see table 1)� 
While many of these SSKs are antiquated and small, they can be used to lethal 
effect, as was demonstrated in 2010 with the sinking of the ROK ship Cheonan. 
While North Korea has taken steps to develop diesel-powered SSBs capable of 
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launching nuclear missiles, it has not made any noticeable progress toward a 
nuclear-powered submarine�
During the Cold War, South Korea primarily fielded “midget submarines”; 
the Korean attack submarine (KSS) program began the process of modernizing 
the submarine fleet in 1989�21 As displayed in table 1, South Korea currently pos-
sesses only conventional diesel-electric SSKs� It operates nine Type 209 (Chang 
Bogo–class, KSS-1) and nine Type 214 (Son Won-il–class, KSS-2) SSKs� It also is 
developing nine new three-thousand-ton SSX indigenous (Jangbogo III–class, 
KSS-3) diesel-electric submarines, the first of which deployed in 2018�
ROK president Moon Jae-in repeatedly has expressed an interest in developing 
SSNs�22 Many current and former ROK government and military officials claim 
that ROK SSNs would dramatically improve the ROK’s ability to both deter and 
defeat the DPRK’s emerging SLBM capability and to secure the maritime com-
mons� In the past the United States has been unwilling to transfer the sensitive 
technology necessary for nuclear naval propulsion to South Korea, but the Moon 
administration’s renewed interest in this technology should spark a new debate 
in the United States on the merits of assisting South Korea in developing its own 
SSNs�23 
THE RISKS POSED BY AN ROK SSN PROGRAM
Sino-Allied Relations
An ROK SSN program could create a number of significant strategic challenges 
for the United States� First and foremost, it might damage already fragile Sino-
allied relations� The logic of the security dilemma suggests that if South Korea 
DPRK Submarines PRC Submarines ROK Submarines USINDOPACOM  Submarines
10 Yugo class (midget sub) 12 Song class (SSK) 9 Chang Bogo class (SSK) 24 Los Angeles class (SSN)
 5 Yono class (midget sub) 13 Yuan class (SSK) 9 Son Won-il class (SSK)   4 Virginia class (SSN)
40 Sang-o class (SSK) 12 Kilo class (SSK) 1 Jangbogo III class SSK/
SSX (8 more planned)
  3 Seawolf class (SSN)
20 Romeo class (SSK) 13 Ming class (SSK)
  2 Sinpo class (SSB)   3 Han class (SSN)
  2 Shang I class (SSN)
  4 Shang II class (SSN)
TABLE 1
REGIONAL SSKs, SSXs, SSNs, AND SSBs
Notes: DPRK = Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; PRC = People’s Republic of China; ROK = Republic of Korea; SSB = diesel-electric ballistic-missile 
submarine; SSK = conventional attack submarine; SSN = nuclear-powered attack submarine; USINDOPACOM = U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
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strengthens its military capabilities, even for defensive purposes, nearby states 
such as China may see these improvements as designed to undermine their se-
curity�24 Furthermore, China increasingly views the U�S� alliance system in the 
Indo-Pacific in adversarial terms and has responded poorly to previous advances 
in allied military capabilities�25 China likely would see an ROK SSN fleet as part 
of a broader effort by the United States and its allies to contain growing Chi-
nese power� Worse still, it might interpret this program as a deliberate attempt 
to degrade the PRC’s second-strike nuclear capability� China fields a relatively 
small—and therefore vulnerable—nuclear arsenal and its SSBNs are not particu-
larly capable or stealthy�26 In theory, new ROK SSNs in the region could be used 
in conjunction with U�S� capabilities to hold PRC SSBNs at risk�
Tensions between the allies and China are mounting already� In 2018, the 
United States disinvited China from the annual Rim of the Pacific naval exer-
cises, employed sanctions against the PRC’s agency for military procurement for 
purchasing Russian weaponry, and imposed several significant tariffs on PRC 
exports�27 China, meanwhile, refused to allow a USN vessel to dock in Hong 
Kong, canceled several high-level military talks with U�S� officials, and amplified 
its challenges to U�S� freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea�28 
ROK-PRC ties also have been on the decline following a significant diplomatic 
spat over the ROK’s purchase of THAAD batteries in 2016 and 2017� An ROK 
SSN program might only compound further the growing hostility between the 
allies and China�
Growing Sino-allied tensions could create several challenges� First, it could 
lead China to expand and enhance its undersea arsenal further�29 This could trig-
ger an unnecessary arms competition and spiraling tensions that would destabi-
lize the region and leave all parties worse off�30 The character of SSNs may make 
them particularly apt to provoke arms races� A number of strategic theorists 
have pointed out that offensive capabilities—those assets that are uniquely well 
suited for offensive operations—are the most likely to create insecurity among 
neighboring states�31 SSNs’ virtually unlimited range greatly enhances the deploy-
ing states’ ability to project power, and their stealth and endurance make them 
difficult to defend against; this makes SSNs particularly effective for offensive 
naval operations�
History is replete with examples of problematic naval arms races� The German 
decision to acquire a large fleet in the early twentieth century triggered a major 
naval arms race with the United Kingdom in the lead-up to World War I�32 The 
U�K� decision to develop a dreadnought—a large, advanced warship with only 
heavy guns—acted as a critical catalyst for the escalation of this arms race; not 
long after Britain introduced this platform, the Anglo-German arms race intensi-
fied further, with both sides acquiring many new capital ships�33 Around the same 
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time, Brazil’s purchase of several British dreadnoughts touched off a local arms 
race with the Argentine and Chilean navies�
The Indo-Pacific itself already may be in the midst of a nascent submarine 
arms race, with various regional countries acquiring new attack submarines� In 
the aftermath of the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, China rapidly began acquiring 
a larger fleet of SSNs as part of an A2/AD approach to challenge U�S� ability to 
operate in the region�34 These acquisitions and fear of Chinese intentions in turn 
provoked a broader regional undersea race, with a number of states enhancing 
their undersea capabilities qualitatively, quantitatively, or both�35 These steps 
raised tensions further, and inspired additional states to seek their own SSKs, of-
ten from China�36 As table 2 demonstrates, states across the region are acquiring 
more-powerful undersea fleets� Singapore’s defense ministry recently highlighted 
that the number of submarines in the western Pacific may rise from 200 to 250 
by 2025�37 
Setbacks in Sino-allied relations could create other challenges� Rather than 
developing new antisubmarine warfare (ASW) or sub-
surface capabilities, China might retaliate with economic 
coercion against South Korea� The PRC’s recent reaction 
to U�S�-ROK cooperation on THAAD is illustrative of this 
risk� China accused the allies of developing capabilities that 
would threaten strategic stability by undermining the PRC’s 
second-strike capability� Following the ROK’s decision to 
acquire the system, China issued a formal diplomatic pro-
test and suspended high-level security dialogues� It also de-
ployed its own long-range radar systems to Inner Mongolia 
in a thinly veiled tit-for-tat maneuver�38 Just as problem-
atically, China initiated a campaign of economic coercion 
targeting South Korea� Korean pop music events in China 
were canceled, several Korean television shows were taken 
off the air, and PRC regulators cut off Korean video game 
manufacturers from the Chinese market�39 China also pro-
hibited travel agencies from offering package tours to South 
Korea, which cut Chinese tourism to South Korea by 20 
percent�40 The Korean firm Lotte was targeted by PRC gov-
ernment investigations, and the bulk of its stores in China 
were shut down “for safety violations�”41 Given the potential 
for China to see ROK SSNs as a threat to its SSBNs, it is pos-
sible that China might respond in a similar fashion should 
South Korea develop this capability�
Planned and Recently Completed  
SSK Acquisitions in the Indo-Pacific
India 24
Taiwan  8
Australia  6
Vietnam  6
Indonesia  5
Thailand  3
Singapore  2
Bangladesh  2
Philippines  2
Note: SSK = conventional attack submarine.
Sources: Groll and De Luce, “China Is Fueling a 
Submarine Arms Race”; ”Thailand Approves $393-
Mln Purchase of Chinese Submarines,” Reuters, 
24 April 2017, in.reuters.com/; Ridzwan Rahmat, 
“TKMS Begins Work on Singapore’s Third and 
Fourth Type 218SG Submarines,” Jane’s 360, 16 
January 2018, www.janes.com/; Marhalim Abas, 
“Fighters, Submarines on Philippines Shopping 
List,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, 22 June 
2018, aviationweek.com/; “Bangladesh’s First 2 
Submarines Commissioned,” Daily Star, 12 March 
2017, www.thedailystar.net/; Franz-Stefan Gady, 
“Taiwan’s Indigenous Submarine to Be Based on 
European Design,” The Diplomat, 26 September 
2018, thediplomat.com/.
TABLE 2
AN INDO-PACIFIC UNDERSEA  
ARMS RACE?
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China also might respond to this system by threatening key U�S� interests 
across the Indo-Pacific� For instance, it could relax further its implementation 
of sanctions against North Korea� This would undercut U�S� (and ROK) attempts 
to compel North Korea to denuclearize� Alternatively, China might intensify its 
militarization of the South China Sea� It could ramp up its interference with U�S� 
freedom-of-navigation operations and surveillance flights and deploy new ca-
pabilities to its expanding network of military facilities throughout the disputed 
waterway� This would undercut the allies’ efforts to maintain free and open ac-
cess to the South China Sea�
U.S.-ROK-Japan Trilateral Cooperation
An ROK SSN program also might threaten delicate ROK-Japan ties, undercutting 
recent U�S�-led trilateral cooperation� Relations between Japan and South Korea 
have been beset by numerous challenges, including a territorial dispute over the 
Liancourt Rocks (known as Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan) and con-
tention related to Japan’s imperial history�42 Given these tensions, Japan might see 
an ROK SSN program as a threat to its own maritime security� In particular, Japan 
could grow concerned that South Korea might deploy its SSNs to assert control 
more actively over the Liancourt Rocks�
ROK-Japan relations already are relatively poor� Despite a recent bilateral 
agreement between Japan and South Korea over compensations for former “com-
fort women” in Korea—women who were forced into sexual slavery for the Im-
perial Japanese Army during the Second World War—this issue has continued 
to disrupt positive relations between the two states�43 Similarly, South Korea and 
Japan have become locked in a dispute over whether Japanese firms should be 
compelled to provide compensation for forced labor during the country’s colo-
nial rule over Korea�44 Overall, the publics in both countries have largely nega-
tive perceptions of one another; a Genron-NPO survey found that 48�6 percent 
of Japanese and 56�1 percent of South Koreans had negative impressions of the 
other state in 2017�45 Japanese fears over an ROK SSN program might serve to 
exacerbate bilateral tensions further�
Damaged relations between South Korea and Japan could undercut the signifi-
cant U�S� interest in stronger U�S�-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation� The United 
States long has sought to strengthen coordination between its two most impor-
tant allies in the Indo-Pacific despite their historical animosity� Trilateral coor-
dination improves the allies’ ability to pursue key common objectives, including 
protecting shared SLOCs and the maritime commons, confronting the DPRK’s 
growing nuclear capabilities, and maintaining a stable regional balance of power� 
The 2016 General Security of Military Information Agreement, which improved 
intelligence and information sharing among the three militaries, represented 
a major improvement in trilateral cooperation� Nevertheless, progress toward 
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trilateral cooperation remains tenu-
ous at best and could be disrupted 
by an ROK SSN program�
Nuclear Proliferation Concerns
A nuclear propulsion system could 
improve the ROK’s latent nuclear 
capabilities, undermining U�S� 
nonproliferation objectives� Joseph 
Pilat defines nuclear latency as “the 
possession of many or all of the 
technologies, facilities, materials, 
expertise (including tacit knowl-
edge), resources and other capabili-
ties necessary for the development 
of nuclear weapons, without full 
operational weaponization�”46 If 
South Korea were to fuel SSNs inde-
pendently, its latent nuclear capabilities would be enhanced in several ways� SSN 
reactors require enriched uranium� Uranium enrichment, currently restricted 
under the U�S� Atomic Energy Act, section 123 (also known as the 123 agree-
ment), is a key prerequisite for a functional nuclear program� Still more prob-
lematically, the most powerful SSN reactors use HEU containing over 20 percent 
U-235� As table 3 emphasizes, many of the leading global navies rely on SSNs 
fueled by HEU� HEU is fissile material—often 90 percent or more U-235—that 
can be used to develop a nuclear weapon� That being the case, ROK production 
of HEU would strengthen substantially the country’s latent ability to produce 
nuclear weaponry and would pose serious nonproliferation challenges�
SSN reactors also would produce uranium waste that would need a dis-
posal plan� Some in South Korea have argued that reprocessing (including pyro- 
processing) is required to manage the ROK’s dwindling storage space for spent 
fuel� As with uranium enrichment, reprocessing—a process that can be used 
to produce plutonium—can serve as the basis for a nuclear weapons program� 
Overall, fueling and operating SSN naval reactors would bring South Korea closer 
to mastering the full nuclear fuel cycle, which would advance its latent nuclear 
capabilities�
Other states have used naval reactor programs for this purpose� In the 1970s, 
for instance, Brazil used work on its naval reactor as part of a broader push to 
conquer the nuclear fuel cycle and potentially develop a nuclear weapon�47 Iran 
similarly has threatened to use work on a naval reactor to advance its latent 
nuclear capability� In 2012, during negotiations over the Iranian nuclear accord, 
Country SSN Fuel: Level of Enrichment (% U-235)
United States HEU (93–97�5)
United Kingdom HEU (93)
Russiaa HEU (40)
India HEU (40)
Brazilb LEU (18–19)
France LEU (5–7�5)
PRC LEU (3–5)
Notes: 
HEU = highly enriched uranium; LEU = low-enriched uranium; PRC = People’s Republic 
of China; SSN = nuclear-powered attack submarine. 
a. Third- and fourth-generation SSNs.
b. Experimental reactor.
Source: George Moore, Cervando Banuelos, and Thomas Gray, Replacing Highly Enriched 
Uranium in Naval Reactors (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, March 2016).
TABLE 3
SSN FUEL ENRICHMENT LEVELS BY COUNTRY
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Iran announced it would be developing an SSN; this constituted an attempt to 
strengthen its bargaining position by threatening to advance its latent nuclear 
potential�48 Similarly, in 2017, Iran resumed its work on this naval reactor to put 
pressure on the new U�S� administration�49
Opportunity Costs
An ROK SSN program also would bring with it sizable opportunity costs� The 
ROK’s planned budget for 2019 was roughly $415 billion and included around 
forty-two billion dollars in defense spending—an 8�2 percent increase year over 
year� Yet although ROK military expenditure is increasing, it is far from unlim-
ited� While an SSN fleet would provide a dramatic and powerful new capability 
for the ROK Navy, the funds required for the project would have to be diverted 
away from other programs that could advance allied interests� More specifically, 
this qualitative improvement could come at the expense of quantitative increases 
to the ROK naval arsenal�50 Alternatively, this funding could be used for missile 
defenses, air forces, or ground forces, or it could be invested in the ROK economy�
A simple comparison illustrates the opportunity costs of an ROK SSN� Table 
4 highlights some of the potential alternative systems and equipment in which 
South Korea could invest to strengthen its ability to deter and defeat North Ko-
rea and better secure the maritime commons� If we assume that an ROK SSN 
would have a per-unit cost similar to that of Virginia-class SSNs—around $2�5 
billion each—this would mean that for the price of a single SSN South Korea al-
most could acquire three of its most advanced guided-missile destroyers (of the 
Sejong the Great, KDX-III class) to augment its growing blue-water capabilities� 
Name of Equipment/Platform Type of Equipment/Platform Cost per Unit (U.S.$)
Virginia class Nuclear attack submarine $2�5 billion
Sejong the Great class Guided-missile destroyer $923 million
Jangbogo III class Diesel-electric attack submarine $900 million
THAAD battery Ballistic-missile defense system $800 million
Son Won-il class Diesel-electric attack submarine $300 million
Dokdo class Amphibious assault ship $288 million
P-8 Poseidon Antisubmarine warfare aircraft $256�5 million
Note: THAAD = terminal high-altitude area defense. 
Sources: Keck and Sokolski, “South Korea Is About to Make a $7 Billion Nuclear Submarine Blunder”; Andrew Clark, “Australia’s Barracuda Subma-
rines: Too Expensive and Too Little, Too Late,” Australia Financial Review, 1 June 2017, www.afr.com/; “KDX-III Sejong Destroyer,” Global Security, 
www.globalsecurity.org/; Franz Stefan-Gady, “South Korea to Develop Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile,” The Diplomat, 2 June 2016, thediplomat 
.com/; Amanda Macias, “North Korea Will Now Have America’s Most Advanced Missile System in Its Backyard,” Business Insider, 9 July 2016, www 
.businessinsider.com/; “History of Patrol Squadron Eight: Continuing a Legacy of Excellence,” United States Navy, 17 March 2014, www.public.navy.mil/.
TABLE 4
THE COMPARATIVE COST OF SSNs
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Alternatively, to improve its ASW capabilities, South Korea could use this money 
to increase the quantity of its undersea assets vastly� For the price of a single SSN 
it almost could acquire three new advanced Jangbogo III–class SSKs or as many as 
eight smaller Son Won-il–class SSKs� South Korea also could upgrade its missile-
defense capabilities significantly, adding three new THAAD missile defense bat-
teries for around the same price� The allies could benefit significantly from the 
addition of any of these other capabilities� 
The preceding section emphasizes that an ROK SSN program may create some 
significant challenges for key U�S� interests in the Indo-Pacific� Several of these 
hazards might make the United States think twice about supporting an ROK SSN 
program� Nonetheless, U�S� coordination with South Korea can help offset some 
of those risks� More importantly, as will be highlighted below, U�S� assistance with 
an ROK SSN program could benefit both countries’ interests in several important 
ways�
THE CASE FOR U.S. SUPPORT
Managing Risks
If the United States provides support and assistance to South Korea in develop-
ing an SSN fleet, it is likely to have greater influence over how South Korea pur-
sues the program� In particular, the United States would be better positioned to 
dampen potential ROK-Japan tensions and address nonproliferation challenges� 
In contrast, if the United States refrains from supporting an ROK SSN program it 
sacrifices any leverage it might be able to exercise over how South Korea designs 
or uses its SSN fleet�
U�S� participation in an ROK SSN program could improve America’s ability to 
prevent unnecessary tensions between Japan and South Korea� First, as Japan’s 
closest ally, the United States is well positioned to reassure Japan that U�S�-ROK 
cooperation on an SSN program is not intended to threaten Japan’s maritime se-
curity� Indeed, given the substantial overlap between Japanese and ROK interests 
in deterring North Korea and preserving a secure, stable Indo-Pacific, Washing-
ton could work to convince Tokyo that Japan stands to gain from enhanced ROK 
naval capabilities� Second, the United States could leverage its support for the 
ROK’s SSN program to encourage South Korea to amplify its maritime coopera-
tion with Japan� This could include expanding existing trilateral naval exchanges, 
maritime exercises, and intelligence-sharing arrangements� If the United States 
chooses to remain uninvolved in the ROK’s SSN development, however, Japan 
likely will see the program as more threatening and South Korea may be less will-
ing to work more closely with Japan on maritime security�
100
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 1, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/1
 Y U  &  F R E N C H  9 5
U�S� leverage also should improve Washington’s ability to mitigate nonpro-
liferation concerns created by an ROK SSN program� In particular, the United 
States could work to convince South Korea to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) 
rather than HEU� LEU is not fissile and would be more difficult to convert into 
a nuclear weapon, so it would pose far fewer proliferation concerns� The United 
States also could offer to provide South Korea with the fuel necessary for an 
LEU SSN, removing the need for South Korea to enrich its own fuel� This would 
dampen further the effect of an SSN program on the ROK’s latent nuclear ca-
pabilities� However, if the United States withholds support for the ROK’s SSN 
development it may find it more difficult to persuade South Korea to address U�S� 
nonproliferation concerns�
Alliance Cohesion
A U�S�-assisted ROK SSN program would have substantial ramifications for the 
strength of the U�S�-ROK alliance relationship� First, support would serve as a 
clear and credible signal of U�S� commitment to the alliance, reducing the ROK’s 
fear of abandonment�51 Public affirmations of alliance commitment are relatively 
“cheap” and therefore not particularly credible unless accompanied by costly 
signals that uncommitted states would be unwilling to issue�52 Since U�S� support 
for an ROK SSN program would involve transferring sensitive technology and 
expertise, it would serve as a credible signal of U�S� commitment to its alliance 
with the ROK� Second, the transfer of sensitive technology and expertise would 
help highlight the enduring benefits of the alliance for South Korea� By reducing 
the ROK’s fears of abandonment and increasing the direct benefits of its partner-
ship with the United States, assistance would shore up the strength of this critical 
alliance�
Conversely, a U�S� decision to oppose an ROK SSN program likely would cause 
significant damage to the U�S�-ROK alliance� Several ongoing trends have weak-
ened this important alliance already� President Donald Trump’s transactional 
perspective on U�S� alliance relationships, expressed both on the campaign trail 
and while in office, has caused some concern in South Korea over the strength 
of the U�S� commitment to ROK security�53 The recent decision to cancel ULCHI 
FREEDOM GUARDIAN and other major military exercises with South Korea to 
accommodate DPRK demands has contributed further to the ROK’s fears of 
abandonment� Alarmingly, polling data indicate that ROK citizens increasingly 
believe that the United States does not take the ROK’s national interests into 
consideration when determining policy�54 Were U�S� policy makers to oppose 
the ROK’s SSN program actively, this likely would reinforce these growing fears 
of abandonment in South Korea� This in turn might lead South Korea to hedge 
against abandonment by jumping on the PRC bandwagon, appeasing North 
101
Naval War College: Winter 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 9 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Korea, or balancing against these threats by initiating a nuclear-weapons pro-
gram� None of these possible courses would advance U�S� national interests�
The United States has used the transfer of military technology to reinforce its 
alliances and security partnerships successfully in the past� U�S�-U�K� cooperation 
on naval nuclear propulsion in the late 1950s provides a telling example� The 
U�S�-U�K� dispute during the divisive Suez crisis in 1956 left President Dwight D� 
Eisenhower looking for a way to reinforce the shaken alliance with the United 
Kingdom� At the same time, Eisenhower hoped to build up British military ca-
pabilities so that the United Kingdom, and NATO more broadly, could assume 
more responsibility for the growing burden of deterring an increasingly power-
ful Soviet Union� To accomplish these objectives, Eisenhower sought to transfer 
naval nuclear technology to assist the United Kingdom in developing its own 
SSN�55 Under the leadership of Admiral Hyman Rickover, USN, and Admiral 
Louis Mountbatten, RN, the allies began sharing technological knowledge about 
naval nuclear propulsion to strengthen their alliance and reinforce the United 
Kingdom’s independent capabilities�56
Although U�S� domestic politics complicated this process, in 1958 the allies 
succeeded in creating the U�S�-U�K� Mutual Defense Agreement, which autho-
rized the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology between the allies� This in-
cluded the sale of an American-made Westinghouse S5W naval nuclear reactor 
to the United Kingdom and the training of British submariners in the United 
States� This allowed the United Kingdom to develop its first SSN—HMS Dread-
nought—powered by the S5W� It also facilitated the development of the United 
Kingdom’s first fully indigenous SSNs, the Valiant class, powered by the “son of 
S5W,” a Rolls-Royce pressurized-water reactor�57 This cooperation had a major 
impact on the strength and cohesion of the U�S�-U�K� alliance� On completion 
of HMS Dreadnought, U�K� leaders praised the U�S� contribution to British naval 
capabilities�58 Two leading RN officers later remarked that the “UK’s debt to the 
U�S� Navy, and to Admiral Rickover in particular, is incalculable�”59
Just as importantly, U�S� decisions to withhold capabilities from allies have 
undermined alliance cohesion in the past� In the 1970s, for instance, President 
Jimmy Carter’s decision to block the sale of the F-16 fighter jet to South Korea 
further compounded the ROK’s concerns about abandonment amid an intra-
allied dispute over the ROK’s human rights practices�60 Similarly, Japan’s attempt 
to acquire the F-22 fighter jet from the United States late in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century came to be seen as a litmus test of U�S� commitment to the 
alliance�61 The reluctance to transfer the F-22, because of the sensitive technol-
ogy involved, was framed in Japan as a sign that the United States was less than 
fully committed to Japan’s defense� This contributed to Japan’s emerging concerns 
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about abandonment amid the American financial crisis and its decision to delist 
North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism�
Coercive Diplomacy with North Korea
An SSN program also could strengthen the allies’ coercive diplomacy toward 
North Korea� Coercive diplomacy here refers to the allies’ efforts to convince 
North Korea to comply with their will through threats to use force�62 The United 
States and South Korea use coercive diplomacy to deter DPRK aggression and 
compel an end to the DPRK’s advancing nuclear and missile programs, including 
its SLBM program� An ROK SSN program could assist with this task by serving 
as a signal of resolve, strengthening deterrence by denial, and providing a useful 
asset for gunboat diplomacy�
An SSN program could be employed as a powerful signal to North Korea of 
the allies’ resolve to secure the Korean littoral and prevent the continued ad-
vancement of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile capabilities� SSNs are expensive, 
controversial, and technically challenging platforms, given the nuclear technol-
ogy required for their development and operation� The ROK’s willingness to 
bear the costs of acquiring and operating this platform would serve as a credible 
signal reinforcing the ROK’s unwillingness to tolerate the DPRK’s illicit weapons 
programs� Furthermore, as mentioned above, support by the United States would 
serve as a credible signal of its resolve to defend South Korea against emerging 
challenges� By sinking funds into their defenses that irresolute states would be 
unwilling to commit, the allies would reduce the chances that North Korea will 
underestimate their commitment to their defense�63
ROK SSNs also could help dissuade North Korea from developing, deploy-
ing, or using SLBMs and SSBs through the threat of denial�64 Current ROK ASW 
capabilities are relatively limited, despite the recent acquisition of new ASW 
helicopters�65 An SSN fleet would provide a strengthened ASW capability, im-
proving the ability of the ROK fleet to track and eliminate DPRK submarines� In 
peacetime, SSNs could rely on their exceptional endurance (see table 5) to loiter 
for extended periods concealed beneath the surface at a safe distance from DPRK 
submarine bases such as Mayang Do to monitor SSB activity using passive sonar� 
In contrast, SSKs would struggle with this task, as they are required to surface 
periodically; even with AIP technology, the ROK’s most advanced submarines 
can transit for only two weeks or so without snorkeling� If a DPRK SSB were to 
deploy, the ROK SSN also could tail and monitor the SSB indefinitely, with or 
without the assistance of allied destroyers and U�S� P-3 Orion aircraft�
Just as importantly, in the event of a conflict ROK SSNs could eliminate pre-
emptively the threat that DPRK SLBMs posed� As highlighted in table 5, SSNs’ 
superior speed would give them an edge over the ROK’s current SSKs in find-
ing and eliminating the DPRK’s SSBs at sea before they could surface to deploy 
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SLBMs—“killing the arrow�” Alternatively, if the SSNs were equipped with vertical- 
launch systems and cruise missiles, they could target DPRK ports directly before 
DPRK submarines put to sea—“killing the archer�”66 
SSNs would amplify the ROK’s ASW capabilities significantly and thereby 
reduce the DPRK’s incentives to continue pursuing an SLBM capability or to 
deploy any SSBs that it develops�67 If North Korea appreciates that SSBs will be 
unable to provide it a secure second-strike capability, given the allies’ ability to 
destroy this capability preemptively, it may be less willing to bear the significant 
cost of further developing this challenging technology� Furthermore, if North 
Korea understands that any SSB it does develop is likely to be tracked and could 
be eliminated if it puts to sea, it may be less likely to deploy these assets� If South 
Korea can deny North Korea the ability to use its SSBs, North Korea also will be 
less emboldened by any SLBM capability it acquires� Without the secure second-
strike capability offered by an SSB, North Korea will find it riskier to engage in 
“salami-slicing tactics” or other steps short of war designed to undermine allied 
security�68
Finally, ROK SSNs could be particularly useful as a tool for gunboat diploma-
cy� Gunboat diplomacy refers to states’ deployment and maneuvering of naval as-
sets to signal capabilities and resolve to an adversary during a dispute� SSNs, able 
to move stealthily and remain concealed for extended periods, can be surfaced 
in sensitive areas as implicit threats�69 This gunboat diplomacy would highlight 
the ROK’s ability to strike key DPRK maritime capabilities, serving as a useful 
reminder of the costs of conflict with the allies�
States frequently have relied on naval capabilities to bolster coercive diplo-
macy� President Ronald W� Reagan used a major naval buildup coupled with 
the publicly released 1986 Maritime Strategy (work on this began in 1982 with a 
classified briefing) to signal U�S� resolve to resist Soviet revisionism and main-
tain maritime supremacy�70 As one of the strategy’s key architects, Secretary of 
the Navy John Lehman, argued, “a key element of the 1982 Strategy was signal-
ing America’s renewed commitment to naval power to both our adversaries 
Platform ROK Jangbogo III Class USN Virginia Class
Propulsion Diesel-electric with AIP Nuclear: S9G reactor
Endurance 2 weeks Unlimited
Top speed (submerged) 20 kt 35 kt
Notes: AIP = air-independent propulsion; kt = knots; ROK = Republic of Korea. 
Sources: “U.S. Navy Fact File: Virginia Class Submarine,” www.navy.mil/; “South Korea to Order 5 More U-214 AIP Submarines to Bridge to Indigenous 
Boats,” Defense Industry Daily, 8 May 2015, www.defenseindustrydaily.com/.
TABLE 5
THE ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR ASW
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and allies�”71 The Maritime Strategy also bolstered deterrence by denial through 
strengthening naval war-fighting capabilities, allowing the United States to deny 
to the Soviets the ability to interdict U�S� supply lines to Europe� Furthermore, it 
augmented U�S� ability to hold Soviet SSBNs at risk, raising the cost to the Soviet 
Union should it engage in conventional escalation in Europe�72
British military operations around the Falkland Islands provide particu-
larly useful insights into the utility of SSNs for deterrence� In 1977, Operation 
JOURNEYMAN saw British SSNs deployed to the waters surrounding the contested 
islands successfully deter Argentine encroachment�73 Again, in 1982, during 
the Falklands War, the presence of several British SSNs helped deter Argentina 
from operating in the British-delineated military exclusion zone� Furthermore, 
after a U�K� SSN, HMS Conqueror, sank an Argentine light cruiser, ARA General 
Belgrano, the entire Argentine navy remained consigned to port, unable to put 
to sea for fear of being destroyed by British SSNs� Subsequently, Britain was able 
to secure control of the sea and cut off Argentine ground forces on the Falklands 
from sea supply�74
Russia’s frequent use of SSNs for gunboat diplomacy during the Cold War 
similarly highlights the platform’s usefulness for coercive signaling� As Brent 
Ditzler argues in a 1989 thesis, “In what has become a standard pattern, a por-
tion of the Soviet submarines involved in exercises and other diplomatic shows of 
force, routinely surface for prolonged periods and/or subsequently make highly 
visible port calls to friendly nations in the vicinity� This exposure is tactically 
unnecessary, and can therefore be assumed to have some diplomatic meaning�”75 
Reinforcing this argument, a retired Russian admiral argues that during the 
1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the Soviet navy used SSNs for the express purpose of 
gunboat diplomacy: “The Chief Commander’s order was that our submarines 
should surface when the Americans appear� It was done to demonstrate to them 
that we had nuclear submarines in the Indian Ocean� So when our subs surfaced, 
they recognized us� In the way of the American Navy stood the Soviet cruisers, 
destroyers, and atomic submarines equipped with anti-ship missiles�”76
Allied Blue-Water Collaboration
SSNs also would offer South Korea the ability to bolster its emerging blue-
water naval capabilities, strengthening the U�S�-ROK alliance’s global maritime 
potential� Presently, South Korea is limited largely to green-water capabilities; 
it prioritizes the defense of Korean littoral waters rather than operations on 
the high seas or in foreign littoral waters�77 Its primary existing blue-water 
assets are the advanced Chungmugong Yi Sun-shin (KDX-II) and Sejong the 
Great–class (KDX-III) destroyers, as well as the Dokdo-class amphibious as-
sault ship, which was designed as the centerpiece of a future rapid-response 
fleet�78 Currently, the underwater support for Dokdo and the KDX destroyers 
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is limited to the Son Won-il– and Jangbogo III–class SSKs, which would limit 
the range and speed of the rapid-response fleet�79 As highlighted by table 6, an 
SSN could provide better support for this blue-water fleet, allowing it to move 
faster and farther from friendly ports� Just as importantly, the SSN fleet could 
operate independently in blue-water environments, given SSNs’ speed and vir-
tually unlimited range and endurance� Overall, an ROK SSN program would 
constitute a key step toward a more effective rapid-response fleet and a stronger 
blue-water capability�
The greater blue-water capabilities conferred by an ROK SSN fleet could allow 
the U�S�-ROK alliance to contribute more actively to regional and global security 
beyond the Korean Peninsula� South Korea could employ these assets to assist the 
United States in patrolling and protecting SLOCs throughout the Indo-Pacific� 
Indeed, South Korea already has demonstrated its interest in assuming a broader 
role in global sea-lane security alongside the United States, contributing forces 
to protecting shipping lanes against piracy in the distant Gulf of Aden�80 South 
Korea also could use its strengthened blue-water capabilities to track and in-
terdict illegal shipments bound for North Korea, in line with the Proliferation 
Security Initiative� Furthermore, rapid-response fleets escorted by SSNs could 
contribute more quickly and effectively to peacekeeping, humanitarian, and 
counterpiracy operations abroad� ROK SSNs also could support USN operations 
throughout the Indo-Pacific by escorting and assisting carrier strike groups�81
These contributions would serve to strengthen the allies’ expanding “global 
partnership�”82 As Presidents Moon and Trump highlighted in their joint state-
ment in June 2017, “United States–ROK cooperation on global issues is an indis-
pensable and expanding aspect of the Alliance�”83 A U�S�-ROK partnership with a 
greater blue-water capability and focus would represent a significant step toward 
the collaborative approach to maintaining global maritime security envisioned 
by A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, first published in 2007, 
updated in 2015� The USN strategy emphasizes “the potential for a global net-
work of navies that brings together the contributions of like-minded nations and 
organizations around the world to address mutual maritime security challenges 
and respond to natural disasters�”84 To help move toward this network, the strat-
egy document states that the United States will “support our allies and partners 
through training, exercises, and the provision of capabilities, via foreign military 
sales and financing, to increase their capacity to address maritime security chal-
lenges�” The rationale behind the Cooperative Strategy’s “global network,” which 
builds on the “1,000-ship navy” coalition concept advocated by Admiral Mike 
Mullen, USN (Ret�), is sound�85 The United States needs stronger partnerships 
with more-capable regional navies to help defend against the emerging threats 
to the maritime commons� The PRC’s growing assertiveness throughout the 
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Indo-Pacific maritime commons is of particular concern� Friendly navies willing 
to assume greater responsibility and acquire more-robust capabilities are a wel-
come prospect; while the United States will continue to bear much of the burden 
for maritime security throughout the world, it cannot carry the load alone�86 
South Korea is uniquely well positioned to form a key part of this partnership in 
the Indo-Pacific, strengthening and broadening the U�S�-ROK alliance� 
The role of SSNs in enhancing a maritime power’s blue-water and power-
projection capabilities is recognized widely� The Soviet Union relied on SSNs as 
the basis for its blue-water fleet, rather than a large surface fleet or naval avia-
tion�87 Brazil’s fledgling SSN program is viewed similarly as the centerpiece of a 
new blue-water navy�88 The United States also regularly uses SSNs as part of its 
forward-deployed naval presence—both independently and as support for its 
carrier battle groups—far from its shores�
U�S�-U�K� cooperation on the U�K� SSN program in the 1950s helped the Unit-
ed Kingdom assume a bigger role in allied blue-water operations to counter the 
Soviet Union at sea� The United Kingdom was able to contribute more to allied 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on the Soviet navy farther from 
U�K� shores because of the added endurance and sensor capabilities of its SSNs� 
As Anthony Wells highlights, the two countries used their advanced capabilities 
to great effect: “[T]he United States and United Kingdom together built a data 
base on every Soviet submarine class and every hull within each class� � � � Speed, 
depth, operating characteristics, and crew performance could all be observed 
and recorded� � � � The superior stealth of well-handled U�S� and U�K� submarines 
permitted penetration of the most sensitive and dangerous areas to observe and 
record weapons trials�”89 The U�K�’s SSNs not only strengthened the country’s 
contribution to its own defense; they also contributed directly to the defense of 
the United States by guarding the Iceland-Greenland gap�90 Similarly, the United 
Boat ROK Son Won-il Class USN Virginia Class
Propulsion Diesel-electric with AIP Nuclear: S9G reactor
Top speed (submerged) 20 kt 35 kt
Range (submerged) 420 nm at 8 kt Unlimited
Top speed (surfaced) 12 kt 25 kt
Range (surfaced) 12,000 nm at 6 kt Unlimited
Notes: AIP = air-independent propulsion; kt = knots;  nm = nautical miles; ROK = Republic of Korea. 
Sources: Richard Tomkins, “New GenDyn Submarine Completes Alpha Trials,” UPI Press, 7 August 2014, www.upi.com/; “South Korea to Order 5 More 
U-214 AIP Submarines to Bridge to Indigenous Boats.”
TABLE 6
THE ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR PROPULSION FOR POWER PROJECTION
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Kingdom was able to use its SSNs to project power across the Atlantic Ocean 
during the Falklands War�
Overall, an ROK SSN program presents a host of potential benefits and risks for 
the U�S�-ROK alliance� As this article argues, such an SSN program could under-
cut Sino-allied and ROK-Japan relations, lead to fears about ROK latent nuclear 
capabilities, and incur sizable opportunity costs� These costs merit serious con-
sideration� Nonetheless, the United States would stand to gain significantly by 
assisting its ally in acquiring this capability� Such a policy would strengthen the 
U�S�-ROK alliance’s cohesion, coercive bargaining position, and blue-water capa-
bilities� Playing an active role in the development of the ROK’s SSN program also 
would give the United States more leverage over the way in which this capability 
is developed, helping it better offset some of the program’s risks�
The underlying question—whether South Korea itself should pursue this 
program—is still up for debate� There is little doubt that such a project would be 
a truly herculean undertaking� Its advisability depends on the ROK’s strategic vi-
sion for itself� If South Korea is content with securing only its immediate territory 
using a powerful land force and a green-water navy well suited for littoral opera-
tions, then an SSN fleet may be superfluous� If, however, South Korea wishes to 
become a blue-water power, capable of projecting power and contributing to the 
security of far-flung SLOCs, SSNs may be indispensable�
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n the development of military professionals, the historical record is an invaluable 
resource for those who choose to study and reflect on the infinite variables that 
affect strategic planning� On January 28, 1944, Admiral Harry E� Yarnell ad-
dressed a meeting of the American Military Institute� In a speech entitled “The 
Utility of Military History” the admiral expressed how “[t]he value of military 
history to the student lies in the fact that when he is in possession of all the infor-
mation regarding a certain operation, he can evaluate the good and bad points of 
a campaign or operation, and, through the lessons learned, be more qualified as 
a leader to carry out actual operations in time of war�”1
Yarnell spoke from experience as a planner in two world wars and from the 
perspective of a career that uniquely equipped him to examine naval planning 
following those wars� Although forgotten and unheralded as a strategist and 
planner, Yarnell left writings that contain numerous lessons learned, or truisms, 
to which he adhered during his naval career� Several of these lessons revealed 
themselves during his planning experiences from 
1918 to 1920, molded in part by the academic 
training and intellectual refinement he received 
from studying at the Naval War College (NWC)� 
Yarnell’s lessons, reinforced during the interwar 
period, guided his thoughts on planning and in his 
postretirement work for the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OPNAV) during World War II�
I
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ANNAPOLIS, NEWPORT, LONDON, WASHINGTON
Yarnell’s naval career prior to World War I provided him with ex-
tensive Far East experience� After graduation from the U�S� Naval 
Academy in 1897, he served on board the battleship USS Oregon (BB 
3) and participated in its cruise from San Francisco around South 
America to Cuba during the Spanish-American War� After complet-
ing his final examinations and receiving his commission as an ensign, 
he returned to the Pacific and served on board a gunboat during the 
Philippine-American War in 1899 and with the China Relief Expedi-
tion during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900�2 In his next assignment, as 
an aide to Asiatic Fleet commander Rear Admiral George Remey, 
Yarnell worked alongside Fleet Intelligence Officer and Inspector of 
Target Practice Lieutenant William S� Sims—forming a relationship 
with the young maverick that would blossom in the years to come�3
Returning stateside in 1902, Yarnell served in and commanded torpedo boats 
and destroyers, with time aboard USS Biddle (TB 26), USS Dale (DD 4), USS 
Stockton (TB 32), and USS Barry (DD 2)� During his time aboard Barry, Yarnell 
returned to the Asiatic Fleet via the Suez Canal, at which point he took command 
of Dale in April 1904� Yarnell returned to the United States in April 1905 for over 
a year of shore duty at the Naval Proving Ground, Indian Head, Maryland, before 
joining the battleship USS Connecticut (BB 18) in September 1906 for its com-
missioning and around-the-world voyage with the Great White Fleet�
Prior to the grand cruise, however, the Navy tried Yarnell before a general 
court-martial for “culpable inefficiency in the performance of duty” and “neglect 
of duty” as officer of the deck when Connecticut ran aground near entering the 
harbor at Culebra, off Puerto Rico, on January 13, 1907� The court acquitted 
Yarnell of all charges�4
Upon the battleship’s return to the United States, Yarnell served a tour at the 
Naval Torpedo Station, Newport, Rhode Island, from 1909 to 1911, with follow-
on assignments first as fleet engineer for the Atlantic Fleet and then as navigator 
in the battleship USS New Jersey (BB 16), during which the ship participated in 
the 1914 Veracruz occupation�
In July 1914, then–lieutenant commander Yarnell received orders to attend 
the NWC long course� He presumably was pleased with this appointment, as 
he recently had published an article in the U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings em-
phasizing how practical experience at sea, together with applying fundamental 
principles of strategy and tactics, enabled greater efficiency within the fleet�5
Although he was already familiar with the writings of Rear Admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan and Carl von Clausewitz, the sixteen-month course introduced 
Yarnell to the “applicatory system” of instruction, which taught strategy and 
Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, USN, circa 
1944, while serving as head of the 
Special Planning Section under the 
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 
Vice Admiral Frederick J. Horne.
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command via war games� Adopted from the Army War College in 1911–12, 
this three-part system revolved around preparing an “estimate of the situation,” 
writing orders, and evaluating these orders via war games or staff rides� The 
“estimate of the situation” provided a logical approach that could be applied 
consistently to evaluate a military or naval problem and ascertain a course of 
action through a series of steps and decisions� A student needed to derive a clear 
mission statement; consider probable enemy strength and intentions; assess one’s 
own forces’ strength, capabilities, and disposition; evaluate the effectiveness of 
possible courses of action; and reach decisions regarding a final course of action� 
A student then would use his individual estimates as the foundation for drafting 
standardized-format orders that could be wargamed for evaluation�6
Yarnell benefited from his NWC experience� The College provided an officer 
with an environment “where ideas, facts, and logic were of greater importance 
than rank and name,” argues historian Gerald E� Wheeler�7 Studies of tactics, strat-
egy, policy, and logistics prepared Yarnell to produce strong, analytically sound 
estimates and to game his solutions, all while being guided to further derive and 
strengthen general principles from his studies and discussions among peers�8 Use 
of Clausewitz in the curriculum and the discussions most likely reinforced for 
Yarnell particular principles when developing strategic plans—namely, the coor-
dination between military leadership and civilian policy makers, drawing from 
the Prussian general’s maxim: “War is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means�”9 After graduation, Yarnell stayed on the NWC staff under the presidency 
of Rear Admiral Austin M� Knight, a reformer akin to Sims in many respects, 
and one whose views, notably on a unified military department, Yarnell shared�10
For his follow-on assignment, Yarnell returned to sea as commanding officer 
of the gunboat USS Nashville (PG 7)� Following American entry into World War 
I in April 1917, Nashville in August received orders to steam to Gibraltar to join 
other Allied warships patrolling the waters for enemy submarines� That October, 
Yarnell went ashore after receiving orders assigning him as temporary American 
base commander at Gibraltar, and on November 25, 1917, he assumed additional 
duties as chief of staff to Rear Admiral Albert P� Niblack, Commander, Squadron 
2, Patrol Force, Atlantic Fleet�11
Concurrently in London, now–vice admiral Sims, in his role as Commander, 
U�S� Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, was steadily building up his 
forces to support the Allied war effort� For several months, Sims maintained a 
robust correspondence with Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Wil-
liam S� Benson requesting additional personnel for his headquarters to develop 
a planning section to coordinate with the British Admiralty� Collectively, the 
Allied planners would develop plans for aggressive operations against the Im-
perial German Navy, such as the April 1918 British raid on the Belgian port of 
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Bruges-Zeebrugge� Sims suggested a staff composed of War College–educated, 
up-and-coming younger officers—and the list included Yarnell�12 In November 
1917, Sims at last received Benson’s approval to establish a planning section 
composed of three War College graduates: Commander Dudley W� Knox, Cap-
tain Frank H� Schofield, and a third man to be named later—Yarnell�13 A fourth 
section member, Colonel Robert H� Dunlap, USMC, arrived in March 1918�14
In December 1917, Knox, Schofield, and Yarnell established the American Na-
val Planning Section London� Free of administrative duties, the officers devoted 
all their time to surveying operations, discovering mistakes, suggesting improve-
ments, and preparing plans for future operations� Essentially they were delivering 
to the force commander a “continuous Estimate of the Situation”—a method that 
Admiral Chester W� Nimitz employed decades later, albeit labeled a “Running 
Summary of [the] Situation�”15 The memorandums they produced mirrored the 
War College methodology� Yarnell participated in the drafting of forty-seven of 
the seventy-one London Planning Section memorandums, all developed in close 
consultation with Knox and Schofield�16
Working under Sims and with his fellow planners, Yarnell refined some of his 
own ideas and advanced an understanding of the need for harmonization among 
Vice Admiral William S. Sims with members of his staff, circa mid-1918. Seated in the second row are, from left to right, Captain Dudley W. Knox; Captain 
Frank H. Schofield; Captain Nathan C. Twining; Sims; and Captain Harry E. Yarnell.
Naval History and Heritage Command
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instruments of power� Principally, this meant coordination between political and 
military leaderships in developing both national and Allied strategy, as well as 
plans touching on information�17 Combined with his work at the Naval War Col-
lege, Yarnell’s Planning Section experience “solidified his unification thinking,” 
writes historian Jeffery M� Dorwart� Yarnell believed that a merger of the Navy 
and War Departments would result in greater cooperation and better coordina-
tion among forces, in the interest of efficiency and economy of effort�18 Yarnell 
drew on the intellectual and informational resources of the Admiralty and from 
Italian and French naval planners to help guide his thinking�
Although the Planning Section work produced intellectually rigorous results, 
these did not always translate into success at sea, notably in the Adriatic�19 The 
planners’ work, however, did provide Sims and OPNAV with various courses of 
action when considering how to prosecute the war effort better�20
The London Planning Section caught Washington’s attention, and by sum-
mer 1918 OPNAV increasingly depended on the London team for its own 
planning�21 In mid-July 1918, Benson cabled Sims of his desire to continue this 
work in Washington and ordered Sims to transfer Yarnell to OPNAV, sending 
Captain Luke McNamee to London in exchange�22 The CNO also requested that 
the London Planning Section prepare an outline of a plans organization based 
on recommendations from the war experience, the resulting memorandum for 
which accompanied Yarnell to Washington�23 Reporting to OPNAV in Septem-
ber, Yarnell served in the Planning Section under Rear Admiral James H� Oliver� 
Yarnell also received verbal instructions from 
Benson to sit on the Joint Army and Navy Plan-
ning Committee, which had been organized to 
“investigate, study, and report upon questions 
relative to the national defense and involving 
joint action of the Army and Navy�”24 Almost a 
full year later, in August 1919, two more officers, 
Captain William S� Pye and Lieutenant Com-
mander Holloway H� Frost, joined the Planning 
Section� Together with the existing section, these 
men formed the OPNAV Planning (or Plans) 
Division; Yarnell described them as “capable 
youngsters with War College training and full of 
vim and vigor�”25 By 1922, the group became the 
War Plans Division, exclusively focused on plan-
ning for a range of war scenarios�26
Yarnell’s work within the division from Sep-
tember 1918 to September 1920 drew heavily 
Captain Harry E. Yarnell, circa 1918, as a member of Vice Admiral 
Sims’s American Naval Planning Section London.
Naval History and Heritage Command
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from his experience in London� Rather than drafting memorandums concerning 
estimates of situations, Yarnell now focused on plans� For his first year, the plan-
ning was “usually administrative planning” on “comparatively minor subjects,” 
such as liaison work with the State Department, the study of international law, 
South and Central American policies and operations, and insular policy�27 But the 
time in London for Yarnell and his fellow Planning Section alumni, in the words 
of historian David F� Trask, “enlarged the horizons of naval expansionist thought,” 
notably through recognition of the increasing naval and diplomatic power and 
influence of the United States� Planning for future conflicts would center on the 
two most able naval powers, Great Britain and Japan�28
Regarding those two powers, Yarnell gravitated toward a focus on the Pacific� 
His initial work with the division raised fundamental questions that were used to 
guide the overall planning process� With Germany defeated and with the United 
States lacking a stated enemy or a plan to confront one, Yarnell deemed the situa-
tion “like trying to design a machine tool without knowing whether the operator 
is going to manufacture hair pins or locomotives�” Two potent navies—those of 
Great Britain and Japan—challenged that of the United States, and in the im-
mediate postwar period both countries were considered likely enemies owing 
to their alliance�29 But in a March 29, 1919, memorandum to acting CNO Rear 
Admiral Josiah S� McKean, Yarnell concluded, “It is apparent that our most prob-
able enemy at the present time is Japan�”30 On August 12, 1919—the CNO’s last 
working day in office and the day after the Planning Division stood up—Admiral 
Benson approved Yarnell’s “Basic Plan of Procedure for the Pacific�” Yarnell 
refined his thinking later in September with his paper entitled “Strategy in the 
Pacific,” which the General Staff College and the Naval War College reprinted�31
When the Joint Board met in October to discuss War Plan ORANGE, the U�S� 
strategic plan to defeat Japan, Yarnell raised additional questions about the basics 
of planning—notably, what the interests and policy of the nation were for the 
Far East� These and other queries, Yarnell concluded, required State Depart-
ment input� This marked Yarnell’s growing conviction of the necessity for in-
creased liaison among the different elements of national power, in this instance 
State Department diplomats and officers of the Navy and War Departments�32 
Considering the emphasis today on coordinating instruments of power— 
diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law 
enforcement—Yarnell in 1920 demonstrated a perceptive grasp of the ways and 
means involved in deriving and carrying out a strategy�33
Upon his detachment from the division, Yarnell drafted a memorandum of 
his own ideas, based on his planning experiences� He emphasized that Navy 
activities must rest on basic war plans, and that from these should flow a series 
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of plans for building programs, base projects, fleet organization, and personnel� 
For the War Plans Division itself, Yarnell stressed that it should be staffed with 
high-quality, War College–educated members, low in number but with good in-
ternal communication� Addressing the division’s current efforts, he emphasized 
consideration of economic efficiency in planning: “It is probably a safe statement 
to make that our naval efficiency would be doubled if every dollar was spent with 
that end in view, and only after the purpose for which spent had been referred 
to the war plans�” He concluded that the Plans Division’s future, “by hard steady 
work, all based on sound principles, and sound general plans,” was assured�34
Yarnell’s World War I planning experience produced an array of ideas and 
potential policy actions because it occurred within an intellectual environment 
of gifted NWC graduates� He benefited from ample opportunities to garner feed-
back from his work, from both uniformed American counterparts and Allied 
military personnel� Through his thinking on the virtues of unification, whether 
of forces or toward strategic alignment, Yarnell always sought to understand 
national policy and interests as the basis for planning a military strategy� A core 
tenet of efficiency underlined Yarnell’s planning, aiming to save resources, re-
gardless of whom or what they represented�
INTERWAR EXPERIENCES AND RENEWED CONFLICT
The period stretching from Yarnell’s work in OPNAV to his retirement in the fall 
of 1939 found him prominently engaged in the growing naval aviation commu-
nity� He commanded Naval Air Station Hampton Roads and the Aircraft Squad-
rons, Scouting Fleet from 1924 to 1926, followed by another staff assignment to 
the Naval War College in 1926–27� In July 1927, he reported to Naval Air Station 
Pensacola for flight instruction and received a naval aviation observer designa-
tion� In September 1927, Yarnell arrived in Camden, New Jersey, to oversee the 
fitting out and commissioning of the carrier USS Saratoga (CV 3) and served 
briefly as its first commanding officer�35
In September 1928, Yarnell achieved flag rank when he became chief of the 
Bureau of Engineering as a rear admiral� During his tenure he obtained German 
diesel engine technology to accelerate research and development in submarine 
engine propulsion�36 In the first quarter of 1930, he served additional duty as a 
naval adviser at the London Naval Conference, where his planning experience 
and technical knowledge supported Secretary of the Navy Charles F� Adams dur-
ing the negotiations�37
Throughout the 1930s, Yarnell’s most prominent roles involved naval aviation 
exercises and senior command in the Far East� As Commander, Aircraft Squad-
rons, Battle Force from 1931 to 1933, Yarnell’s carrier force of USS Lexington 
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(CV 2) and Saratoga participated in Grand Joint Army-Navy Exercise No� 4 and 
achieved notable distinction by conducting a surprise carrier raid on Army in-
stallations on Oahu—providing a foretaste of Japanese actions nine years later� In 
the follow-on, Navy-only Fleet Problem XIII, which examined challenges posed 
in conducting offensive operations against central Pacific Japanese League of 
Nations mandates, Yarnell concluded that the Navy needed additional carriers to 
ensure success in a future Pacific war�38
As Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet from 1936 to 1939, Yarnell garnered in-
ternational praise for his deft handling of challenges to American interests amid 
the outbreak of war between Japan and China� Having observed the fighting in 
and around Shanghai, Yarnell merged his ideas on naval aviation and Japanese 
interests with his old planning emphasis on unification and economy of force� In 
a letter of October 15, 1937, to CNO Admiral William D� Leahy, Yarnell sought 
to avoid the waste of World War I by advocating an economic and economical 
war, in particular a war “of strangulation, in short, an almost purely naval war in 
the Pacific as far as we are concerned.” A naval war of strangulation would entail 
using submarines, aircraft, and light forces with cruising endurance, economi-
cally employed, executing plans prepared in cooperation with the State, War, 
Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Force, inspecting the crew of his flagship, USS Saratoga (CV 3), in Lahaina Roadstead, 
Hawaii, February 17, 1932.
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and Navy Departments�39 Leahy shared Yarnell’s letter with President Franklin 
D� Roosevelt, who liked Yarnell’s approach, since it aligned with Roosevelt’s own 
thinking on confronting Japanese aggression�40
These ideas were not new� Back on February 13, 1919, Yarnell had submitted 
a memorandum to CNO Benson about a campaign against Japan� It detailed 
American actions that would be essential in the event of a war against Japan, 
including moving the fleet to Honolulu, building ships capable of fighting across 
the Pacific, and attacking Japanese commerce� “The war on commerce will be a 
preponderating feature,” Yarnell wrote, “the one method by which we can defeat 
Japan[,] as she depends on food imports�”41 In a November 25, 1938, letter, Yarnell 
suggested to Leahy that the United States halt financial loans and shipments 
of war materials to Japan, while increasing American submarine, aviation, and 
cruiser forces to threaten Japanese supply lines�42 This letter included a study 
entitled “Situation in the Pacific�” Historian Michael Vlahos notes the near-
verbatim similarity of Yarnell’s perspective regarding the Japanese in both the 
1938 study and the May 1918 Memorandum No� 21, “U�S� Naval Building Policy,” 
which Yarnell had helped to write for Sims’s London Planning Section�43 Yarnell’s 
recommendations—together with the Report of the Board to Investigate and 
Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, Commander, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, (bottom row, center) with his staff, aboard his flagship, USS Augusta (CA 31), circa winter 1937.
Naval History and Heritage Command
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Report upon the Need, for Purposes of National Defense, and for the Establish-
ment of Additional Submarine, Destroyer, Mine, and Naval Air Bases on the 
Coasts of the United States, Its Territories and Possessions, led by Rear Admiral 
Arthur J� Hepburn—historian Jeffery Underwood contends, merged with Roo-
sevelt’s to shape the president’s Far Eastern foreign policy of deterrence toward 
Japan�44
In July 1939, Admiral Thomas C� Hart relieved Yarnell as commander of the 
Asiatic Fleet and Yarnell returned to the United States to be retired from active 
naval service�45 Upon arrival in Washington in late August, he met with a variety 
of senior State, Navy, and War Department officials to discuss matters in the Far 
East�46 In a memorandum to CNO Admiral Harold R� Stark, written on Septem-
ber 2, Yarnell reiterated his 1938 positions on planning for a Pacific war� Specific 
points included engaging in a naval war of “cruisers, submarines, and aircraft 
operating against lines of communication” and avoiding fighting the Japanese 
alone (i�e�, without Allied support)�47 In early October 1940, following the Japa-
nese occupation of French Indochina, Yarnell met with Secretary of the Navy 
Frank Knox and recommended strengthening the Asiatic Fleet with aircraft, 
submarines, and cruisers�48 Writing to Stark after meeting with Knox, Yarnell 
offered his services to the Navy as a commander of escort or auxiliary vessels, 
recalling similar services that retired British admirals had performed during the 
First World War—an offer Stark politely declined�49
Yet while the Navy may not have been interested in Yarnell serving at sea, it 
was interested in his intellectual insights� On January 3, 1941, Yarnell reported for 
duty to Secretary Knox, who had decided to make use of his services as a general 
adviser, among other duties, until April, with follow-on assignments pertaining 
to industrial incentives, shipyard inspections, and awards boards� None of these 
leveraged Yarnell’s planning expertise or Far East experience but rather his Bu-
reau of Engineering experience and analytic abilities�50 In his advising capabili-
ties, Yarnell quickly drafted several brief memos to Knox, including one harping 
on the subject of wasted defense spending owing to the lack of a basic plan for 
national defense�51
On January 15, 1941, Yarnell submitted to Knox a memorandum entitled “Far 
Eastern Situation�” The memorandum arrived at an interesting moment: on the 
eve of the first “ABC” conference among U�S�, British, and Canadian military 
staffs� Yarnell articulated to Knox Japan’s desire to avoid war with the United 
States if it could achieve its goals without conflict, for “[t]he cooler heads of Japan 
realize that war with the United States is almost tantamount to national suicide�” 
Since this dynamic shifted the strategic initiative to the United States, Yarnell 
endorsed coordinating and strengthening American and Allied air and naval 
forces in the Far East to blunt any Japanese movement farther south� Regarding 
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the Philippines, he advocated for strengthening air, antiair, and submarine forces 
in the Philippines as soon as possible—by taking these forces “at the expense of 
Panama and Hawaii, which are in no danger of attack until the situation in Eu-
rope is radically changed for the worse�”52 Yarnell presumably knew of discussions 
among the Americans, British, Dutch, Australians, and New Zealanders to form 
an alliance to blunt Japanese aggression, and may have drafted this memo to bol-
ster the argument and efforts of Hart and the Asiatic Fleet to funnel increased aid 
to the Pacific rather than Europe� In either case, a week after Yarnell submitted 
his memo to Knox, Hart received word that no reinforcements would be going 
to the Asiatic Fleet�53
In mid-January 1942, following American entry into World War II, Yarnell 
received orders assigning him as adviser to the Chinese military mission�54 In his 
own words, the mission was “interesting, but doesn’t do much to win the war”; he 
added, “I dislike a desk job, and I dislike Washington�”55 In August 1942, orders 
were cut to assign Yarnell to the General Board, but he spoke about the move 
to Knox, who promptly had these orders canceled�56 Instead, Yarnell requested 
sea duty at month’s end—“preferably in the Pacific”—but received from Knox a 
noncommittal response, stating that he would be ordered to sea duty “when and 
if a suitable billet is available�”57 So when the Chinese delegation was recalled in 
January 1943, Yarnell requested to be returned to the retired list�58 But he would 
make one last request for a sea assignment; on May 15, 1943, to Rear Admiral 
Randall Jacobs, chief of the Bureau of Personnel, Yarnell reiterated his October 
1940 appeal to Stark, seeking active duty as a convoy commodore� Jacobs politely 
declined on the basis of Yarnell’s age of almost sixty-eight�59
No sooner had the aged admiral returned to Newport in early 1943 than he 
received a request to go back to Washington to assist the Navy once again� In 
mid-February, Captain William D� Puleston—who himself had been retired but 
was serving in the Office of Economic Warfare Analysis—wrote to Yarnell and 
mentioned how Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aviation Artemus L� Gates 
had expressed a desire for Yarnell to advise him on the future of naval aviation� 
Appealing to Yarnell, Puleston wrote, “If we get the correct plan for naval avia-
tion settled, it will point the way to the naval-military policy for the post-war�”60 
Yarnell evidently liked what he heard, writing to Gates within days to offer his 
services as an adviser�
Days later, Yarnell submitted a proposed plan of naval and military organiza-
tion that cribbed from a similar plan he had submitted to the Chinese military 
mission� Among other points, the plan advocated a unified military command 
structure under a single civilian authority, again demonstrating his belief in the 
benefit of unification�61 Meeting with Gates in May and June, Yarnell discussed 
matters of naval aviation, which most likely included how to address public 
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efforts urging creation of an independent air force�62 Perhaps spurred by Gates, 
Yarnell wrote to Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) Vice Admiral Frederick 
J� Horne about the independent air force movement� With CNO Admiral Ernest 
J� King’s concurrence, the VCNO asked whether Yarnell would be interested in 
heading a board to study the matter; Yarnell agreed�63 King wrote Yarnell a follow- 
up letter about his acceptance, in which he thanked him for his willingness to 
serve, and added, “[Y]ou can expect to be asked for advice on a large variety of 
air—and other—matters�”64
Mere days prior to receiving the invitation from Horne, Yarnell had drafted an 
article that articulated his views on unification and aviation independence that 
he had developed over his interwar career�65 Historian Clark Reynolds describes 
Yarnell’s unification article and forthcoming June 1943 investigation into naval 
aviation as having “stirred up several hornet’s nests in about three months” before 
the retired admiral “passed into obscurity�”66 Titled “A Department of War” and 
published in the August 1943 Proceedings, Yarnell’s article declares demobiliza-
tion to be one of the major domestic problems confronting the nation� He asks 
“whether or not a thorough reorganization of our military departments is essen-
tial in the interest of efficiency and economy�”67 Having witnessed America’s costs 
in blood, time, and treasure in building forces for World War I, and then ineffi-
ciencies both nationally and with Allies in waging the war, Yarnell concludes that 
organizational independence had resulted in waste�
Yarnell proposes a new U�S� Department of War for the post–World War II era� 
He avers that the current organizational construct had disadvantaged American 
military aviation and he disparages the British model of three independent armed 
services—a thinly veiled swipe at American advocates of air force independence� 
Yarnell outlines a new organization that a civilian secretary would lead, oversee-
ing a uniformed chief of staff who would oversee an Operations Division and a 
Material Division� The former would handle personnel procurement, training, 
and operations in war for the three service branches—army, navy, and air� The 
Operations Division chief also would act as commander in chief of all forces in 
time of war� The Material Division’s responsibilities would include design and 
procurement of all matériel for the armed forces� Under this proposal, all officers 
would attend a single military academy and all would receive aviation training� 
Upon graduation, officers would be assigned to one of the three uniformed 
branches� Officers for the Material Division would be drawn from leading tech-
nical colleges�
Yarnell believed his proposal would provide greater flexibility for the exchange 
of officers among branches; increase unity of command and mutual understand-
ing among branches; and commit officers in the respective divisions to a career 
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of both designing and building the weapons of war, or training for the most ef-
ficient use of said weapons in time of war� The proposal, Yarnell argued, “would 
meet the requirements of modern war through a more logical force structure,” 
thereby assuring “the most efficient use of the sums appropriated by Congress 
for our national security�”68 The article bore the hallmarks of Yarnell’s planning 
philosophy refined over the decades, perhaps most of all regarding efficiency, 
both in economic matters and in the sharing of knowledge among personnel�
In late June 1943, Yarnell reported for duty in Washington to investigate avia-
tion matters� Using a survey of active naval aviators, Yarnell’s effort examined 
both aviation issues and overall national defense organization� By coincidence, 
his survey arrived in aviators’ mailboxes at the same time that his Proceedings ar-
ticle reached wardroom tables� When summarized, the data from Yarnell’s survey 
reflected a belief that there had been a misuse of naval airpower in the war� The 
survey also revealed support for unification of the services under a single military 
secretary rather than an independent air force in direct competition with the 
Navy and War Departments�69
Admiral King did not implement all of Yarnell’s recommendations� However, 
some elements—notably the appointment of aviators to Admiral Nimitz’s staff—
proved useful in the fast-carrier task force campaigns of 1944�70
DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING
Soon after receiving the aviation assignment, Yarnell received a second tasking: 
to prepare a plan for demobilizing the Navy and reducing the size of the postwar 
force� The matter had emerged in late July when Acting Secretary of War Robert 
P� Patterson Sr� informed Knox of the War Department’s recently established 
Special Planning Division to study postwar planning�71 A week later, on August 4, 
1943, Yarnell wrote to Joseph W� Powell, special assistant to Secretary Knox� The 
letter stated that the Navy had ongoing war projects that were unnecessary, and 
by acting immediately to reduce those projects the service could save billions of 
dollars and avoid numerous postwar labor issues�72 In a testament to his analytic 
ability, Yarnell recognized that the equilibrium in the war had shifted sufficiently 
in favor of the Allies to warrant a reduction in war projects� With direct reference 
to defensive bases in the Atlantic and Alaska, Yarnell recommended an intel-
ligent reduction in demands for military manpower and war matériel both to 
save money and to ease postwar transfer of labor from the military to the civilian 
economy� Yarnell’s letter to Powell, writes historian Jeffrey G� Barlow, probably 
persuaded Horne to draft an order for a demobilization board�73 The letter argu-
ably reinforced a memo from Horne to King of August 2 in which the VNCO 
stated as follows:
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While it is not considered necessary to set up a planning board or planning division 
as such at the present time, it is considered advisable to consider seriously the detail 
of an officer of rank and experience who should give his entire thought as to what 
planning will be necessary and how it should be carried out, and for this purpose it 
is suggested that Vice Admiral [Roland M�] Brainard might be ordered to duty under 
the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as soon as he is placed on the retired list�74 
Horne tapped Yarnell to draft a proposed order for a demobilization board, 
which he submitted on August 13 for finalization within OPNAV over the com-
ing week�75
On August 26, 1943, Knox ordered Yarnell to serve under the VCNO and head 
a Navy Special Planning Section tasked with planning for postwar demobiliza-
tion� Yarnell would “prepare maximum and minimum estimates of the Post-war 
requirements for the Navy and naval establishment,” and after VNCO approval 
these would serve “as a basis for post-war demobilization planning�”76 Horne is-
sued a follow-on memo to Yarnell the next day to define the scope of the work� 
The VCNO requested the preliminary study by November 1, to include retention 
target figures for naval units (types and sizes, surface and air), the shore estab-
lishment, and personnel� Horne included some of his own ideas for Yarnell’s 
consideration, which historian Vincent Davis summarizes as wanting the biggest 
possible active and reserve fleets, with Horne requesting that Yarnell give con-
sideration to organizing task forces that “spread around[, which] appears more 
desirable than a concentrated fleet organization� Naval officers and men should 
know the world and its seas�”77
Yarnell adroitly composed his preliminary draft and submitted it to Horne 
within two weeks� In it he acknowledged some enduring policy assumptions—
maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, avoidance of European disputes, ongoing 
interests in the Far East—then recognized that the defeat of Germany and Japan 
would leave the United States with an overabundance of military power that 
would necessitate a swift demobilization of personnel and disposal of matériel� 
Yarnell stressed maintaining a building program of certain ship types to sustain 
research and development in case of emergency; this inclusion, one presumes, 
resulted from his experiences as chief engineer of the Navy�78 After incorporat-
ing some initial feedback, Yarnell reviewed Army demobilization plans and 
consulted with senior Navy civilian and uniformed officials to refine his thinking 
further� Unlike in his previous planning experiences, Yarnell produced the report 
independently�79
Horne received Yarnell’s refined Navy demobilization plan draft on September 
22, 1943� Yarnell framed the postwar force within national policy and the mission 
of the armed forces� He concluded that both American military services (writ 
large—the Army and the Navy) had failed to fulfill their prewar missions, which 
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were as follows: to understand foreign policies and commitments; to recognize 
the increasing power of the nations disputing those policies; to recognize that 
policy and its supporting force are interdependent; and to inform the govern-
ment of their inability to support national policies, owing “to the inadequacy of 
the armed forces�” The last-listed charge stemmed from Yarnell’s own evaluation 
of the nation’s (lack of) prewar military preparedness—and arguably it was only 
his seniority and his reputation that permitted him to lay such a serious charge 
against the prewar military leadership� Yarnell listed eleven policy assumptions 
that should guide postwar Navy planning for demobilizing the wartime force� 
While identifying factors relevant to the strength of the postwar Navy, he noted 
that the United States and Great Britain, as the only two great naval powers in 
the world, might both be confronted with a long postwar period of unrest and 
instability requiring global policing by military forces�80
The plan reflected Horne’s desire to maintain a large postwar Navy� Yarnell 
included as one of his relevant factors that “the first estimate of the naval forces to 
be kept in commission should be too large rather than too small�” In his analysis 
of the plan, historian Vincent Davis observes how Yarnell “tacitly assumed that 
the American people would be willing to support a large peacetime military es-
tablishment” and alluded to compulsory military training and a unified military 
establishment�81 Drawing additional cues from Horne’s August 27 memo, Yarnell 
recommended assigning naval forces to eight geographic stations, with a post-
war surface navy organized into three task forces, each composed of three large 
aircraft carriers and two battleships, with supporting cruisers, destroyers, and 
auxiliaries� Three reserve task forces mirroring the “fully manned” task forces 
would train reservists, while each of the six geographic stations (not including 
the East or West Coast of the United States) would sustain a squadron of four 
cruisers, twelve destroyers or destroyer escorts, two carriers, and supporting aux-
iliaries� Plans for actual demobilization would be drafted by OPNAV to address 
the postwar surface forces, the disposition of Navy shore facilities, and the status 
of naval aviation� The Marine Corps, Navy bureaus, and assorted offices would 
draft their own demobilization plans�82 The geographic scope of Yarnell’s plan 
vastly expanded the historical stationing of USN forces abroad� This plan would 
pair perfectly with future plans for the United Nations and President Roosevelt’s 
vision of the United States as one of the world’s “Four Policemen�”83
Yarnell’s preliminary plan provided the framework for Navy Basic Demobi-
lization Plan No� 1� Yarnell submitted a revised plan to Horne on October 28� 
The revision incorporated feedback from colleagues and affirmation from King 
that the plan was “based on acceptable assumptions and that sound conclusions 
are reached�”84 Yarnell added a new postwar policy assumption of “support of 
an adequate Merchant Marine and commercial aviation as factors in our future 
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security�” Regarding postwar armed strength, Yarnell included a new statement 
for expeditionary warfare in future American conflicts, whereby “the armed 
forces should be designed and trained to carry on a war of aggression in enemy 
territory�” He added a lengthy paragraph recommending an immediate study on 
the elimination of certain types of vessels not needed for the Pacific War and to 
eliminate all construction unessential for the successful prosecution of the war� 
Reassessing the target strength of the postwar Navy, Yarnell included a statement 
that Great Britain “will be a strong commercial rival with the remote possibility 
of becoming a future enemy”—perhaps an optimistic appraisal derived from his 
World War I experience� He also altered his assumption on the future of Russia, 
to include a growth in its naval forces� Yarnell delineated the number of aircraft 
squadrons for the previously listed geographic stations and changed the desig-
nation from “task forces” to “numbered fleets�” Lastly, he added an additional 
amphibious force composed of a reinforced regiment of Marines and required 
transports�85 Although still only a draft, Yarnell’s plan outlined a substantial 
postwar role for the Navy, matching a large force to domestic and international 
commitments that were unprecedented in the service’s history�
Formally released on November 17, 1943, Navy Basic Demobilization Plan 
No� 1 retained most of Yarnell’s refined draft� Horne and his staff made some 
changes to Yarnell’s work, with slight numerical edits to the size and scope of 
the problem and rewording of assumptions about Great Britain and Russia as 
potential adversaries� Horne’s staff dropped Yarnell’s national policy commitment 
for compulsory military training� Instead, Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No� 1 
stated that “[d]efense of our national interests must envisage the desirability of 
being able to commence offensive operations without waiting for an initial as-
sault and setback by any future enemy� A well trained Navy composed of vessels, 
aircraft, and amphibious units, ready for immediate use will be essential to that 
end�” The three numbered fleets each received an additional battleship and two 
repair ships, but otherwise the proposed postwar Navy size tracked with Yarnell’s 
draft�86 Issued under Horne’s signature, Plan No� 1 was, according to Vincent 
Davis, ultimately less a plan for demobilization than “a statement of assumptions 
and principles intended to guide the various offices of the Navy Department in 
their participation in the planning of the postwar Navy�”87
A week after Horne released Plan No� 1, Yarnell shared his reflections on 
the existing planning process in a letter to the VCNO� To ease the task at hand, 
Yarnell recommended that Horne acquire a “small able ‘Plans Division’ to give 
you considered opinions on many of the problems that come across your desk�” 
Making a brief reference to his experience with OPNAV in September 1918, 
Yarnell suggested that the associated personnel include “a Rear Admiral (Active 
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List) in charge and not more than three or four younger officers, Captains or 
Commanders� They should be high grade officers who have served their time at 
sea and are due for 2 or 3 years shore duty� They should have no administrative 
duty.” Creating such a plans division would provide the VNCO with “reasoned 
opinions quickly on many questions which you now have to work out yourself�”88
While the letter bore Yarnell’s signature, it easily could have been the specter 
of Sims guiding his protégé’s hand across the page, writing the same request to 
Benson� The tone of Yarnell’s letter shows awareness that he alone could not 
keep pace with the immensity of events, and that a younger, core team of officers 
would equip the VCNO better for postwar planning matters� Yet despite this 
awareness, Yarnell essentially remained Horne’s Special Planning Section all by 
himself�
Yarnell worked on Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No� 2 from November 
1943 to February 1944� While Plan No� 1 assumed the Allied nations would reach 
no agreement to maintain peace in the postwar era, Plan No� 2 assumed the Unit-
ed States and Great Britain would divide control of the sea and air in accordance 
with present strategic areas—a reflection of the growing assumption within the 
Navy Department that Anglo-American naval cooperation would continue after 
the war was over� Plan No� 2 also assumed continuation of President Roosevelt’s 
Good Neighbor Policy, with air or naval actions undertaken in conjunction with 
the nations of Central and South America� The Soviet Union would police the 
waters adjacent to its territory in the northwest Pacific, China would have a navy 
adequate to police its rivers and coastal waters, and Japan would be permitted a 
coast guard capable of policing local waters and maintaining lighthouse service� 
In the Pacific, new assumptions included retaining the Marshall, Caroline, Mari-
ana, Pelew, and Bonin Islands, with air and naval bases on the former three and 
air bases on the latter two�89 The plan rested on a fundamental assumption that 
after the war the Allied powers would cooperate in maintaining the peace and in 
making and abiding by agreements for commercial and military air bases, togeth-
er with reciprocal agreements for the use of foreign naval and military air bases�
The drawdown of the Navy, in both uniformed personnel and civilian work-
ers, would be conducted gradually� Economic considerations were essential in 
the disposal of obsolete weaponry and the retention of naval stores on the basis 
of sound economy in government� Yarnell included a recommendation for the 
Army and Navy to organize a research effort, codified in legislation, to continue 
developing new weapons and armaments� In other areas Plan No� 2 essentially 
mirrored its predecessor�90
Overall, Yarnell’s plan aimed at maintaining a naval establishment capable 
of policing the far reaches of the globe and of expanding further efficiently, if 
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necessary� It would keep an eye toward developing future tactics, techniques, and 
technologies for naval warfare on, above, and below the oceans�
Yarnell concluded his planning work in June 1944� Horne had forwarded the 
revised Plan No� 1 with its subsidiary office and bureau plans to the new Secretary 
of the Navy, James V� Forrestal, on May 22�91 Following this, on June 9, Horne 
sent Yarnell’s Plan No� 2 to the bureaus and offices for review, and concurrently 
requested that Yarnell prepare Navy Basic Demobilization Plan No� 3� This third 
iteration incorporated the premise that peace and security would be guaranteed 
by an international organization under an international agreement, dominated 
by the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China� Further premises in-
cluded that other nations would contribute to or join the organization, with the 
Americans, British, Russians, and Chinese responsible for the sea and air in their 
respective strategic areas, and that the world organization’s total power would be 
capable of ensuring peace against any probable aggressor—including one of the 
four dominant powers�92
In three days, Yarnell replied with a prescient memorandum forecasting the 
postwar world� He first listed three factors requiring study before a demobiliza-
tion plan could be crafted: the general world conditions in the immediate post-
war era; postwar armed strength among the leading Allied nations, their future 
policies, and the probability that one of them would become an aggressor; and 
the likely character of the international organization that would be agreed on�93 
Yarnell envisioned an immediate postwar world filled with nation-state tension, 
unrest, and civil and minor wars� Domestically, dominant issues would be demo-
bilizing war workers and servicemembers, disposing of war matériel, practicing 
economy in government expenditure, and finding a solution to racial problems� 
In Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, Yarnell foresaw difficulties, with conflicts 
among nations, probable violence between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and dif-
ferences between Russia and Turkey over the Bosporus and Dardanelles� The 
burden for addressing these conflicts would fall on Great Britain and Russia, 
with America’s participation limited to withdrawal of its combat forces, provision 
of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, and protection of American nationals 
and other interests� The Far East also faced uncertainty over the stability of the 
Chinese government, France and Great Britain resuming control of their colo-
nial possessions, and the Philippines gaining independence� “Due to the growth 
of nationalist feeling,” Yarnell accurately predicted, “there will be unrest and 
disturbances in the colonial areas,” perhaps recognizing that neither the French 
nor British would resume control with ease� Yarnell projected the United States, 
emerging as the preeminent military power on the sea and with strong air and 
ground forces, would maintain its prewar policies of the Open Door in Asia, the 
Monroe Doctrine, and promotion of international trade, with the addition of a 
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willingness to enter into an international organization for peace, and obtaining a 
share of sea and air transportation�94
Yarnell then proceeded to examine the three other dominant powers� First, 
with Great Britain’s power having been on the decline since the Boer War of 
1899–1902, Yarnell deemed the country unlikely to become an aggressor and 
advocated maintaining friendly relations�
Second, Russia possessed great potential for power� Yarnell wrote that Rus-
sian leaders’ shared “realistic and nationalistic” policy, developed with their own 
security in mind, was a policy that the United States “must be prepared for � � � in 
the post-war settlements�” He foretold the country’s insistence on taking Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Bessarabia, and parts of Poland and Finland, as well as on 
projecting its claims in the Pacific to southern Sakhalin Island and the Kurils� 
Yarnell argued that the United States should not object to these actions, nor 
to possible demands for neutralizing the Kiel Canal and the Dardanelles, as he 
considered these Russian policy initiatives to be born of understandable security 
imperatives� Claiming that “[t]here are no major clashes of policy between the 
United States and Russia,” Yarnell opined that “with realistic statesmanship on 
both sides, there is no danger at present or in the visible future of a major clash 
between nations�” As Russia had no sea power, Yarnell deemed that it could not 
be considered a serious threat for twenty or thirty years—a conclusion at odds 
with that of Forrestal and the Office of Naval Intelligence by the fall of 1944�95
The challenge that the third power, China, continued to face was maintaining 
a stable government in power during and after the war� Despite his knowledge of 
the senior levels of the Nationalist Chinese government, Yarnell curiously wrote 
that, beyond the nation reverting to chaos and civil war, there was nothing to 
replace the current government should it collapse; astonishingly, the Communist 
Chinese did not elicit a mention� Even with a stable government, reconstruction 
of the nation would occupy its energy, and without sea power China could not 
be considered a threat�96
Yarnell affirmed that an international organization would not change, to 
any appreciable degree, the amount of American naval strength that Plan No� 2 
deemed necessary to be kept in commission, and therefore he recommended that 
the figures for forces and outlying bases in Plan No� 2 be accepted in relation to 
Horne’s June 9 memorandum�97 By essentially cutting the knees out from under 
his own Plan No� 3, Yarnell left Horne with a useful conceptual document, but 
ensured that it was Plan No� 2 that would receive further development in the 
future�98
Yarnell’s memorandum to Horne is a fascinating document� His global 
socioeconomic-political forecast proved mostly accurate, although it was perhaps 
overly optimistic regarding the other dominant powers� The retired admiral 
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broke new ground for Navy planners in attempting to examine the post–World 
War II world, thanks to the intellectual template provided by his work in London 
and OPNAV from 1918 to 1920� Yarnell’s predictions about developing an in-
ternational order centered on the four dominant powers—reflecting Roosevelt’s 
“Four Policemen”—and the policy issues they would confront proved rather pre-
scient, at least when considering the United Nations Security Council�
On the other hand, Yarnell’s faith that Great Britain would maintain sufficient 
military strength to police Germany and address other European problems, 
along with Russia, proved unfounded� Yarnell completely misread the potential 
of the Soviet and Chinese Communists to develop into formidable adversaries 
by decade’s end� The omission of the Com-
munist movement in China and the belief that 
the United States would limit its involvement in 
European affairs were extremely odd oversights 
for someone of Yarnell’s experience in both re-
gions� Furthermore, while he was aware of the 
growing capability of aviation, as particularly 
evidenced by bomber operations in Europe, 
his overriding assumption that only sea power 
could threaten the United States was obsolete�99 
Notably, neither Yarnell nor Horne was privy to 
a highly classified project that only King and a 
few other Navy personnel knew existed, code-
named Manhattan�100
With his submission of Plan No� 3, Yarnell 
essentially concluded his work� He continued to 
provide additional memorandums and insight 
to senior officials over the course of the summer and into the fall; for all intents 
and purposes, however, responsibility for postwar planning thereafter resided 
with the staffs of Horne and King—Yarnell acknowledged that the demobiliza-
tion problem “is not in my hands any longer�”101 On November 24, 1944, Yarnell 
received orders returning him to inactive duty as of January 15, 1945�102 The day 
after Christmas, the Navy Department announced his third retirement�103 King 
thanked Yarnell for having “worked with devotion and distinction in the Office of 
the Chief of Naval Operations� His departure carried with it my personal regret at 
the loss of his services and my thanks for a job well done�”104 Ironically, comments 
historian Jeffrey Barlow, the press release was sent out the same day that King’s 
planners issued their study on the postwar world�105
Yarnell returned to Newport� He told a friend that he had “a lot of painting and 
carpenter work to do around the house�”106
Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, fully retired and at his desk in his home in 
Newport, Rhode Island, February 2, 1945.
Author’s collection
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REFLECTION AND PERSPECTIVE
With his planning experiences of 1918–20 and 1943–44, Admiral Harry E� 
Yarnell provided the Navy with continuity, personnel-wise, between the world 
wars� His training at the Naval War College and his work with “the ablest men” 
of Admiral Sims’s Planning Section instilled and reinforced in Yarnell ideas and 
methodologies that he applied throughout his career, especially at critical junc-
tures of the Navy’s evolution and force development� Most notable among these 
were the necessity for policy relations between and among the State, Navy, and 
War Departments; unification and unity of command; economy of force; and 
the applicatory system� While during World War II he perforce conducted his 
planning efforts without the contributions of a small section of talented minds 
working in unison, in contrast to the previous war, his half century of service 
and study of military history equipped him admirably for the task� He embraced 
emerging technologies and grasped political developments to formulate plans 
that provided the Navy leadership with sound foundations for further discussion 
and refinement� While Yarnell was—and continues to be—unheralded for his 
strategic vision, his fingerprints can be found all over both the interwar Navy and 
the force that entered the Cold War era�
If Yarnell represented one of the last beneficiaries of Sims’s leadership and 
legacy, he in turn provided that legacy to the Cold War U�S� Navy�107 In one of his 
final memorandums to Horne, in mid-December 1944, Yarnell wrote about the 
German V-1 and V-2 weapons� He explained that “the introduction of these mis-
siles as an operational weapon marks a turning point in the methods of waging 
war� In the near future, even before the end of the present war, controlled missiles 
and high speed robot aircraft undoubtedly will become a prime factor in the suc-
cess of naval warfare, and in the safety of our country�”108
Like Sims, Yarnell kept an eye out for promising young minds, and found 
one in a young reserve lieutenant and budding strategist� In January 1945, the 
lieutenant wrote to the thrice-retired admiral, thanking him “for the fact that 
my Navy service has been as interesting and as useful as it has in fact proved�” 
He then added, “I am especially grateful to you for the arrangement whereby 
you made it possible for me to work in a section where I felt I was more useful 
to the war effort than that in which I had previously been�”109 Writing in 1946 
about the implications of the atomic bomb, Yarnell’s former lieutenant grappled 
with military history’s role in formulating strategy� He concluded that “[h]istory 
is at best an imperfect guide to the future, but when imperfectly understood 
and interpreted it is a menace to sound judgement�”110 Presumably Yarnell 
would have agreed with this conclusion by the author, his former lieutenant: 
Bernard Brodie�
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
PREDICTION
Wayne P. Hughes Jr.
The predictive power of experts, operations analysis, and the value of infor-
mation are interwoven subjects that are hard to winnow down to an essence� 
Prediction is a big subject, so I have limited this article to what I know best: the 
operational and tactical domains of conventional warfare�
First you will read three examples of limitations of predictions when they 
are formed on the basis of information alone� Next I will demonstrate that even 
a modest amount of quantitative analysis, even with incomplete information, 
can help a decision maker execute a military campaign without making explicit 
predictions about the coming battles or operations� Analysts cannot eliminate 
wartime surprises, but they can help to avoid the worst mistakes and steer 
military leaders toward better decisions� I will conclude by advocating what 
is too rarely done: the comparison of quantitative campaign analysis done be-
fore a war with what actually transpired in the war, to show that useful—even 
critically important—advice can be formulated very quickly to help decision 
makers� On one hand, intense thinking about 
the war is necessary; on the other hand, expert 
judgment alone should be augmented with 
simple, transparent, timely—even if incomplete— 
quantitative analysis�
PREDICTION FROM INFORMATION ONLY
Black Swans
Surely the most drastic book on prediction is N� N� 
Taleb’s The Black Swan, subtitled The Impact of the 
Highly Improbable. Taleb makes an entertaining 
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case for the occurrence of unforeseeable events and the like, but his advice is pret-
ty trite; since, by definition, a black swan cannot be predicted, the most we can do 
is be ready for surprises, and then be responsive and adaptive when they occur�1
Gray Swans
More interesting are what might be called gray swans: surprising events of great 
consequence for which evidence existed beforehand but was lost in a clutter of 
information� In the commercial sector, the recent burst of the housing bubble is 
the latest of many collapses brought on by “the madness of crowds” whose herd 
instinct overcame many clues of excesses in plain sight�2 Gray swans in the mili-
tary domain are exemplified by the invasion of South Korea in 1950, the collapse 
of Soviet control in 1989, and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990� All three 
illustrate “surprises” that Monday-morning quarterbacks have decried� After the 
debacle at Pearl Harbor was described alternatively as resulting from a nefarious 
plot or the careless handling of information, Roberta Wohlstetter wrote what is, 
to me, the definitive interpretation in Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision.3 At 
the strategic intelligence level, she shows that it was easy to miss the clues of what 
turned into a tactical disaster amid information overload� At the emotional level, 
one must see the need to hedge against human shortcomings in predicting future 
wars, while being careful not to cry wolf too often�
Gray swans are complicated by the fact that an enemy frequently will use 
deception to ensure they are gray, so to speak� In part Japan was successful in 
its Pearl Harbor attack because it employed deception to achieve surprise� I will 
refer later to Barton Whaley’s masterful study of strategic deception, but here I 
will mention an equally valuable source: the recent book by Erik Dahl, Intelligence 
and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond.4 
Dahl is particularly insightful because he goes beyond deception in big wars to 
include deceptions that terrorists use to attempt to achieve surprise�
Expert Political Judgment
What, then, about predictions by experts? A marvelous book by Philip E� Tet-
lock first describes finding 284 self-proclaimed authorities who made a living 
commenting on political, international, or economic trends and were willing to 
participate in his study� Tetlock’s questions were the kind that could be answered 
“better,” “worse,” or “about the same�” Over several years in the 1990s Tetlock ac-
cumulated 82,361 answers in his database� In 2003, Tetlock compared the predic-
tions with actual results� Two years later he published his conclusions in a book 
entitled Expert Political Judgment.5
And the envelope, please� Well, it is a fat envelope, because Tetlock gives all the 
interested parties a nuanced hearing� To summarize his findings, I quote from a 
New Yorker book review: “[t]he experts performed worse than they would have if 
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they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes� � � � Human 
beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world are poorer forecast-
ers than a dart-throwing monkey�”6 Worse still, the experts tried to defend their 
wrong predictions with excuses such as “My timing was off ” or “An unforesee-
able event interfered with what should have happened�” Tetlock also shows that 
nonexperts who answered the same questions did better than the dart-throwing 
monkey� Not a lot better—but significantly more so than the experts�
INFORMATION SUPPLEMENTED BY ANALYSIS
These are examples of predictability on the basis of information only� Tetlock’s 
Expert Political Judgment is full of statistics measuring the performance of ex-
perts, but as far as I know the experts did not do any analysis to supplement their 
opinions� So, let us next make a distinction between information-based predic-
tion alone and decision-making that is assisted by a quantitative assessment�
Why Military Analysis Cannot Predict
As we begin the shift to military operations analysis, I refer to an essay by the late, 
great Air Force analyst Clayton Thomas�7 In effect, he described model-based 
analysis as an if-then statement� Two things—the model and its inputs—are on 
the if side; model and inputs together are processed to yield a result—the then 
side� If the model represented reality—which in campaign analysis it cannot—
and if the data were precise—and in warfare the data are always “dirty” with 
errors—then the result would be an accurate prediction� We military analysts 
make no such claims; we say no more for the results than that when they are used 
wisely insightful conclusions can be reached and better decisions made�
Prediction Is Sometimes Unavoidable
Although generally we do not claim to predict outcomes, sometimes a decision 
maker must do just that, and we must help him� A prominent example is the 
procurement of warships and aircraft that are intended to have thirty- or even 
forty-year service lives� To see the impossibility of getting the designs right, no 
matter how comprehensive the analysis may be, reflect on the state of the world 
in 1979 and all that has changed since then that affects the prospective wartime 
performance of those ships today�
Space permitting, I could write at length, first, about how our warships com-
pleted before 1979 were designed earlier to carry technologies that were earlier 
still; second, that expensive, multipurpose ships are a poor way to hedge against 
future gray swans; and third, that we have not had to fight a fleet battle since 1945� 
All our learning about war at sea in the missile age has been vicarious, except for 
the handful of embarrassing single-ship attacks we have suffered�
143
Naval War College: Winter 2020 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
 1 3 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Analytical methods and predictive power vary with tactics, technologies, and 
testing and with whether the predictions concern policy, operations, logistics, 
procurements, or strategies� A fine book on the subject is the Military Operations 
Research Society’s Military Modeling for Decision Making, because it is compre-
hensive in distinguishing modeling and techniques for different defense-related 
purposes�8
Strategic Planning and Force Procurement
An accurate, recent, thirty-eight-page appraisal of predictive power when aided 
by extensive, even exhaustive, analysis was published in October 2011 by the 
distinguished statesman Richard Danzig�9 Quoting liberally from both Taleb and 
Tetlock, Danzig shows the limits of model-assisted planning and why the limits 
have been inevitable when programming weapon systems for the future� His cure 
is difficult to implement, however, because Danzig argues, in black swan fashion, 
for more-nimble Department of Defense and congressional processes and accep-
tance of something less than the perfection demanded by those in government 
who metaphorically dodge and weave in a defensive crouch�
In one respect, Danzig’s advice seems implementable� He recommends that we 
work on simpler systems that can be designed and produced more quickly and be 
discarded after shorter lifetimes, when geopolitical circumstances change or new 
technologies serve up either threats or opportunities� Although Danzig does not 
say it this way, the implication is that top-down solutions are unavoidable when 
expensive, long-lived systems must fill capability niches that will endure for the 
long haul—for example, multifunction orbiting satellites, or ballistic-missile-
carrying submarines armed with “failure proof ” nuclear weapons for strategic 
deterrence� Otherwise, bottom-up, quickly deliverable, relatively inexpensive 
systems that fill immediate needs—sometimes by short-circuiting the procure-
ment bureaucracy—are the way to recover from failures of prediction in strategic 
planning� An example is the recent, rapid development of unmanned aerial ve-
hicles, both in the large quantities deployed and in the many design variations� 
Falling somewhere in between were the successes at Kelly Johnson’s Lockheed 
Skunk Works, which responded quickly—from the U-2 in 1955 to the SR-71 in 
1966—to fill a need for long-range surveillance aircraft perceived at the highest 
levels of the Central Intelligence Agency�
Strategic Deception in Wartime
Barton Whaley’s Stratagem is a good, quantitative book on methods of deception 
to achieve strategic surprise, how many false clues it takes to achieve it, how to 
enhance your chances of success, and why attempts to deceive have not cost much 
in resources�10 He gives historical examples, such as the strategic surprise the 
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Germans achieved in 1941 when they invaded the Soviet Union and what the Al-
lies achieved in the Normandy invasion� Whaley tells the deceiver how to succeed 
and the rewards that ensue� He shows that the victims of strategic deception be-
have much like Tetlock’s experts, who were blinded by their own overconfidence�
Tactics, Technology, and Testing
The measured performance predictions in peacetime exercises become caught up 
in the fog of war� Jon Sumida observes that before World War I the Royal Navy 
expected a hitting rate of 30 percent with the fleet’s big guns�11 But in the Battle 
of Jutland the Germans achieved a rate of about 4 percent and the British 3�5 
percent�12 There were good reasons for the diminished performance at Jutland, 
but that is the point about prediction: there are always going to be ex post facto 
reasons your peacetime expectations will be wrong� The English operations ana-
lyst David Rowland has devoted much of his career to comparing ground combat 
exercise data with wartime data from similar battles� In one of his early papers 
he compares results from laser-instrumented, nonlethal training exercises with 
actual combat results in similar environments during World War II� The predic-
tions based on the exercises overestimated the casualty production rate for tanks 
by a factor of two; for artillery duels by a factor of three; and for pure infantry ac-
tions by a factor of seven! Yes, a sevenfold overestimation of soldier performance� 
In effect, Rowland confirms S� L� A� Marshall’s highly controversial conclusions 
about the small number of American soldiers who fired their weapons when 
under fire in World War II�
One of the most famous model-based predictions—I think prediction is the 
apt word—was by Frederick W� Lanchester, who claimed that the square law phe-
nomenon would apply to air-to-air combat�13 He wished to show the advantage 
of numbers over quality in a new age of air warfare� But Lanchester was wrong� 
From evidence reported by Philip Morse and George Kimball in their famous 
Methods of Operations Research and in more-detailed recent analysis by Niall 
MacKay, we know that through World War II the linear law applied in the air�14 
What Lanchester failed to see was that air combat essentially consists of duels, in 
the form of dogfights or ambushes, so the square law assumptions are not met� 
This was no theoretical matter� As MacKay shows, the top Royal Air Force leaders 
in the Battle of Britain argued between massing defending fighters—in Lanches-
ter square law fashion—and getting the fighters in the air as swiftly as possible, 
so that small detachments were in the best position to win duels between single 
aircraft� I also tell our students of campaign analysis that the greatest number of 
kills often does not come from air-to-air combat� If they want to anticipate—to 
predict, as it were—which side will achieve air superiority, they must make a 
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difficult estimate of how successful each side’s attempt will be to attack aircraft on 
the ground, the way the Japanese surprised and destroyed MacArthur’s air force 
in the Philippines immediately after Pearl Harbor�
Lest you think we are better off now, with modern computers and power-
ful algorithms built into our best models, here is a more recent example� The 
U�S� Navy depends mightily for defense of the fleet on the Aegis missile system� 
Using data from controlled experiments at sea, one might conclude that if you 
shoot two surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at an incoming antiship cruise missile 
(ASCM), and if you also add some point defense, you can expect to shoot down 
90 percent or more of the attacking ASCMs� What is the combat record? In 
battles at sea, warships of other states have averaged around 75 percent success 
in defending themselves from ASCMs� But all the successes must be attributed 
to soft-kill and point-defense weapons, not to SAMs� There are also several in-
stances of warships that might have defended themselves but did not, illustrated 
by the recent successful missile attack on the Israeli warship Hanit� Navy officers 
also will remember the Exocet hits on USS Stark and HMS Sheffield, which might 
have defended themselves with surface-to-air missiles but did not� In the entire 
record, starting in 1967, of more than 220 missiles fired on ships at sea, only one 
antiship missile has been shot down by a SAM� The record of USN missile ships 
in combat is zero for two, if one counts the action of USS Vincennes in shooting 
down an Iranian airliner as a failure� As at Jutland, a careful examination of these 
missile-era events shows there were reasons for the wartime results—pretty good 
reasons, too—but the important conclusion is that the fog of war almost always 
makes peacetime predictions too optimistic� Wartime surprises, although not 
exactly black swans, always will be present�
OUR PRODUCT IS USEFUL INSIGHT
Now I am going to focus on the domain of gray swans when our tools are used for 
operational and tactical predictions� I will show that even though the predictive 
power of our analyses is less than we would wish, if we focus on the right objec-
tives and use appropriate measures of effectiveness our results and recommenda-
tions will be a powerful aid to decision makers� Indeed, I am going to arrive at 
conclusions so cheerful they may surprise you�
Campaign Analysis
Campaign analysis is hard to do, and its predictive power is very much a mat-
ter of how demanding you want to be� For example, between the world wars the 
Naval War College played over three hundred games, most at the campaign level 
and most against Japan� They were highly valuable because they sobered our 
early optimism about the war’s most important elements� After the war, Admiral 
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Chester Nimitz wrote a famous letter saying that, except for kamikazes, the 
games had anticipated its major events accurately—referring, I suppose, to what 
happened in the drive through the Central Pacific that he oversaw� On the other 
hand, the Guadalcanal campaign, the shift from a battleship-centric force to a 
carrier-centric force, the vital contribution of American code breaking, and the 
drive by MacArthur up the New Guinea coast were vital aspects about which the 
games afforded no clues� In fact, after Pearl Harbor every class of warship except 
minesweepers changed its function�
At the tactical level, even the postmortems do not do justice to two factors that 
some operations analysis might have revealed� Looking back at the Battle of Mid-
way of June 1942, historians recognized four things that were necessary for the 
Americans to overcome a numerical inferiority of seventy-five ships to twenty- 
five: code breaking; brilliant leadership by Nimitz, Fletcher, and Spruance; great 
courage in our naval aviators; and just plain good luck� But they missed two oth-
ers� Until recently, no historian had picked up on the value of radar� If the Japa-
nese ships had had our air-search radar, our surprise dive-bomber attack could 
not have succeeded�15 Nor has any historian I have read identified the key role 
of Midway Island itself, which served as an immobile fourth American aircraft 
carrier, drawing away Admiral Chuichi Nagumo’s attention and firepower at the 
critical time�16
And yet, and yet: war games and fleet exercises schooled our carrier com-
manders before the Pacific War to know that the best way to win—and the only 
way, if outnumbered—was to detect the enemy first and get off a decisive first 
strike with every aircraft you had� Simple but elegant salvo equations, not yet 
invented in 1942, would match the results and “predict” with sufficient quantita-
tive accuracy the outcomes of all five of the big carrier battles in the Pacific ex 
post facto�17
Having in mind, then, that both Admiral Nimitz and the Midway historians 
ought to be given some slack, I will now describe three remarkable examples 
of the power and utility of our methods applied to campaigns, to show how 
analyses can help military leaders make better decisions and avoid the worst 
blunders� The examples are entertaining because they were performed by our 
young officer students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in a course on 
joint campaign analysis� The students had to reach their conclusions very quickly, 
with maximum professional knowledge and minimum computation, because the 
class pretense—a realistic one—was that their decision maker needed their inputs 
within about seventy-two hours� In these “ministudies,” the students did not have 
time to construct a detailed, realistic simulation�
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Foresight and Hindsight in Wars
The Falkland Islands War. In the first example, the students fought the Falklands 
War on paper in 1982 before it started� They had no inkling that General Bel-
grano was about to be sunk, taking the Argentine surface navy out of the war; or 
that Exocet missiles would be highly effective in destroying British ships; or that 
Argentine ground forces in the Falklands would be thoroughly outclassed� To do 
justice to their insightful work would take several paragraphs, but I can report the 
bottom line very quickly�
Neither side that fought had done such an analysis—early, fast, and basic� I 
believed then, and still do, that if they had the Argentine junta would have won 
the war, and British prime minister Margaret Thatcher would have been more 
cautious about sailing forty-two ships—essentially committing the United King-
dom to take back the Falklands� Why? Because the focused campaign analysis by 
the students showed that, with only a little foresight, the Argentine air force—all 
140 fighter/attack aircraft, flown by capable pilots—could have staged through 
Stanley airfield on East Falkland Island� It did not take a detailed model or pre-
cise inputs to conclude that those aircraft, even when dropping iron bombs the 
old-fashioned way, would have penetrated the twenty-two Harriers and other air 
defenses and put enough British ships out of action to force the fleet to abandon 
the invasion�
Operation DESERT SHIELD. While my class was meeting in the fall of 1990, a big 
debate was raging over whether the United States and our Middle East partners 
could force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait without a ground campaign� At the 
time, many American members of Congress and pundits were arguing that this 
was possible�
The charge to my students was to do a fast-turnaround ministudy to deter-
mine whether there was an operation other than an invasion of Kuwait that 
would persuade Saddam Hussein to leave� After doing as much quantitative as-
sessment as time permitted, the students concluded that if we wanted him out of 
Kuwait we would have to attack on the ground� This seems obvious in hindsight 
now, but it was not so when the students made their appraisal�
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Lastly, I report on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)� 
This student appraisal was done even faster than a ministudy—over a single 
weekend� We asked the students how long it would take to win the war� Astutely 
they asked, “What do you mean by ‘win the war’?” Together we agreed that get-
ting to Baghdad and toppling Saddam Hussein would constitute victory! I still 
think that was a suitably specific analysis goal, because everything after that 
comprised peacemaking operations—long and difficult though they turned out 
to be�
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Four student teams each made independent estimates� One team said it would 
take four weeks; one team said two to four weeks; one team said two weeks to 
get there, but that they did not know how long the city fighting would last; and 
the last team said three weeks� As it transpired, it took three weeks and a day to 
overthrow the regime� What our students could not predict, of course, was that a 
sandstorm would slow the advance, and that some elite soldiers operating inside 
Baghdad would enjoy such luck and display such courage�
But the students had some crib notes to help them make their estimates� They 
knew that research, most notably by the Army analyst Bob Helmbold, had con-
cluded that the rate of advance of an army unopposed or against light opposition 
has been and still is about twenty-five miles a day� The students could scale back 
the movement rate appropriately in making their estimates—predictions, as it 
were� In actuality, our soldiers and Marines advanced the three hundred miles to 
Baghdad in three weeks—a rate of fifteen miles per day�
OTHER DOMAINS
I have emphasized the rewards and limitations of operational and tactical analysis 
to prepare for war� There is a lot more to the story� Before summing up, here is a 
brief contrast with two other domains of prediction�
Attenuating Terrorist Attacks
I am not well informed on what kind of analysis would best supplement experi-
ence in fighting the perpetual war against terrorists� But I have read a fine paper 
entitled “How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can Mislead Terrorism Risk Ana-
lysts�” It is a warning against a methodology that cannot help and might hinder 
prediction and planning for homeland defense�18
Authors Jerry Brown and Tony Cox see two problems with the methodol-
ogy� One danger is to put confidence in the predictions of experts that are in 
fact inputs to the analytical scheme� They are suspicious of expert opinion, as 
am I� The other problem is adapting a methodology—probabilistic risk assess-
ment (PRA)—that has been effective for engineering analysis but is essentially 
a decision-theory way to design against adverse natural events and risks� The 
authors point out that when the enemy is not nature but an attacker who wants 
to outwit us and penetrate our defenses, then PRA actually can help the enemy� 
The proper mind-set is game theory, which says that we must do the best we can 
against the best he can do� The PRA methodology comes no closer to examin-
ing enemy choices and capabilities than to ask an expert the “probability of an 
attack”—without regard for what the enemy observes us doing�
There is wide agreement that a new attack against our homeland will come 
someday� Predicting where and against what target is the hard part that the PRA 
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method cannot illuminate� Brown and Cox recommend shifting the emphasis 
of risk management from using experts to guess where risk might be greatest to 
calculating where targeted investments will most improve the resilience of critical 
infrastructures� This entails more attention to two things: First, install additional 
safeguards where they have the biggest payoff—for example, by adding some 
“inefficient” redundancies to our excessively “efficient” but vulnerable electrical- 
distribution system, as well as the grids that distribute trains, trucks, petroleum, 
and communications� Second, establish and practice procedures to recover after 
an attack—for example, on the large containerport at Long Beach or the San 
Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge� Perhaps we have improved disaster recovery 
since the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers, but from the natural disasters of 
which I am aware, such as the 2004 Indonesian tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, 
and also from an NPS-conducted experiment in intergovernmental cooperation 
in San Diego, preparing to act after an attack may be more productive than trying 
to prevent every attack� It is likely that the two best ways to recover more quickly 
are by conducting inexpensive drills to improve coordination among many agen-
cies and levels of government, and by ensuring readiness to employ emergency 
modes of communication� The general rule is “when there’s a war on, study the 
war�” That applies to the war on terrorists, to the frequent use of unmanned ve-
hicles in peacetime, and to the unending competition to safeguard and exploit 
cyberspace�
Measuring Influence to Avoid War
The object of the Cold War was to exert American influence without fighting the 
Soviet Union� We never could measure past success in predicting outcomes of 
our campaigns, including a highly predictable world disaster from a nuclear ex-
change, because there was no war to study� The paradox is that the only available 
measures of the success of the analyses and the predictions resulting therefrom 
were that, year by year, deterrence held�
As far as I know, during the long Cold War there was only one attempt to 
measure the predictive power of the many campaign analyses of a hot war� It 
occurred because an inspired analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
persuaded the CNA president to refight, on paper, a study that his think tank 
had conducted for the Navy in 1965, of a war at sea conducted ten years later� A 
study assumption was that the nuclear threshold would not be breached, in part 
because the American strategy was to confine the war to the oceans� The war 
was bloody enough among the combatants, but massive civilian casualties were 
avoided� Around 1976 (I am citing from memory) the analysis was repeated with 
the same military objectives, but with the geopolitical environment updated, re-
sulting in somewhat heavier demands on NATO forces, principally those of the 
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U�S� Navy� In 1976, Soviet forces were slightly greater than had been projected in 
1965; our estimates of Soviet maritime combat capabilities were about the same� 
On the other hand, between 1965 and 1976 the American fleet had become much 
smaller, and future combat capabilities projected to be in the fleet in 1976 had not 
lived up to technical expectations when actually deployed� Thus, all inputs for the 
repeat campaign analysis seemed to indicate a worse outcome� Yet the outcome 
of the campaign “fought” on paper in 1976 was amazingly about the same as in 
the 1965 study, and perhaps a little bit better� The reason was that in two or three 
instances after the new systems built in 1965 were deployed, new tactics were 
conceived and developed to fight with them more effectively� Better tactics more 
than offset technological disappointments and our smaller fleet�
But that interesting finding is peripheral to the two main points� First, it is 
highly useful to test our tactical and campaign analyses when their inputs and 
assumptions can be tested, yet it hardly ever is done� Second, the study results—
even in 1965, and despite their flaws—were decisively instructive� The purpose of 
the study was to test whether a war against the Soviet navy limited to the sea was 
attractive for NATO� The answer was no� That was the conclusion of overarch-
ing importance� As with the Falkland Islands scenario, it did not take exquisitely 
detailed analysis to see why—after the analysis had been done� The Soviet Union 
was a continental power that did not depend fundamentally on the oceans, but 
NATO was a maritime alliance for which control of the Atlantic was essential� 
The Soviets had too little at risk and NATO too much risk to make the threat of 
a war at sea an effective deterrent� No more was heard of it� NATO continued, 
wisely, to believe the central front in Europe was the critical region of interest�
There is a modern analogy to the war at sea, as we contemplate ways to influ-
ence China, keep faith with friendly states in Asia, and avoid a big and economi-
cally disastrous war� Far from being unwise, analysis of a war-at-sea strategy in 
the western Pacific looks feasible and desirable because, unlike that of the Soviet 
Union, Chinese prosperity depends on the sea� Unlike the Soviet state, China has 
begun to build a fleet that can protect the movement of its shipping in the open 
ocean, while shifting from a sea-denial to a sea-control navy�
A brilliant recent article by Naval War College professors Toshi Yoshihara and 
James Holmes points out that one cannot construct a strategy unless its ends, 
ways, and means are well defined� Hence the state—namely, China—must be 
identified as the strategy’s object�19 The ends almost have been established, be-
cause the Secretary of State and others have indicated our intention to put more 
emphasis on the western Pacific� In effect, our policy experts have made a predic-
tion about the future� Next must come an analysis of the best ways to sustain our 
influence there at an affordable cost� Yoshihara and Holmes describe the limits 
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of the Air-Sea Battle concept and suggest other actions at sea that can and should 
precede strikes on mainland China� U�S� and allied navy components should try 
to keep the war at sea, exploit American maritime strengths, and demonstrate 
that China has the most to lose at every level of escalation—from maritime 
interdiction short of a full blockade all the way up to sinking Chinese warships 
and commercial vessels with American submarines in their home seas� Once we 
have in hand the ways to constrain every kind of confrontation, next comes fur-
ther campaign analysis, testing, and negotiation with allies and partners in Asia� 
We must ascertain the means: the types and numbers of forces to execute such 
a flexible strategy that also fits the desires of China’s neighbors and worldwide 
commercial interests�
The same fleet must be suitable in times of cooperation, competition, confron-
tation, or conflict, and China has a say in what our ends must be� If all our ships 
are expected to have thirty- and forty-year service lives, the challenge will be to 
construct one long-lived fleet for all circumstances� We do not yet know whether 
Yoshihara and Holmes are right about the ways and means, but analysis to meet 
various conditions, not a prediction of a single future, is the way to find out�
WHAT TO BELIEVE ABOUT PREDICTION
Black swans exist� Unavoidable surprises will continue� Black swans do not have 
to be deceptive, because, by definition, their surprise cannot be predicted�
Gray swans in the military world are complicated because they are concealed 
by a perverse enemy who wants to surprise us� Pearl Harbor happened not just 
because it was an unlikely event and the clues about the attack were mishandled 
but also because a clever enemy was doing his utmost to surprise us�
Regrettably, gray swans are not likely to become rarer� The growth of knowl-
edge, illustrated by the replacement of a written Encyclopaedia Britannica with 
the electronic Wikipedia, exceeds our capacity to sort the information quickly� 
And in fast-moving military operations the enemy will be trying constantly to 
throw sand in our eyes�
Expert judgment for national policy and military strategy is unreliable unless 
it is substantiated with the quantitative methods of operations research� Critical 
decisions can be greatly—even decisively—enhanced by quantitative analysis, 
notwithstanding that a decision maker’s prewar conclusions will fall well short 
of—and should never claim to be—a prediction of the future� Useful insights 
come from wise application of dirty data processed in an appropriately simple 
model to yield results that are at once precise, inaccurate, and helpful�
The Falklands War seventy-two-hour analysis by our campaign analysis stu-
dents illustrates how decisive macro insights can be discerned in a very short 
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time� Despite limited knowledge of how a war will unfold, quantitative analysis is 
powerful for uncovering the essential features of good and bad choices�
The students’ overnight analysis ahead of OIF showed two different things� On 
one hand, the analysis demonstrated that an amazingly accurate estimate of how 
long it would take to overthrow the Hussein regime could be made swiftly� On 
the other hand, analytical power did not help anticipate that after toppling the 
regime there would be a very long aftermath of difficult peacemaking� It is not 
new news that the enemy gets a vote, and sometimes his choice will seem not to 
be in his own best interests�
Accurate predictions are useless if they are too late to help the decision maker� 
If he or she must act in seventy-two hours, we must help him within seventy-two 
hours� Our students follow the one-third, one-third, one-third rule of analysis� 
Given three days to complete the work, spend the first day figuring out how 
quantitative analysis can best help him make his decision; do the analysis on the 
next day; and take the third day to recover from your mistakes, answer his ques-
tions, or enrich the work�
There are many variations of conflict in which military operations analysis 
can supplement professional knowledge profitably� One is when the campaign 
goes on endlessly; this allows time to gather “combat” data, assess it, and apply 
it—while remembering that the enemy also is observing and adapting� Another 
is when the object is not to prepare for war but to adapt new ends, ways, and 
means to prevent war by retaining influence over a prospective enemy in chang-
ing circumstances� Then the goal of analysis is to help decide what strategy and 
capabilities will be the best ones to keep the peace or to contain the war at a low 
level of violence�
A paradigm of all prediction is the if-then statement, with two parts to the 
if side� To the extent that a model describes the circumstances and the data are 
accurate, the analysis process will give accurate results� When the model is a sim-
plification (an artful one, we hope) and the data are dirty (but good enough, we 
hope), then the goal is not to predict the outcome but to help a decision maker do 
the best he can after adding his own wisdom to our quantitative analysis�
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bringing domestic politics back into grand strategy
Michael O’Hara
American Pendulum: Recurring Debates in U.S. Grand Strategy, 
by Christopher Hemmer� Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ� Press, 
2015� 224 pages� $29�95�
Is the American Century Over?, by Joseph S� Nye Jr� Malden, 
MA: Polity, 2015� 146 pages� $12�95�
Having to answer such questions as how to maintain primacy and how to wield 
such power illustrates the luxury of exercising hegemony and the challenge of 
being a superpower� But it was not always thus for the United States� In the late 
nineteenth century, as the country rose and began to surpass Great Britain, the 
Naval War College’s own Alfred Thayer Mahan advocated a powerful vision of 
American growth by looking outward� Mahan’s grand strategy was inherently 
maritime, and he proposed an “expansion of national influences” through not 
only military means but also commercial trade and other tools of statecraft� To 
Mahan, American grand strategy required deep engagement in the world�
Of course, Mahan was not the first to preach this gospel� Decades earlier, 
John Quincy Adams had guided the fledgling state in feeling out the extent and 
limits of American power� Many European states viewed jealously the endow-
ment of resources and demography of the United 
States� Foreign powers understood immediately 
the potential for American power—and the need 
to check it before its inevitable rise� According to 
historian and former Naval War College profes-
sor Charles Edel, Adams recognized the hostility 
of the continental powers, and he understood his 
“special duty” to pursue peace� Intent on securing 
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America’s rise, Adams conceived of a grand strategy to guide his nation toward 
power and, more importantly, toward justice�
Two recent works by Christopher Hemmer and Joseph Nye examine the 
challenges of acquiring power and holding on to it� Hemmer and Nye address 
the problems of American statecraft through the twentieth century until the 
Obama era� Today, as the presidential campaign season begins and we continue 
the perpetual debate over America’s role in the world, these books are timely and 
relevant� The analyses from these two scholars, one a dean of the U�S� Air War 
College and the other a former dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Govern-
ment, indicate that American preeminence will extend far into the twenty-first 
century� However, the character of that power may look very different and will 
require the United States to make smart strategic choices at home and abroad�
At its outset, Christopher Hemmer’s American Pendulum: Recurring Debates 
in U.S. Grand Strategy asks, “Should a state invest more in its armed forces, its 
health-care system, the education of its young, its economic infrastructure, or 
its diplomatic apparatus?” (p� 4)� For many, the answer to this question depends 
not only on how the state conceives of power but on whether one accepts the 
author’s definition of grand strategy� Hemmer frames his analysis using Barry 
Posen’s theory of security: that it is “national, comprehensive, and long term” 
and “advanc[es] some conception of a state’s national interests as a whole” (p� 2)� 
This broader definition puts Hemmer into the conversation with other scholars 
such as Hal Brands, John Gaddis, Paul Kennedy, Christopher Layne, and John 
Mearsheimer� If Hemmer casts grand strategy as a guns-or-butter problem, Nye 
offers a sensible solution: both�
Hemmer’s chapters detail eight episodes in the last century� Beginning with 
the American rise to power under Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, 
Hemmer discusses the expanding security perimeter of the United States� He 
looks beyond the Monroe Doctrine to the dilemma facing a nation with increas-
ing means and ambitions� For readers with an interest in the policy of contain-
ment, Hemmer discusses its origins, implementation, extensions, and culmina-
tion over the four central chapters of the book� Here readers will enjoy a rich 
discussion of the Truman Doctrine, the competing visions of George Kennan and 
Paul Nitze, détente, and the “end of history�” The chapters provide ample citations 
to a breadth of scholarship� For those who argue that strategy requires an adver-
sary, Hemmer’s chapter titled “Grand Strategy in the Absence of a Clear Threat” 
examines the shift from containment to “enlargement” and the challenges that 
faced decision makers during the period to which Charles Krauthammer referred 
as “the unipolar moment”—from the fall of the Soviet Union until 9/11� The war 
on terror and the rise of China receive treatments in the final two chapters�
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Hemmer frames the recurring debate in American grand strategy as the chal-
lenge of striking the right balance between unilateralism and multilateralism� 
From the Farewell Address of George Washington, who advocated for “as little 
political connection as possible” in commercial relations, to Thomas Jefferson’s 
warning about the dangers of “entangling alliances,” the American tradition is re-
plete with skepticism about foreign engagement� The crucial debate for Hemmer, 
however, is “not about whether to be internationally involved, but about how to 
be internationally involved” (p� 7)� Therefore the question Hemmer poses is not 
about American isolationism, but rather about how—and on what terms—the 
United States should engage in the world�
In Is the American Century Over?, Joseph S� Nye Jr� argues that multilateral 
engagement in the world was an essential element of the “American Century” 
and a fundamental feature of American power� The book’s title begs the question 
in a period of increased American unilateralism� Nye frames American power in 
terms not only of the sticks and carrots of hard power but of the attraction and 
persuasion of soft power—the latter being a term he coined� For Nye, America 
was at the height of its power when it led the club of nations that enjoyed unprec-
edented security and prosperity�
Whereas Hemmer focuses on American power in terms of the country’s eco-
nomic and military might that came to the fore at the turn of the last century, Nye 
argues that the American Century began in 1941 as the United States assumed 
the central role in maintaining a global balance of power� Nye’s analysis proceeds 
from this foundational question about the start date of the American Century to 
ask whether the United States is in decline, in either absolute or relative terms� 
Ultimately, Nye concludes that the United States has passed its peak; neverthe-
less, he argues that the United States will remain the most powerful nation in the 
world� America will maintain its preponderance of power, but in less dominant 
proportions� Thus, even amid concerns about the rise of China and the supposed 
danger of Graham Allison’s “Thucydides trap,” Nye remains optimistic�
Yet immediately after his consideration of hegemonic transition and America’s 
responses to this challenge, Nye curbs his enthusiasm about American power by 
considering the problem of strategic overstretch� A concise examination of the 
culture, society, economy, and political institutions of Rome provides a brief but 
sobering lesson� In this analogy, Nye concludes that the key to America sustain-
ing its strength lies in its political unity, a renewal through immigration and 
entrepreneurial innovation, and its political institutions� Whereas many strate-
gists look beyond their borders for answers to American security within the 
international system, Nye focuses on internal factors as the means to maintain 
our place in the world�
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Domestic politics, it turns out, is key to grand strategy both for Nye and for 
Hemmer—just as it was for the great Cold War strategist George Kennan� To the 
author of the containment strategy, domestic vitality was the key to successful 
foreign engagement� In his 1947 “long telegram,” Kennan urged the United States 
to “create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country 
which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of 
its internal life and with the responsibilities of a world power, and which has a 
spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents 
of the time�”1 For the grand strategist, whose concern is to leverage the elements 
of national power to attain a political aim, both Hemmer and Nye might agree 
with Kennan that the theory of American security begins and ends—as it did 
during the competition with the Soviet Union—with “a nation dependent on 
pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and po-
litical leadership that history plainly intended them to bear�”2 Hemmer and Nye 
complement each other well, and they remind us that the most important recur-
ring discussions about grand strategy begin at home—wise words too often left 
out of the debate on statecraft�
N O T E S
 1� X [George F� Kennan], “Sources of Soviet 
Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947), p� 867�
 2� Ibid�, p� 868�
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will the united states learn from the iraq war? 
Daniel J. Cormier
The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, ed� Joel D� Rayburn [Col�, 
USA] and Frank K� Sobchak [Col�, USA]� Vol� 2, Surge and 
Withdrawal, 2007–2011. Carlisle, PA: U�S� Army War College 
Press, 2019�
The U�S� Army’s unofficial two-volume history of the Iraq War offers a critical 
examination of the conflict, one that is illuminating and controversial� In 2013, 
while serving as the U�S� Army’s Chief of Staff, General Raymond T� Odierno 
commissioned a team of Army warrior-scholars, all of whom had served in Iraq 
during the war, and asked them to conduct a candid examination of the conflict� 
He wanted to ensure that the Army and the nation grasped the war’s implications 
for the future� The study accomplishes this goal� It escapes the pattern of most 
official histories by openly addressing contentious topics� It is an engaging read 
that includes critiques of the decisions of senior military and civilian leaders as 
well as instructive lessons from the conflict�
But critics of the study are also accurate in pointing out that the work is not 
definitive� The complexity, scope, and duration of the conflict will foster a va-
riety of interpretations� In the foreword, another Army former Chief of Staff, 
General Mark Milley, highlights this reality� He describes the history as an 
“interim” report that is intended to “sharpen thinking, and promote debate�” 
That description is accurate, and it underscores the study’s value� This history 
shines a light on the need for a national dialogue about how the United States 
understands, prepares for, and conducts war�
These goals challenge many of the current efforts in Washington to move on 
from the conflict and focus on the business of great-power competition� This 
desire, the authors correctly point out, epitomizes the type of conceptual failure 
that happened after Vietnam� It allowed the wrong “lessons of Vietnam” to take 
hold, leading the Army and the nation to over-
value technology and to focus, almost exclusively, 
on high-end conflict� The emphasis on tactical ex-
cellence created military leaders who were ill pre-
pared for the complexities of modern war� It took 
several years for the United States to comprehend 
the fallacy of this outlook, as it had to relearn the 
same lessons in Iraq� That learning curve required 
a price that was paid in blood and treasure�
Dr. Daniel J. Cormier is a professor in the National 
Security Affairs Department at the Naval War Col-
lege. As an Army officer, he has served in a variety 
of command and staff assignments in the United 
States, Europe, the Middle East, and, most recently, 
Africa. In addition to his operational background, 
he is a Middle East Foreign Area Officer and gradu-
ate of the Moroccan Cours d’état-major, the French 
École de guerre, and the French Institut des hautes 
études de défense nationale.
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On the basis of a survey of recently declassified military records, as well as oral 
history interviews, the authors provide an unclassified account of how America’s 
senior military leaders in Iraq understood the conflict and reacted to the complex 
mosaic of challenges they faced� The second volume begins by summarizing the 
flawed decisions made by senior U�S� government leaders early in the war that 
were detailed in the first volume of the work� These included the proclamations 
that excluded Baath Party members from the new Iraqi government and disband-
ed the Iraqi army, as well as constraints that Washington placed on American 
troop levels� Those choices disenfranchised Iraq’s Sunni population and created 
a security vacuum� The former Iraqi soldiers and leaders became the backbone 
of insurgent movements that resisted efforts to establish a new government 
in Baghdad� The decisions also revealed an American strategy for the conflict 
that was overly ambitious� For example, the objectives for the war were poorly 
aligned with the resources provided� Additionally, the U�S� administration failed 
to sustain American public support or to create the international cooperation 
on which success depended� The administration never effectively responded to 
Syria’s direct support of Sunni insurgents and Iran’s sponsorship of Shia attacks 
on U�S� forces� This lack of a coherent regional strategy ceded the initiative early 
to “Syrian and Iranian proxies,” making the accomplishment of America’s “politi-
cal and military objectives almost impossible” (pp� 620–21)�
The study also makes clear that, from beginning to end, U�S� actions in Iraq 
suffered from naive assessments at the highest levels of the U�S� government� 
These included a “short-war assumption” and the superficial belief in the trans-
formative power of democratization, specifically elections (p� 619)� The authors 
detail how the parliamentary elections in 2005 chiefly served to empower a new 
Shia elite that was beholden to the interests of religious and tribal-based fac-
tions� This led Iraqi government officials to pursue efforts to control the nation’s 
security forces to dominate their Sunni rivals� A Kurdish push for semiautonomy 
for Iraq’s northern provinces further demonstrated the scramble for power that 
American decisions unleashed� Instead of rebuilding a new nation-state, the quick 
return of authority to the Iraqi government produced a new era of sectarian strife�
Additionally, the authors avoid re-creating the Vietnam myth that the U�S� 
military could have won but for the decisions of its civilian leaders� There was no 
dereliction of duty in Washington, DC, where national leaders simply pursued 
narrow interests over the advice of the military� In fact, the authors argue that sev-
eral of America’s military leaders supported the decisions made in Washington—
and thus helped lose the war (pp� 9–10)� The faithful adherence to policy guid-
ance by General George W� Casey, the U�S� Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) 
commander from 2003 to 2007, translated into a coalition strategy oriented 
toward quickly training and transferring responsibilities to indigenous forces in 
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Iraq� These choices squandered precious time and allowed the security situation 
to deteriorate (p� 618)� By 2006, Iraq effectively was divided along sectarian lines, 
jeopardizing its survival as a unitary state�
The preponderance of volume 2 details the efforts of American forces to 
reverse this severe situation, from 2007 until they withdrew in 2011� The au-
thors include a summary of the debates, critiques, and studies that took place in 
Washington, such as the congressionally appointed Iraq Study Group findings in 
2006 that included seventy-nine recommendations and emphasized the need for 
bipartisan cooperation in Washington, DC, unity of effort by U�S� government 
agencies in the Middle East, and enhanced diplomatic efforts with Syria and 
Iran to produce the support required to stabilize Iraq� Several of the perspec-
tives from academia and think tanks and from within the U�S� government are 
examined also� These include Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s support 
for a steady transfer of control from American to Iraqi forces (pp� 10–16)� But 
President George W� Bush decided on a different course� He replaced Rumsfeld 
with Robert M� Gates, overruled many of his principal military advisers, and 
agreed to a “surge” of U�S� troops that others proclaimed offered a chance for 
success (pp� 17–24)�
The study posits that the steps taken in Iraq after 2007 ushered in a new era 
of the war� General David Petraeus, who replaced Casey as the MNF-I com-
mander, and Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, the day-to-day commander 
of all coalition troops in Iraq, implemented several changes that transformed 
the security situation� For example, they ensured a more coherent U�S� whole-
of-government effort and repositioned military units from large bases to small 
outposts� These shifts permitted counterinsurgency (COIN) techniques that 
improved understanding of Iraq’s sociopolitical challenges� The authors also 
highlight that the new approach enhanced the integration of U�S� conventional 
and special forces efforts, leading to significant improvements in the security 
situation in Iraq�
The study’s positive portrayal of the effectiveness of COIN operations is bal-
anced by several sobering revelations� Chief among these is that the Iraqi prime 
minister, Nuri al-Maliki, never subscribed to the U�S� goal of reconciling with 
the disenfranchised populations of Iraq (p� 432)� While America fought battles 
to rebuild Iraq, al-Maliki postured for a sectarian confrontation and continued 
his well-established pattern of marginalizing the Sunni factions (pp� 472–76)� His 
unwillingness to embrace political compromise meant that the gains in security 
that the U�S� surge produced were temporary and indecisive�
By the end of 2008, as President Bush was preparing to leave office, the United 
States signed a strategic framework agreement with Iraq� The accord moved 
American forces out of Iraq’s cities in the summer of 2009 and included a pledge to 
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withdraw them completely by 2011� These steps undermined any remaining U�S� 
influence in Iraq; U�S� forces found themselves watching from the sidelines in 2010 
as al-Maliki refused to relinquish power after a new round of parliamentary elec-
tions� The Iraqi prime minister also thwarted the final attempts of the United States 
to build a strategic relationship with Iraq through a status of forces agreement that 
would have allowed a residual American advisory presence� Instead, Iraq’s Shia-
dominated government developed a closer relationship with Tehran (pp� 414–20)� 
The report concludes that Iran was the “only victor” from the war (p� 639)� But 
global affairs are rarely resolved� In 2014, American troops returned to Iraq to help 
it fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—a mission that continues today�
In the last chapter, the authors catalog several of the major insights that 
permeate the study� These include identifying the ways that the Army culture 
and bureaucracy detracted from the war’s efforts� For example, Rayburn and 
Sobchak reject the prevalent view in Washington that technology can replace the 
troop-intensive requirements of modern combat operations� They emphasize 
that human interaction remains indispensable to understanding and addressing 
the sociopolitical dynamics of any war (pp� 615–16)� Their study also contends 
that the U�S� government’s management of the war did not encourage American 
commanders to be innovative� The Washington culture and bureaucracy prefer 
compliance, centralize decision-making, and discourage risk taking� The au-
thors argue that the nation must escape this pattern, prevalent since Vietnam� 
Instead, military commanders must share responsibility for ensuring the quality 
of decision-making and strategy formulation� They also must be able and willing 
to adapt rapidly as conditions on the ground change (p� 621)�
Another major concern the study illuminates is that America’s senior com-
manders relied on “overly optimistic planning” and failed to reassess several 
assumptions adequately (p� 625)� Among these assumptions was a reliance on 
the metric of violent incidents, particularly against their own forces, to measure 
stability and progress in Iraq� Commanders repeatedly and erroneously judged 
that Iraq was more stable than it was and that a rapid transfer of power was 
possible (p� 619)� This confusion also was seen in Vietnam� Additionally, the na-
tion’s generals never were able to anchor military coalition efforts successfully to 
the political goals of the United States in Iraq� This gap in strategy occurred in 
part because of a failure to discern the sociopolitical dynamics of Iraq and the 
Middle East, such as the rivalries that existed in Iraq and their link to its national 
politics� Instead, the U�S� generals continually were surprised that Iraqis and re-
gional players were pursuing their own interests and remained focused “on the 
comfortable tactical and operational tasks that were necessary but not sufficient” 
to address Iraq’s challenges and accomplish American strategic objectives (pp� 
619–20, 625–26)�
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The authors also illuminate gaps between how U�S� leaders conceptualized 
the conflict and the war’s realities� They cite the failure to appreciate that a “sov-
ereignty dilemma” existed in Iraq, where gains in security led to a decline in 
American influence over government leaders in Baghdad, who became empow-
ered to consolidate their political positions� They argue that a “counterintuitive 
application of U�S� national power” often is needed, such as the requirement for 
increases in economic and diplomatic commitments as security improves or the 
withholding of American capabilities in the absence of political progress (p� 619)�
It is important to note that the Army’s narrative history is not the final word� 
The research for the study was limited primarily to American, allied, and recently 
unclassified sources� As more documents are released and additional perspec-
tives are assessed, such as Iraqi and Middle Eastern views, a different and more 
comprehensive picture of the Iraq War likely will emerge� The authors also could 
have engaged more thoroughly with several analytical inquiries� For example, 
their examination of the value of COIN operations is focused too narrowly 
against the presurge strategy inside Iraq and at the operational level of war� They 
also could have examined whether America’s COIN approaches were misaligned 
with the sociopolitical context of Iraq, such as privileging centralized Western 
conceptions of governance� Other pertinent factors that are worthy of consider-
ation include whether and how the undertow of global geopolitics, regional per-
ceptions that America’s actions were neocolonial, and the challenges presented by 
tribal culture affected America’s application of COIN concepts� These types of in-
vestigations may paint a different picture about the course and lessons of the war�
But this history of the Iraq War illuminates several problems that must be 
addressed if the United States is going to avoid repeating the same mistakes in 
future conflicts� For the military, there is a need for substantive changes in how 
leaders are prepared to serve at the strategic level� This includes reconsidering 
how the context of modern war affects the efficacy of military force and concep-
tions of success, as well as how hybrid warfare techniques and disruptive technol-
ogies—such as information, cyber, space, artificial intelligence, and robotics—
challenge traditional preparations for conflict and competition� Importantly, the 
military needs senior leaders who are capable of wrestling with this complexity 
and linking the use of martial means to the context of the environment, as well 
as the political ends desired� They also must serve as custodians of competent 
and responsible strategic thinking� The “best” military advice is irrelevant if it 
is not tied to achievable political objectives� These considerations could impel a 
profound change in how the Army and the nation develop the talent, technol-
ogy, and concepts of operations they will need to be successful in the future� But 
whether this study achieves its goal of producing the burst of introspection that 
Washington requires remains to be seen�
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LEARNING FROM WARS—FOUGHT, “FOUGHT,” UNFOUGHT, AND NOT 
YET FOUGHT?
Maritime Security Risks, Vulnerabilities and Cooperation: Uncertainty in the Indian Ocean, by Lee  
Cordner� Cham, Switz�: Springer International Publishing, 2018� 281 pages� $149�99�
Lee Cordner applies decades of regional 
experience and maritime expertise in a 
comprehensive assessment of the Indian 
Ocean maritime environment and 
makes a rational, risk-based argument 
for the necessity of cooperative ap-
proaches in maritime security within the 
region� Cordner’s analysis of this region 
identifies important characteristics of 
the political, economic, and security 
environment� He also examines a broad 
list of other regional influences affecting 
maritime security and cooperation� 
Cordner analyzes the effects of the 
region’s rich demographic composition 
and identifies significant challenges to 
collective action posed by differences in 
culture, religion, ethnicity, and language� 
His assessment captures the difficulty in 
finding common interests among Indian 
Ocean states� Although his analysis 
describes the Indian Ocean region as 
a disparate collection of subsystems, 
he identifies numerous challenges in 
promoting and achieving a shared 
value of regionalism among Indian 
Ocean states� Cordner further develops 
a multinational concept of regional-
ism that is more than mere collective 
action and activities; it also includes a 
shared regional identity and purpose� 
Cordner examines the Indian Ocean 
as a maritime system that is vital to 
global trade, worldwide economic 
prosperity, and energy security� His 
analytical approach includes assess-
ment of the maritime security effects 
of international rules and norms such 
as freedom of the sea, the law of the 
sea, the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (i�e�, UNCLOS), 
and state maritime claims within the 
region� Over the years, compliance with 
these rules has been the predominant 
state behavior in the region, with a 
few subregional exceptions (such as 
periods of piracy by nonstate actors or 
sea-denial operations by states in key 
geographic choke points)� Extraregional 
powers have been crucial to countering 
these violations of the maritime order, 
but the author recognizes potential 
value in a coordinated regional state 
response, associated collective security 
capabilities, and leadership in the future�
Cordner analyzes the Indian Ocean as 
a transportation system or “highway” 
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LEARNING FROM WARS—FOUGHT, “FOUGHT,” UNFOUGHT, AND NOT 
YET FOUGHT?
Maritime Security Risks, Vulnerabilities and Cooperation: Uncertainty in the Indian Ocean, by Lee  
Cordner� Cham, Switz�: Springer International Publishing, 2018� 281 pages� $149�99�
that enables global trade by connect-
ing markets in the east and west� He 
examines the interests and actions of 
regional states and intergovernmental 
organizations, including a subregional 
relative power and influence assessment 
for the Arabian Gulf and northern Ara-
bian Sea� This evaluation suggests the 
absence of an influential regional state 
power with the requisite will to exert 
regional leadership and power at sea� 
Further, the region also lacks a powerful 
intergovernmental organization of states 
capable of expanding a regional dialogue 
on maritime security� As complications 
of any organic movement among 
regional states for increased maritime 
cooperation, Cordner identifies 
governance issues affected by dynamic 
domestic political systems, developing 
economies, contentious intranational 
demographic relationships, and limited 
military capabilities and capacities�
In his assessment, Cordner crafts an 
analytical framework that defines 
security in this context, evaluates risks 
within the region, and identifies the 
ensuing vulnerabilities in the security 
environment� His framework’s concep-
tual foundation is built on theories of 
decision-making and risk analysis� This 
approach includes a detailed progression 
of scholarly references and conceptual 
themes related to security, risk, and 
vulnerability—all while examining 
the relationships and linkages among 
these three concepts� This book would 
interest a decision-making and risk-
analysis scholar in search of a practical 
application of risk-management 
theory in an international maritime 
context, or a regional expert seeking 
an assessment of the Indian Ocean 
from a maritime perspective�
The author makes the argument that 
through a comprehensive, fact-based 
risk assessment of the Indian Ocean 
maritime environment, identification of 
common risks and shared vulnerabilities 
will inspire states in the region to create 
a more effective, mutually beneficial, 
collaborative maritime security environ-
ment� Employing risk criteria on the 
basis of a likelihood-versus-consequence 
construct produces a prioritized 
list of nineteen specific risks in the 
Indian Ocean region� Such a risk-based 
approach in national decision-making 
considers the possibility that states may 
be willing to accept certain risks—or 
seek to mitigate potential consequences—
rather than dedicate resources to 
eliminate the risk outright� Of course, 
the possibility of a “free rider” course of 
action poses another kind of risk, yet it 
remains attractive to Indian Ocean states 
with limited resources, capabilities, and 
popular support for shared maritime-
security activities� Even the prospect of 
cost sharing can be problematic� While 
Cordner understands these vexing 
challenges, he nevertheless remains 
undaunted as he considers the prospects 
for achieving greater regional coopera-
tion� In the course of doing so he makes 
a stimulating argument, and recommen-
dations, for increased regional dialogue 
and further study on maritime security�
SEAN SULLIVAN 
Fortune Favors Boldness: The Story of Naval Valor 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom, by Barry M� 
Costello [Vice Adm�, USN (Ret�)]� Jacksonville, 
FL: Adducent, 2018� 372 pages� $31�95�
Fortune Favors Boldness: The Story of 
Naval Valor during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, by Vice Admiral Barry M� 
Costello, USN (Ret�), is a compilation 
of historical anecdotes, entertaining 
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sea stories, leadership lessons, and 
inspirational passages that cumulatively 
shine a light on the heroic deeds of the 
sailors, Marines, and Coast Guards-
men who helped topple the Saddam 
Hussein regime in 2003� This concise, 
yet detailed, historical narrative that 
focuses on wartime naval operations 
in the Arabian Gulf is a must-read for 
all naval personnel who desire to learn 
from those who sailed into harm’s 
way to fulfill the national security 
imperatives of political leadership�
This graphically depicted slice of U�S� 
naval history is also an excellent read for 
all Americans� Too often the real-world 
exploits of sailors and Marines, and 
their contribution to national security, 
go unnoticed by a citizenry whose 
only knowledge of the naval service 
stems from having watched Top Gun, 
NCIS, and A Few Good Men. Costello’s 
uncanny ability to simplify and relate 
complex military operations through 
the eyes of the actual senior leaders, 
surface warriors, aviators, submariners, 
minehunters, flight-deck hands, and 
engine-room operators makes this 
collection of stories a gripping yet edu-
cational read for the general populace�
As a professor at the Naval War College, 
I have observed that far too many of-
ficers lack a factual grasp of post–World 
War II naval history� Therefore I agree 
wholeheartedly with Vice Admiral 
Costello’s motivation for authoring his 
memoir, which stemmed from a recog-
nition that there is a “dearth of writings 
from Navy leaders over the last several 
decades from which current and future 
generations can benefit” (p� 6)� Indeed, 
Costello explains that junior naval 
personnel made it clear “that they want 
to know what happened and why certain 
decisions were made�” Fortune Favors 
Boldness delivers on this yearning�
As the commander of Cruiser Destroyer 
Group 1 (CCDG-1), embarked in USS 
Constellation (CV 64) (commissioned in 
1961, the ship was on its final deploy-
ment), Vice Admiral Costello had a 
unique vantage point from which to re-
late the story of naval operations during 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)� This 
is evident as he not only shares his own 
recollections but also includes several 
personal accounts from members of the 
strike group� These include the aviators 
who flew “downtown” into the teeth of 
enemy air defenses on the first strikes of 
the war, the embedded press corps who 
had surprisingly free and open access 
to all the strike group’s planning and 
operations, the surface and subsurface 
officers who launched hundreds of 
Tomahawk land-attack missiles, the 
mine-hunting forces that cleared critical 
waterways in the northern Arabian Gulf, 
and the forces that secured critical oil 
platforms just before Saddam Hus-
sein’s forces could destroy them�
The book’s title, derived from the motto 
of Vice Admiral Costello’s CRUDEVGRU, 
“Fortune Favors Boldness,” is fitting as 
the reader is made privy to the mes-
sages, phone calls, e-mails, and private 
conversations between and among a 
cadre of leaders who understood clearly 
that the naval service’s contribution 
to the “shock and awe” campaign of 
General Tommy Franks, USA, would be 
decisive in the early stages of the war� 
The discourse among senior military 
leaders from the United States and 
partner nations provides a treasure trove 
of leadership lessons for future officers 
that the author brilliantly highlights to 
make it easy for the reader to absorb�
Vice Admiral Costello notes at the 
outset that his goal was to write a great 
adventure story for the sailors, Marines, 
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and Coast Guardsmen who served 
in the Arabian Gulf during OIF, for 
veterans of all times and services, and 
for the American people so that they 
could appreciate the sacrifices of the 
young heroes who stood the watch to 
protect their security� Furthermore, he 
clearly states that his mission was to pen 
a “leadership book with an emphasis 
on lessons to help” future naval leaders 
(p� 9)� Vice Admiral Costello accom-
plished his mission, as did the naval 
forces he was proud to lead into battle 
during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM�
SEAN P� HENSELER
The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, compiled 
by the War History Office of the National De-
fense College of Japan, trans� Willem Remme-
link� Leiden, Neth�: Leiden Univ� Press, 2016� 672 
pages� $87�50�
Of the major military services of the 
twentieth century, the Imperial Japanese 
Army (IJA) and the Imperial Japanese 
Navy (IJN) are two of the least under-
stood outside their national homes� As 
a result, Willem Remmelink’s work in 
translating into English the official Japa-
nese history of the invasion of the Dutch 
East Indies in 1942 is a major contribu-
tion to the study of World War II�
This book is volume 3 of 102 in the War 
History series (Senshi Sōsho) that the 
Japanese National Defense College—now 
called the National Institute for Defense 
Studies—produced between 1966 
and 1980� It is the first of three that 
Remmelink plans to translate on the 
Dutch-Japanese war in 1942� The series 
is joint in that it examines the activities 
of both the IJA and IJN� With that 
said, this volume focuses primarily, but 
not exclusively, on ground operations� 
The other two planned translations 
will focus on sea and air operations in 
and around modern-day Indonesia�
Remmelink’s translation work is 
impressive� This English-language 
volume is full and unabridged� The book 
includes seventy maps and probably 
as many photos� The quality of the 
maps is high, but that of the photos 
leaves a little to be desired; they seem 
to be scans of the photos printed in 
the Japanese originals� Extras include 
the Japanese order of battle, useful 
glossaries of military and naval terms, 
and indexes of personal and place- 
names in both English and Japanese�
The book starts off slowly, with the 
early chapters containing a collection 
of documents with a single sentence 
connecting one staff memo to the 
next; there is very little historical 
analysis or narrative� But if one pulls 
back a bit, these early chapters offer a 
fascinating look at a military staff at 
work planning real combat operations�
The Japanese enjoyed enormous and 
rapid success in the seizure of the Dutch 
East Indies� Why? The central argument 
of history is that the Japanese isolated 
the battlefield with air and naval assets� 
The IJA and IJN worked well together 
in joint operations� While the IJA had 
material shortages even in 1942, it 
overcame these problems with bold, in-
novative leadership� For example, the IJA 
conducted its first airborne operation 
during the invasion� The Japanese also 
had the support of the local population, 
which wanted to rid itself of the Dutch�
This history raises some interesting new 
questions� Many of the strengths the 
Japanese brought to the fight against 
the Dutch were the exact opposite of 
things they did in their war against the 
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Americans� What happened? Why was 
there such a fundamental change? Why 
were the Japanese unable to sustain 
these traits later in the war? Books 
that challenge the received wisdom are 
always fun, and this one only increases 
the interest in the next two translations�
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
India’s Wars: A Military History 1947–1971, by 
Arjun Subramaniam� Annapolis, MD: Naval In-
stitute Press, 2017� 576 pages� $40�
Air Vice-Marshal Arjun Subramaniam 
is not a man to shy away from chal-
lenges� In India’s Wars, he attempts to 
explain in one volume the creation, 
evolution, and employment of India’s 
armed forces during the first quarter 
century of its independence� He 
succeeds remarkably well, and this 
volume likely will be the best example 
of its genre for the foreseeable future�
India’s Wars is more than an impressive 
chronological discussion of battles 
fought and mostly won� Subramaniam 
also examines questions and issues of 
high strategy and national identity� For 
example, he examines how a country 
led by the heroically popular pacifist 
Jawaharlal Nehru could create a joint 
military consisting of former colonial 
regiments with long and storied 
traditions, elements of the Indian army 
that had fought alongside Japanese 
troops in World War II, and air and 
naval forces� This section of the book 
looks at India’s martial past during the 
precolonial and colonial periods�
The book then follows a chronological 
path, examining major military ac-
tions� Subramaniam looks hard at the 
first Indo-Pakistan War, of 1947–48� 
Responsibility for initiating the war is 
placed solely on Pakistan� Associated 
chapters feature detailed descriptions 
of India’s attempts to hold ground in 
Jammu and Kashmir� Useful maps 
accompany every battle description�
It is easy to forget, except in the well-
known example of Jammu and Kashmir, 
that the boundaries of modern India 
were not permanently established at par-
tition� The princely state of Hyderabad 
chose not to join greater India and opted 
to continue as an independent state� 
Similarly, Portugal did not relinquish 
its city colony of Goa on India’s west 
coast� When efforts at political solu-
tions increasingly appeared doomed to 
fail, the government decided to settle 
both situations via military means�
The 1962 India-China war is examined 
thoroughly with as much attention 
to this Indian defeat as is given to 
earlier victories� Subramaniam identifies 
political failures on the basis of unre-
alistic expectations regarding Chinese 
intentions and miscalculation of Chinese 
capabilities� Mistakes in operational dis-
positions and tactics are faced squarely�
Subramaniam’s best writing covers 
the 1965 war with Pakistan� He 
carefully explains Pakistan’s strategic 
and operational preparation for the 
conflict, including an alliance with 
the United States, modernization of 
the Pakistani armed forces with U�S� 
equipment, and substantial improve-
ment of such capabilities as close air 
support� Although Pakistan was unable 
to field as many divisions as India, 
Subramaniam makes a convincing 
case that the acquisition of Patton 
tanks, better artillery, and F-86 fighter-
bombers gave Pakistan a qualitative 
edge� Subramaniam also makes a point 
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of crediting Air Marshal Asghar Khan of 
the Pakistani air force as responsible for 
significant improvements in his service�
The role of paramilitary mujahideen 
is discussed in detail, Subramaniam 
arguing that these forces were largely in-
effective in sparking popular uprisings� 
He also looks at the opposing navies, 
and attributes lack of any real Indian 
naval campaigns to the unavailability of 
INS Vikrant, India’s sole aircraft carrier, 
during the period of hostilities�
Subramaniam provides clear descrip-
tions of combat actions, supported by 
adequate maps and occasional pocket 
biographies of key personalities� He 
candidly admits to failures of Indian in-
telligence, and notes that Pakistani forces 
experienced similar problems� Indian 
mistakes and losses are cataloged care-
fully, as are those of Pakistan� He draws 
extensively from personal interviews, 
unit war diaries, and secondary sources�
The book concludes with the liberation 
of Bangladesh� Although Pakistan is 
identified as responsible for widespread 
human rights abuses in what was then 
East Pakistan, Subramaniam recognizes 
that Indian leaders from Indira Gandhi 
on down recognized the greatly im-
proved strategic situation India would 
face if Pakistani forces were removed 
from a shared eastern border� The war’s 
depiction follows Subramaniam’s pattern 
of explanatory description, buttressed by 
maps� He examines the rapid collapse of 
Pakistani forces in Bangladesh and mili-
tary operations along the West Pakistan–
Indian border� Subramaniam provides 
a careful examination of the naval war 
and mentions the roles of militia forces, 
intelligence, and covert operations�
Regrettably, Subramaniam stopped 
his examination of India’s military at 
1971� His excellent ability to analyze 
and explain would have been welcome 
in looking at the role of the Indian 
military during the national emergency 
of 1975 to 1977� An examination of the 
impact of India’s nuclear capabilities on 
doctrine, strategy, tactics, and forces also 
would be a notable addition to this work�
Taken in its entirety, the picture India’s 
Wars paints of the evolving Indian mili-
tary is a flattering one� Modern military 
prowess rides comfortably on proud 
traditions and achievements of the past� 
If a reader detects a certain satisfaction 
on the part of the author, it is as well 
deserved as it is understandable�
RICHARD J� NORTON
Brothers at Arms: American Independence and the 
Men of France and Spain Who Saved It, by Larrie 
D� Ferreiro� New York: Random House, 2016� 464 
pages� $18�
In the past, Larrie Ferreiro has 
combined his expertise in military 
history with his extensive knowledge of 
naval architecture to produce unique 
interpretations of eighteenth-century 
events that shaped our world� Building 
on the impressive scholarship in works 
such as his Ships and Science and 
The Measure of the Earth, Brothers at 
Arms combines familiar accounts of 
French officers who served with the 
Continental Army with descriptions 
of the contributions of other French 
and of Spanish officials without whose 
assistance the newly created United 
States likely would not have survived�
The book begins with the interesting 
assertion that the courts of Europe, 
particularly the Bourbon monarchies 
of France and Spain, were the prin-
cipal audience for the Declaration of 
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Independence� It is this assertion that 
frames the balance of the work� The 
chapters then explore how different 
segments of French and Spanish 
society aided the American cause� 
Beginning logically, it describes the 
contributions of the merchants who 
provided the covert shipments of 
arms that sustained the Continental 
Army through the early years of the 
conflict� Ferreiro then moves through 
the ministers who directed events, the 
soldiers whose expertise leavened the 
new American army, and the sailors 
whose exploits secured the final victory�
The thread that runs through the entire 
book is the international dimension of 
the struggle for American independence� 
The various strands are tied together 
in the concluding chapters� In turn, 
Ferreiro explores the closing phases of 
the war in North America, the global 
struggle that eventually transcended the 
American war, and finally the interna-
tional legacy of the conflict� Ferreiro’s 
writing is crisp and his style accessible to 
the general reader, while the scholarship 
remains first-rate and valuable to the 
specialist� While the notes are presented 
in a style more typical of popular history, 
the combination of primary sources, 
archival material, and scholarly works 
cited is a testament to the depth of 
research supporting this volume�
The only minor weakness in the work 
is that it includes only three, small-scale 
maps, each covering an enormous 
theater� For a reader unfamiliar with 
the geography involved, larger-scale 
maps within the text might be more 
useful� This is, however, a minor issue 
in an otherwise masterful treatment�
It is the blending of the stories of 
familiar characters such as Lafayette 
and Rochambeau with the invaluable 
contributions of other French and 
of Spanish officers and officials that 
proves most effective, particularly with 
regard to the efforts of the lesser-known 
characters� While the contributions of 
the prominent and well-known French 
officers are not neglected in this volume, 
it is the supporting members of the cast 
of characters who shape the narrative� 
While a recently published biography of 
Bernardo de Gálvez also has mined this 
rich vein of historical material, Brothers 
at Arms serves a different purpose� 
Ferreiro makes a compelling case for the 
often-neglected contributions of Spain 
to the American cause, but does so in 
the context of the complex and inter-
related set of theaters� The operations of 
Gálvez against the British possessions 
in West Florida set the stage for French 
participation in the North American 
finale at Yorktown; a Spanish official in 
Havana provided the financial resources 
for the campaign as well� Ferreiro 
makes clear that each state acted out 
of self-interest rather than altruism�
Larrie Ferreiro has added depth and 
breadth to our understanding of the 
American War of Independence, 
particularly the global dimension of that 
struggle� He has placed the commonly 
understood struggle over control of 
the colonies within a broader interna-
tional context� Where other works have 
considered the strategies that European 
powers employed during this fight, he 
has challenged us to assess the interac-
tions among these various states and 
among the various theaters� In Brothers 
at Arms the war is presented as a global, 
integrated struggle� An informative 
book for the general reader, it also is 
a valuable and insightful volume for 
historians of the period� Ferreiro’s book 
points the way to a more nuanced 
understanding of the American war and 
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should inspire more inquiries into the 
international dimension of the conflict� It 
challenges us to think first of Vergennes 
and Floridablanca, who thought in terms 
of grand strategy, rather than of soldiers 
and sailors with whom we are familiar�
KEVIN J� DELAMER
Plutarch’s Politics: Between City and Empire, by 
Hugh Liebert� New York: Cambridge Univ� Press, 
2016� 264 pages� $104�
Although the price of this volume 
may discourage individual ownership, 
unfortunately, do not let it deter you 
from seeking it out� The author, a profes-
sor of political science at West Point, has 
produced a tour de force of scholarship 
and analysis of an underrated, if not 
neglected, classical writer� Plutarch, a 
Greek of the first century AD, who thus 
lived under the Roman Empire, was 
one of the most consequential ancient 
authors in his impact on later European 
culture; not least, he is the authority for 
the history forming the backdrop of 
Shakespeare’s Roman plays� His massive 
work Parallel Lives paired biographical 
accounts of one Greek and one Roman 
statesman or military commander from 
the period of the ascendancy of the 
independent state system of Greece and 
the Roman Republic� The focus there-
fore is on political-military leadership 
in the context of republican political 
orders� Representative pairings include 
Numa and Lycurgus, the founders of 
Rome and Sparta; Fabius and Pericles; 
Alcibiades and Coriolanus; Crassus and 
Nicias; and Demosthenes and Cicero�
Liebert’s overriding intention is to 
disprove a widely held view that 
Plutarch’s writing is superficial, merely a 
form of hero worship� The author shows 
convincingly that neither Plutarch’s 
choice nor his treatment of the men 
about whom he writes suggests a 
hagiographical purpose� Some of his 
statesmen are exemplars of severely 
flawed greatness� In all cases, he provides 
information supporting a negative as 
well as a positive interpretation of them� 
In an interesting and original discussion, 
Liebert suggests that the unusual format 
of the Lives is intended to set up an ago-
nistic confrontation between the paired 
Greeks and Romans, one whose funda-
mental purpose is to make his readers 
reflect deeply on human personality and 
leadership styles� (Apparently, Augustus, 
the founder of the Roman Empire, 
used to enjoy watching boxing matches 
between a Greek and a Roman—perhaps 
the source of Plutarch’s inspiration�)
The other central thrust of Liebert’s 
argument is that Plutarch deserves to 
be regarded not just as a chronicler 
of political and military deeds but as 
a political philosopher, one intent on 
exploring and preserving an under-
standing of the workings of the political 
order of the classical polis, or city-state, 
prior to the advent of universal Roman 
rule at the beginning of the millen-
nium� Plutarch was not in any sense 
a revolutionary� He was a prominent 
citizen in his hometown of Chaeronea 
in central Greece and well connected 
with the ruling Roman elites of the day� 
But he seems to have been concerned 
to nourish a recollection of the time of 
polis independence, as a way to encour-
age local patriotism and civic engage-
ment in the circumstances facing him�
Liebert’s book is far from a comprehen-
sive study; rather, it focuses primarily 
on two of the lives, those of Numa and 
Lycurgus� This allows the author to 
develop a richly detailed portrait of the 
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polities that are in many ways the most 
important and instructive of Graeco-
Roman antiquity, as revealed especially 
in their foundings� Sparta is the quintes-
sential Greek polis in its self-contained 
and parochial nature; Rome, by contrast, 
is the city destined to become an empire 
and put an end to the classical world�
CARNES LORD
World War II Infographics, by Jean Lopez, Nicolas 
Aubin, Vincent Bernard, and Nicolas Guillerat. 
New York: Thames & Hudson, 2019� 192 pages� 
$40�
The magnitude of World War II is 
difficult to comprehend fully� The scope, 
course, and details of the war are such 
that gaining a useful working knowledge 
of it can be challenging� The authors 
have assisted such endeavors greatly 
with the present volume� They come to 
the project with significant knowledge 
of the war and expertise in writing and 
editing military history� Additionally, 
Guillerat was trained as a data designer 
and graphic artist� The result is an 
informative, enjoyable, and aesthetically 
pleasing volume that is easy to use� The 
authors go far beyond simply present-
ing chronology, statistics, and lists�
Containing hundreds of easy-to-read 
and visually appealing color charts and 
graphics, the volume divides its subject 
matter into fifty-three areas, grouped 
in four sections: “The Context of the 
War,” “Arms and Armed Forces,” “Battles 
and Campaigns,” and “Aftermath and 
Consequences�” Among the areas 
of particular naval interest are the 
infographics labeled “Combat Fleets,” 
“A Carrier Battle Group in 1942,” “A 
Tidal Wave from Japan,” “The Battle of 
the Atlantic,” “The Battle for Midway,” 
“War in the Mediterranean,” and 
“Japan: The Final Days�” Economic, 
demographic, and military information 
is presented visually in a manner that 
moves beyond names and numbers and 
provides the reader with useful and 
memorable information� For example, 
of the 2�2 billion people alive in 1939 
when the war erupted, 130 million 
of them, from thirty nations, were 
mobilized for military service (p� 23)�
The volume’s inclusion of coverage of 
areas not always presented in others 
works, such as the Manhattan Project 
and the Holocaust, is extremely help-
ful� Also of interest are infographics 
on troop mobilization, armaments 
production, civilian displacements, 
military collaboration and resistance, 
and Operation BAGRATION� The 
work provides information on major 
battles but not a graphic portrayal of 
every battle, so some users may desire 
more details on specific battles and 
campaigns� This should not be viewed 
as a defect, however, since supplying the 
latter is not the purpose of the work�
The authors have managed to organize 
and portray visually, using state-of-the-
art graphic design, the scope and course 
of the war� The only thing lacking in 
the book is a CD of the work, which 
would allow the infographics to be 
used in the classroom or elsewhere� Its 
9½˝ × 11¾˝ size makes it very readable 
and functional as a research volume� 
The book does not have an index�
Each of the volume’s fifty-three areas of 
study is introduced with a well-written 
narrative overview of the section that 
is contextualized historically� What one 
finds in this volume that sometimes 
is lacking in other, similar works is 
references and sources for all the data 
presented� For historians and students, 
this is necessary and extremely helpful�
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The design layout and choice of 
information presented allow for the vo-
luminous facts and figures pertaining to 
World War II to be comprehensible not 
only to specialists but to students and 
general readers� It will withstand both 
the requirements of scholarship and the 
expectations and desires of general read-
ers� Such balance is difficult to obtain�
Although the volume is one of graphics 
and not pictures, the saying that “a 
picture is worth a thousand words” is 
certainly applicable and accurate in the 
instance of World War II Infographics. 
Coupled with a good historical atlas 
of the war, it should be a ready refer-
ence work for research and pleasure 
browsing by anyone with more than a 
nominal interest in World War II� There 
are several helpful infographic books 
on World War II on the market, but, 
from this reviewer’s perspective, this 
volume goes far beyond the others�
TIMOTHY J� DEMY
Messing with the Enemy: Surviving in a Social 
Media World of Hackers, Terrorists, Russians, and 
Fake News, by Clint Watts� New York: Harper-
Collins, 2018� 304 pages� $27�99�
Many books have been published on 
“cyber” in recent years, many of which 
leave the reader with the sense that 
cyber must be important, while never 
clearly communicating what cyber 
actually is or what a “cyber warrior” 
might do all day� Clint Watts’s Messing 
with the Enemy is distinctive in provid-
ing an accessible yet detailed account 
of what Watts and his colleagues did 
to detect, analyze, and disrupt online 
two very different adversaries: jihadist 
terrorist organizations and the Russian 
government� The book is not technical 
and does not hide behind buzzwords, 
nor does it imply that the subject is 
too classified or too specialized for the 
reader to understand� The social media 
world in which Watts works may depend 
on technology, but ultimately the story 
in Messing with the Enemy is of very hu-
man communication and manipulation� 
The book is an engaging read and, while 
it is not a scholarly study, its “operator” 
perspective fills a niche likely to interest 
the Naval War College Review audience�
Author Clint Watts is a West Point 
graduate who became a Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) counterterrorism 
field agent, returned to West Point as 
cofounder of its Combating Terror-
ism Center, went back to the FBI in 
counterintelligence, and today is an 
independent consultant� Watts’s writing 
is lively, conveying plenty of personality 
while still delivering serious substance� 
Watts comes across as someone who 
would be fascinating to share a drink 
with; would be maddening to supervise; 
and, on balance, is an asset to America�
With respect to terrorists, Watts and 
his teams mapped organizational and 
intellectual networks faster than the U�S� 
Intelligence Community did, using pub-
lic social media posts and open-source 
data ranging from weather reports to 
donkey prices� Watts directly “messed” 
with terrorist leaders, who—as if they 
were Bond villains—proved surprisingly 
willing to converse with a counterterror 
operative� Watts recounts goading 
jihadists into incautious revelations or, 
for one U�S�-born leader, into anger-
ing his al-Shabaab hosts by tweeting 
about preferring Applebee’s to Somali 
cuisine� Such “messing” is a staple of 
conducting counterintelligence or 
fighting organized crime, yet official U�S� 
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“countering violent extremism” efforts 
often consist of milquetoast declarations 
that violence and extremism are bad�
Watts could not mess so personally 
with the Kremlin, but he was among 
the earliest voices warning of Russian 
social-media-influence operations� 
The book details Russian support to 
pro-Assad trolls and hackers in 2011, 
then an exponential increase in Russian 
actions targeting the United States 
after the occupation of Crimea in 2014� 
Russia-linked sources promoted all 
manner of conspiracy theories, extremist 
ideologies, racial animosity, and negative 
news stories� Watts’s description of the 
2016 Russian efforts to help Trump 
specifically may be old news in the wake 
of the Mueller report, but the book 
places the 2016 election story within 
the proper context of a much larger 
Russian campaign predating Trump�
The book’s title promises survival tips 
for a new world of online adversaries� 
Watts has some logical policy sug-
gestions, but their implementation is 
unlikely politically, so one comes away 
pessimistic� For individuals, Watts 
encourages readers to think critically, 
read widely, and vet sources� Someone 
motivated enough to read the book 
might follow that advice, but effecting 
widespread social change will be very 
difficult� Ideas such as content “trust” 
ratings on social media sites quickly run 
into issues with the First Amendment, 
the power of tech companies, and the 
ability of seductive bad content to 
migrate to new platforms� Watts has 
justifiably harsh words for the federal 
government’s social media outreach and 
its cumbersome bureaucracy and con-
tracting rules� How one might scale up 
the expertise of street-smart iconoclasts 
such as Mr� Watts is unclear, however�
In fairness, Watts does not claim to have 
easy solutions (however confident he is 
of his own talents)� He recognizes that 
the fundamental problem is with us, not 
our adversaries� So long as American 
society is polarized, distrustful, and 
weak in critical thinking, enemies will 
have ample opportunity to mess with us�
DAVID T� BURBACH
Smoke ’Em If You Got ’Em: The Rise and Fall of 
the Military Cigarette Ration, by Joel R� Bius� 
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018� 328 
pages� $39�95�
As a child living on Army posts dur-
ing the Vietnam War, I noticed that 
most interior spaces had a distinctive, 
common odor� I later realized that what 
I thought of as “Army building smell” 
was actually the odiferous residue of 
thousands of smoked cigarettes, coupled 
with gallons of pine-scented cleaning 
products� The “soldier-cigarette bond” 
and the historical ubiquity of smoking 
within the U�S� military—particularly 
the Army—constitute the subject of Joel 
R� Bius’s Smoke ’Em If You Got ’Em: The 
Rise and Fall of the Military Cigarette 
Ration� His book charts the “rise and 
entrenchment of [the] soldier-cigarette 
bond from 1918 to 1945” before 
turning to its “demise and dislodge-
ment � � � from 1973 to 1986” (p� 2)�
Bius and the Naval Institute Press should 
be commended for producing this well-
written and -researched work of political 
and cultural history� Additional credit is 
due to Matt Simmons for an exception-
ally striking and clever cover design�
Smoke ’Em If You Got ’Em explains 
well the military’s role “in establish-
ing and entrenching” an American 
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“cigarette-smoking culture” (p� 3)� The 
Great War catalyzed cigarette consump-
tion and production within the United 
States� Prior to that war, factory-made 
cigarettes—a still-new product favored 
primarily by women—accounted 
for less than 10 percent of tobacco 
consumption� However, cigarettes 
proved to be an invaluable adaptogen, 
valued by soldiers for their ability to 
soothe nerves and mask the stench of 
trench warfare� Eventually recogniz-
ing these morale-enhancing effects, 
the U�S� Army began to include free 
cigarettes as part of a soldier’s daily 
ration in June 1918� Free government-
issued cigarettes would continue as an 
integral part of a soldier’s ration until 
1973� As a result, cigarette smoking 
became an American habit, reaching 
“staggering levels after WWI” (p� 59)�
This soldier-cigarette bond legitimized 
cigarette smoking as a marker of 
patriotic masculinity� Cigarettes quickly 
became so popular among all Americans 
that by the time of the Second World 
War smoking was “as much a part of 
American culture as baseball or apple 
pie” (p� 65)� While the Great War’s daily 
ration was four cigarettes, soldiers in 
the Second World War were “authorized 
anywhere from twelve to twenty-eight 
free cigarettes per day” (p� 73)� Ciga-
rettes had become such “an essential part 
of the WWII soldiers’ routine” (p� 64) 
that cigarette production and distribu-
tion constituted “a vital warfighting issue 
of strategic consequence” (p� 62)� Bius 
details the ensuing political wrangling 
over tobacco crop subsidies, home-front 
shortages, and hoarding that threatened 
this now strategically vital resource�
Cigarette smoking—widespread among 
civilians and the military alike during 
the Second World War—continued after 
the war� Bius describes how during this 
period the “cigarette had essentially 
become an appendage on men’s bodies” 
(p� 89)� In fact, in 1950, 80 percent of 
American men smoked, tobacco was 
the nation’s fourth-largest cash crop, 
and 3�5 percent of consumer spending 
on nondurable goods went toward 
the purchase of cigarettes (p� 88)�
Bius’s narrative then fast-forwards to 
1973 and the post-Vietnam establish-
ment of the all-volunteer force� That 
same year, Congress abolished free 
cigarette rations as a cost-cutting 
measure� Soldiers continued to smoke� 
Bius argues that it took growing health 
concerns about smoking, coupled with 
rising health-care costs associated with 
an all-volunteer military, eventually 
to sever the soldier-cigarette bond� A 
1986 Department of Defense report on 
smoking and health in the military and 
ensuing antitobacco initiatives sought to 
curtail smoking dramatically within the 
military� Bius claims that these efforts 
were so successful that by “1986 cigarette 
smoking among the military ranks � � � 
dwindled” to a rate no higher than that 
of the larger civilian population (p� 207)�
Smoke ’Em If You Got ’Em creates the 
impression that the soldier-cigarette 
bond remains severed; I’m not so sure� 
The antitobacco “Truth Initiative” (www 
�truthinitiative�org) reports that military 
personnel continue to smoke at rates 
notably higher than civilians� Moreover, 
while overall rates of cigarette smoking 
have declined within both populations, 
use of both smokeless tobacco and 
e-cigarettes has surged within the 
military� This is especially true among 
deployed soldiers and Marines� Even 
Bius recognizes the persistence of the 
soldier-cigarette bond—at least in 
wartime; in a footnote, he observes that 
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it has been his “personal experience” 
that “smoking rates among military of-
ficers and enlisted personnel deployed to 
combat zones such as Iraq or Afghani-
stan increase dramatically” (p� 273)�
While Smoke ’Em If You Got ’Em 
excels in telling the story of the rise of 
cigarettes within the U�S� military, it 
fizzles out in describing its purported 
fall� It is true that Uncle Sam no longer 
issues free cigarettes—the cigarette 
ration has fallen away� However, it would 
seem that the soldier-nicotine bond 
continues� Indeed, according to Bius 
himself, “when it comes to the soldier 
and the cigarette (or pipe, or cigarillo, or 
cigar)”—to which I would add chewing 
tobacco or vaped nicotine—“some 
things never change” (p� 273)�
BRAD CARTER
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program 
Manager for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Professional Reading 
Program (PRP).
From the robot vacuum cleaner that patrols my floors to the unmanned 
planes that my friends in the Air Force use to patrol the skies, human-
ity has started to engineer technologies that are fundamentally different 
from all before. Our creations are now acting in and upon the world 
without us.
P� W� SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR
 The formal mission statement underpinning the CNO PRP reads as follows: “The mission of the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program 
is to assist Sailors on their career-long path of personal development in the naval 
profession� Reading professionally relevant books will help Sailors develop as 
leaders of character who are strategically minded critical thinkers and skilled 
naval and joint warfighters, capable of meeting the operational and strategic 
challenges of the future�”
One way for sailors to prepare for the strategic challenges of the future is to 
read what the world’s foremost thinkers and futurists have written� New York 
Times best-selling author Dr� P� W� Singer is considered widely to be the premier 
scholar on all things futuristic, including drones, cyber warfare, and the weapon-
ization of social media� Several of his books appear in the CNO PRP, as well as 
on the professional reading lists of other military services� Of particular note are 
four of Singer’s books, which their publishers describe as follows:
• Ghost Fleet (with coauthor August Cole) is a page-turning imagining of a war 
set in the not-too-distant future� Navy captains battle through a modern-day 
Pearl Harbor, fighter pilots duel with stealthy drones, teenage hackers fight in 
digital playgrounds, Silicon Valley billionaires mobilize for cyber war, and a 
serial killer carries out her own vendetta� Ultimately, victory will depend on 
who best can blend the lessons of the past with the weapons of the future� But 
what makes the story even more notable is that every trend and technology 
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in the book—no matter how sci-fi it may seem—is real� Ghost Fleet has 
drawn praise as a new kind of techno-thriller while also becoming the new 
must-read for military leaders around the world�
• Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century 
explores the greatest revolution in military affairs since the atom bomb: the 
dawn of robotic warfare� We are on the cusp of a massive shift in military 
technology that threatens to make real the stuff of I, Robot and The Termi-
nator. Blending historical evidence with interviews with an amazing cast of 
characters, Singer shows how technology is changing not just how wars are 
fought but also the politics, economics, laws, and ethics that surround war 
itself� Traveling from the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan to modern-day 
“skunk works” in the midst of suburbia, Wired for War will tantalize a wide 
readership, from military buffs to policy wonks to gearheads� (This book is 
the primary text used in the Naval War College’s highly regarded elective 
course entitled “Unmanned Systems and Conflict in the 21st Century,” in 
which Singer is a frequent guest lecturer�)
• In LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, Singer and coauthor Emer-
son Brooking tackle the mind-bending questions that arise when war goes 
online and the online world goes to war� They explore how ISIS copies the 
Instagram tactics of Taylor Swift, a former World of Warcraft addict foils war 
crimes thousands of miles away, Internet trolls shape elections, and China 
uses a smartphone app to police the thoughts of 1�4 billion citizens� What 
can be kept secret in a world of networks? Does social media expose the 
truth or bury it? And what role do ordinary people now play in international 
conflicts? Delving into the web’s darkest corners, we meet the unexpected 
warriors of social media, such as a rapper-turned-jihadist PR czar and the 
Russian hipsters who wage unceasing info wars against the West� Finally, 
looking to the crucial years ahead, LikeWar outlines a radical new paradigm 
for understanding and defending against the unprecedented threats of our 
networked world�
• In Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know, Singer and 
noted cyber expert Allan Friedman team up to provide the kind of easy-to-
read yet deeply informative resource book that has been missing on a crucial 
issue of twenty-first-century life� Written in a lively, accessible style and 
filled with engaging stories and illustrative anecdotes, the book is structured 
around the key question areas of cyberspace and its security: how it all works, 
why it all matters, and what can we do? Along the way, they take readers on 
a tour of the important (and entertaining) issues and characters of cyberse-
curity, from the Anonymous hacker group and the Stuxnet computer virus 
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to the new cyber units of the Chinese and U�S� militaries� Cybersecurity and 
Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know is the definitive account on the 
subject for us all—and comes not a moment too soon�
Military professionals at all levels are being bombarded by constant technolog-
ical change and must master the complexities of their current environment while 
keeping a weather eye on scientific and engineering developments that could 
alter significantly the way in which we will fight in the future� As we frequently 
note at the Naval War College, the future is closer than you think!
JOHN E� JACKSON
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